# THE OTHER BATTLEFIELD

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# CONSTRUCTION AND REPRESENTATION OF THE PAKISTANI MILITARY 'SELF' IN THE FIELD OF MILITARY AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NARRATIVE PRODUCTION

Inauguraldissertation

an der Philosophisch-historischen Fakultät der Universität Bern

zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde

vorgelegt von

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Promotionsdatum: **20.10.2017**

eingereicht bei

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## Acknowledgments

The work on this thesis expanded over an extended period of time and I am grateful for the wealth of support and feedback. My initial thanks go to Prof. Reinhard Schulze for guiding me to the battlefield. In earlier stages, my peers at the Graduate Institute for Advanced Studies of the Humanities and Social Sciences provided constructive feedback and comments as well as companionship over coffee. I am especially thankful to Susanne Leuenberger, Maurice Cottier and Franziska Zaugg. Christina Oesterheld and participants of the Pakistan Workgroup at the University of Heidelberg provided valuable feedback on the research project and a draft of chapter three. Mohammad Ayub Kulla helped with my initial struggle to understand the subtleties of Urdu humorous writing. In Lahore, my quest for autobiographical texts of officers was supported by Ikram Chaghatai and Imran. Thank you David Loher and Florian Zemmin for the valuable feedback and the careful reading, I appreciate it. Nelly Thelwall, thank you for your support to iron out the creases in English that emerged from my carelessness.

Finally, I would like to express my great gratitude to Ronja, Sophie Lou and Maurice Reza who had to endure my fights with the other battle over the years.

## Contents

# 1 Introduction

In search of autobiographies and memoirs by Pakistani military officers I went to Lahore in April 2011. The paradise – or rather hell – for book shopping in Pakistan is located on Mall Road. On Sunday morning at the second-hand book market, booksellers pile up used books in all conditions on the pavement. The variety of books baking on the hot concrete is extraordinary: Urdu chapbooks, illustrated software of self-teaching guides, histories in hand-made leather binding, and French bestsellers from the late 1980s sit next to multivolume commentaries on the Quran. To find what you are looking for is a time-consuming and discouraging task – despite the help of the booksellers, interested in selling you anything that might have the slightest connection to what you are after. In three hours, I did not manage to find a single title on the list I brought with me. Out of frustration I ended up buying a biography of General Akhtar Abdur Rahman entitled *Silent Soldier – the Man Behind the Afghan Jehad*.

During the week the printed word can be found in bookshops on Mall Road near Regal Chowk, less chaotically arranged, and in an air-conditioned environment. My first stop was at Ferozsons, a publishing and bookselling institution in Pakistan, situated in the beautiful colonial Ghulam Rasul building. Browsing the shelves of Biography/Autobiography I found General Musharraf's *In the Line of Fire*, its Urdu translation *Sab se pehle Pākistān*,[1] and several autobiographical texts published by Oxford University Press that were on my list. On seeing my initial harvest of books, one of the employees pointed me to the history section, indicating that the officers also wrote autobiographical accounts centring on historical events. Indeed, the history section was interspersed with contributions of officers' first-hand accounts, particularly covering the subsection on the creation of Pakistan in 1947, and its two wars with India in 1965 and 1971.

With two bags full of books, I walked the short distance to Vanguard Bookshop. The two shop windows at 45 Mall Road were plastered with colourful dust jackets. To my great surprise, on the left-hand side of the entrance an A1-size blue poster of the book cover of *Cutting Edge PAF,* picturing an F-16 fighter jet, advertised the publication of Air Chief Marshal Anwar Shamim's autobiography by Vanguard publications. I expected to find autobiographical narratives in traditional bookshops, published by different publishers. But I was surprised that Vanguard publications, known to be a progressive publisher founded by Najam Sethi in 1978 had produced a book written by a former officer. Besides Anwar Shamim's reminiscences, a

[1] For the transliteration of Urdu into English, I follow the guidelines of Romanisation of the Library of Congress.

pyramid of books was piled up before the counter featuring another fighter jet that caught my attention. Sajad Haider's *Flight of the Falcon – Demolishing Myths of Indo-Pak Wars 1965 & 1971*, also published by Vanguard originally in 2010, was already available in its third edition.

The aim of this study, as the title suggests, is first to (re)construct how the Pakistani military officers represent themselves in their autobiographical texts, and second, to contribute to the understanding of Pakistani military officers as cultural and symbolic agents. On a broader scope I try to answer the question of what the practice of writing military autobiographical narratives says about the cultural and symbolic position of the Pakistani military officers. In other words, I try to evaluate what it means for Pakistan that officers' autobiographical narratives are not sweltering on the hot concrete of the Urdu bazaar but fill the history sections of what can be described as progressive book companies. On a narrower scope, I examine the social practice of writing autobiographical narratives by Pakistani officers: How do the military officers represent themselves in their texts? How do they understand their role in history? How do they see themselves? What categories belong to this 'self'? The research thus explores two dimensions that are mutually interrelated: the first pertains to the self-representation of the officers and the second to the sort of historiography or historical interpretation the officers put forward.

### 1.1 The other battlefield(s)

Since the 1960s, military officers from all branches and ranks have been publishing autobiographical texts – a tradition well established by officers of the colonial army. The list I brought to Lahore to shop for included over 60 authors and almost 100 titles published up to 2011. Some of the texts have become bestsellers and have been reprinted several times, while others were self-published and distributed through the local book market. The output of officers as cultural producers is both considerable and neglected in research literature. Despite the fact that some of the texts, such as Ayub Khan's *Friends not Masters* (1968) or General Niazi's *The Betrayal of East Pakistan* (1998), are an integral part of the source material for studies about the Pakistani military and its role in the history of Pakistan. Because of both the present and

historical role of the military in Pakistan, these texts play an important part in the historiography of Pakistan and its military.[2]

Since the creation of Pakistan, the military has been engaged in several battlefields, both in the literal and metaphorical sense. The military leadership has defined the fate of the state of Pakistan over extended periods of time and ruled it directly (1958-62, 1969-71, 1977-1985) and indirectly (1999-2008). The military in Pakistan does not restrict itself to the role defined in the constitution but plays a prominent role in politics and the national economy. After the creation of the Pakistani military from the British Indian Army, it has fought three major wars with its neighbour India and conducted countless internal operations against regional secessionists and religious extremists. Internationally, the Pakistani military is involved in UN missions and since the mid-1990s has contributed roughly 10,000 soldiers. Today, military interests largely define the foreign policy of the nuclear state of Pakistan, and companies that are managed by ex-servicemen dominate the national economy. Besides its political and economic role as an institution, the aspirations and interests of the officer corps continue to define important aspects of Pakistan's internal and external policy.

The military as an organised group occupies a special social place in a society marked by divisions and cleavages along confessional, ethnical and economical lines. It positions itself beyond confessional, ethnical or economical groups[3] and facilitates upward mobility for many Pakistanis. Civilian population contact to members of the armed forces secures privileges and prevents social decline. In addition, through numerous foundations the military maintains a net of social institutions such as hospitals and schools throughout Pakistan.[4] The military occupied and continues to occupy not only a social but also a symbolical role. It depicts itself as the national integrator of Pakistan and as a highly motivated and modern institution that defends not only the geographical but also the ideological borders of Pakistan (Fair, 2014).

Military officers occupy a high social status but seem to remain segregated from the wider public of Pakistan. Officers and their families live in gated communities; their everyday lives being played out in institutions that are separated from the general public and often restricted

[2] Autobiographies and memoirs are used to understand or illustrate the intentions of the great men that shaped Pakistan's history. Sometimes used in a rather naive positivistic way, the texts are used as sources to establish historical facts. (Books by officers are partisan narratives – that even progressive publishers print.)

[3] The military does not give information on the social aspects of recruitment. Rizvi estimates that 60 percent of the officer corps is recruited from the Punjab. (Rizvi 2000) Fair and Nawaz analysed it again in 2011 with statistically available material (but note that it is not reliable data).

[4] The Fauji Foundation alone operates over one hundred medical facilities and close to two hundred educational institutions. According to the foundation, it caters to over 9.6 million Pakistanis, about 7 percent of the population.

to members of the military (Lieven, 2011). One could argue that there is a separate military public with networks of clubs, schools, and foundations governed by specific social interactions, rituals, and symbols. This segregation hinders access and renders social and anthropological research difficult. Other social aspects of the military, such as the social disposition of newly-recruited officers or the study on ethnic composition remain difficult to analyse due to the lack of publicly available sources (Fair and Nawaz, 2011).

Despite numerous policy-oriented studies that have examined the military as an institution, civil-military relations, and security-related issues, particularly since the US American-led war on terror, the officers - as social and cultural agents - have rarely been studied.[5] Policy-driven research and theorisation of civil-military relations clearly outnumber the study of historical or social anthropological aspects of the military. This is due to the political interests of research institutions that need to analyse the security-related aspects, such as the army's relation to religious extremists or its policy regarding nuclear arms. Furthermore, ex-servicemen or researchers with family-links to the military have conducted historical analysis of the army. Many officers who wrote autobiographical narratives have also produced historical accounts.

### 1.2 Pakistani officers as social and symbolic agents

In this study I focus on social and cultural aspects of a subject that has predominantly been studied by political science, sociology and security studies. Pakistani military autobiographical narratives are thereby understood as products of a cultural practice by which the officers negotiate their 'self' and their role in history in a communicative process.[6] I argue that military officers through their practice of negotiation their historical roles engage as cultural producers – and as such they claim a part in the historiography of Pakistan.

Bourdieu has demonstrated how the analytical concept of field can be used to analyse cultural practices and how it is influencing and is influenced by social processes, most prominently in the field of cultural production (Bourdieu, 1984; 1993; 1996), but also in the juridical field (Bourdieu, 1987), the academic field (Bourdieu, 1988), and the cultural field in

[5] As I will show further below, such research is scarce and when touching upon the social and cultural roles of the military the research literature focuses on the military institution and the military's professional ethos.

[6] Christoph Schumann initiated my interest in autobiographical narratives and the Pakistan military. The understanding of autobiographical writing as a form of communication is influenced by his approach. See: Schumann (2001).

general (Bourdieu, 1977).[7] Bourdieu's relational approach connects the analysis of cultural products – in our case military autobiographical texts – with the analysis of social and symbolic (power) relations. Following Bourdieu's approach, the Pakistani military officers are understood as social agents that engage in different field, for example in the cultural field, the military field, or the economy. In each field, the officers position themselves in relations to other agents of the field and try to gain the profit at stack of the specific field. According to Bourdieu seemingly autonomous fields are situated in hierarchical power relations to other fields (Bourdieu, 1993; 1984; 1987). Bourdieu has demonstrated that agents in the cultural field – to which autobiographical texts also belong – act "disinterested" and produce "art for art's sake" (Bourdieu, 1993). Recognition inside the cultural field enables agents to occupy a dominant position in the field of power that is governed by the economy and politics. Writing officers as cultural producers struggle for recognition in the cultural field, and thus accumulate symbolic capital in the form of recognition. Several also engage as fiction writers or (military) historians, as I will demonstrate in chapter three.

Officers writing their autobiographical narratives do so as part of Pakistani society and as former (and in rare cases) as current members of the Pakistani military. In contrast to officers who produce texts inside the military institution and as part of the institution, the officers direct their text to the Pakistani public.

### 1.3 Military autobiographical writing as a social practice

In this study, I understand the writing of military autobiographical narratives to be a cultural practice by which the Pakistani officers represent their 'self' and their historical role to a Pakistani public. Two premises thus underlay this understanding: First, writing autobiographical narratives is a social practice, and second, this practice involves the representation of the 'self' to the reader. Related to the second premise, the practice of autobiographical writing thus further involves the identification of the 'self' and its situation/location in history.

As a social practice, writing a military autobiographical narrative is determined by social structures as well as being an expression of human agency. It claims freedom of invention but is structured by the social and cultural dispositions (education, rank, past military deployment,

[7] Here, I will neglect an extensive discussion of the evolution of the concept of field as well as the problems of the different definitions of field in Bourdieu's theory. Analogue to Bourdieu's other concepts, I understand the field as a tool that in the course of research proves its workability. Bourdieu and Chamberon (1991).

etc.) of the author and the rules of the field. When writing military autobiographical narratives, the officers follow established traditions and conventions. In the case of the military autobiographical narrative writing, these traditions include the British military text tradition and established Urdu text traditions such as *afsāna* (story), *safarnāmah* (travel log), and *ṭanz o mazaḥ* (wit and humour).

The practice of writing and publishing military autobiographical narratives brings the officers in relation to a public. Since Philip Lejeune's *On Autobiography (1989),* we understand autobiographies to be an institutionalised communicative act between the reader and the author, which includes some form of representation of a 'self'. Lejeune (1989) speaks of the 'autobiographical pact', "the affirmation in the text of this identity, referring back in the final analysis to the name of the author on the cover" (p. 14), through which reader and the author agree that the narrator, the narrated subject and the author of an autobiographical text share an identity. In this communicative act, several dimensions of this 'identity' or in our case of the 'self' are thus distinguishable: the author, the narrator and the subject of the story.

The ***author*** can be defined as the "intellectual creator of a text written for communicative purposes" (Schönert, 2014, p. 1) who is located in a particular time and space (Smith and Watson, 2001, p. 59). Chantal Mouffe (1992) notes that the author is not accessible in the narrative – or at least his intentions, according to Roland Barth – but can be understood as "the articulation of an ensemble of subject positions, corresponding to the multiplicity of social relations in which [he] is inscribed" (p. 376). The ***narrator*** is defined as the "inner-textual (textually encoded) highest-level speech position from which the current narrative discourse as a whole originates and from which references to the entities, actions and events that this discourse is about are being made" (Margolin, 2014, p. 646). In autobiographical texts the *narrator 'I'* is a textual category and is the persona of the 'real' person who tells a story about himself. Sometimes he wants to tell this story and other times he is coerced into telling it (Smith and Watson, 2001, p. 59). In military officers' autobiographical works, many narrators stress that they were encouraged to write their life story or version of history by other military officers, by their wives or out of a sense of duty. The ***subject of the story*** the narrator elaborates on in the text is the *narrated 'I'*, which François Lionnet (1991) defined as "the object 'I', the protagonist of the narrative, the version of the self that the narrating 'I' chooses to constitute through recollection for the reader" (p. 193).

While Lejeune (1989) distinguishes between these three different aspects of the 'I' in autobiographical narratives, Smith and Watson (2001), in reference to Paul Smith, distinguish a fourth notion they term as the ***ideological 'I'*** (p. 61). According to Paul Smith (1988) the

ideological 'I' is defined as the "the concept of personhood culturally available to the narrator when he tells his story" (p. 105). After Smith and Watson (2001) the ideological 'I' can also be understood as the "possible positions for autobiographical narrators to occupy, contest, revise, and mobilise against one another at specific historical moments" (p. 63). The underlying assumption of an *ideological 'I'* as Helga Schwalm (2014) explains, is "that only through an engagement with such socially/culturally prefigured models, their re-inscription, can individuals represent themselves as subjects" (2014, p. 16). The representation of the 'self' in autobiographical narratives thus has two dimensions: It both incorporates the different forms of 'I' at play in autobiographical narratives and draws on culturally available prefigured models. It refers at the same time to textual (narrator, narrated) and cultural categories.

### 1.4 The Pakistani military 'self'

The above clarifications regarding the practice of writing autobiographical narratives are not geared towards theory-building autobiographical narratives. However, they are necessary to understand my analytical concept of the Pakistani military 'self' and make it operational for the study of the Pakistani military officers' autobiographical texts.

In this study, I use 'self' is as an analytical concept. As such, my use of 'self' differs from the three most common understandings of the concept of 'self'. First, my use of 'self' as an analytical concept differs from the psychoanalytical concept of 'self' as introduced by Sigmund Freud. Second, the 'self' is not understood as an "objectively" or "subjectively" understood sameness "among members of a group or category" (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000, p. 7). In other words, it does not correspond to what would be described as the Pakistan military officer corps' 'identity'. Third, my use of 'self' has to be distinguished from the notion of "selfhood" as a "fundamental condition of social being […] understood as something to be valued, cultivated, supported, recognized, and preserved" (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000, p. 7). Rather, the concept of 'self' in this study is used to refer to the sum of the representational practices that include 1) relational and categorical identification, 2) the historical narration i.e. the self-location of the narrator and protagonist in history, and 3) the occupation of a subject position.

1) In their autobiographical narratives, officers position themselves in relation to others and ascribe themselves categories. This is realised predominantly by the narrator, but also by the protagonist of the story, both function as the "identifier" (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000, p. 16). Brubaker and Cooper (2000) distinguish between a relational mode of identification, where the identifier places himself or others in a "web of friendships or kinship" (Brubaker and Cooper,

2000, p. 15) and a categorical mode of identification, where the identifier locates himself or others in a group, which shares a common category. In the military autobiographical narratives of Pakistani officers, the identification is accompanied by attribution and negotiation of categories and relations and involves different strategies.

2) In autobiographical narratives, officers locate themselves in historical events through historical narration. Here narration is understood as the "means of lending coherence to the historiographic text or artefact (and to the narrated history) and interpreting a historical event" (Fulda, 2014, p. 227). This location involves the integration of the life-story into an overarching history and the organisation of historical material by "naming adversaries, establishing or imputing intentions and identifying obstacles and factors in overcoming them" (Fulda, 2014, p. 227). The narrator of the autobiographical narrative refers to historical events and lending them coherence.

3) Finally, the officers occupy a subject position in regard to the narrated historical events. The subject position corresponds to the culturally available role model the authors/agents occupy and negotiate in relation to the narrated historical events. This subject position emerges from the narrators' presentation of the protagonist's role and his employment of narrative strategies. Narrative strategies are thereby understood as the "use of certain narrative techniques and practices to achieve a certain goal. The approach adopted and the intended goal, which presuppose certain competences (creative, referential, and receptive), characterise the author" (Tjupa, 2014, p. 565).

### 1.5 Research design

The research design chosen for this study integrates textual analysis with the assistance of a qualitative computer-aided data analysis software (CAQDAS) tool ATLAS.ti (Friese, 2012). Through broad scoping I was able to retrieve 98 possible autobiographical texts published between 1968 and 2012. The scoping followed the snowball principle both in catalogues of online booksellers and libraries in Pakistan as well as secondary literature (especially Sarvar, 2013). The scoping revealed that particularly the civil war in East Pakistan had an impact on the publication of autobiographical texts. It also indicated that the publications differed according to rank of the author, primary language of publication as well as publisher and print run. The composition of and distribution of the available military autobiographical narratives will form part of the analysis in chapter three.

The sources have been selected according to two criteria: self-reference as a (former) member of the Pakistani military and publication. Because I analyse the representation of the Pakistani military 'self', the authors have to have a military socialisation and the texts have to be framed as originating from a Pakistani military officer.[8] It is common practice by the authors of military texts to indicate the military rank – it is also frequent to add the status of being retired (retd.) or (r). Because I look at the officer corps as cultural producers and their 'self' representation as a communicative practice, the text has to be published and available in Pakistan. The mechanisms that could restrict the publication of the texts were factored in: It is the practice of some authors who criticise the senior military leadership to publish their autobiographical narratives first outside Pakistan, at some point these texts will then be imported or reprinted in Pakistan. Availability in Pakistan is not connected to purchase. Texts no longer published but still available in public libraries are also included in this study – in this case the officers communicate through the archives. In compiling the sources, I consulted online bookshops and the catalogues of the library at the National Defence University and the National Library in Islamabad. During a visit to Lahore, I was able to locate several of the texts in the Punjab Public Library and the Library of the Government College of Lahore.

For the textual analysis 35 texts were selected and placed in a hermeneutical unit (Friese, 2012).[9] The selection reflects the composition of the corpus of published texts and includes texts both in English and Urdu and from all three branches of service. As military autobiographical writing it is not a clearly defined genre of literature – the autobiographical genre itself is "notoriously difficult to define" (Schwalm, 2014, p. 14), genre was not a criterion for selection. The genre of texts soldiers or men at war write has been analysed most prominently by Samuel Hynes in *The Soldiers' Tale* (1998), Alex Vernon *Arms and the Self* (2005) and Harari (2007) but defy a definition of genre (Lawson-Peebles, 2005). To denote the broader sense of 'life-writing' the officers engage in, I will use the term 'military autobiographical narrative'. Texts included in the corpus were labelled as memoirs, autobiographies, recollections, stories, *rudād*, *sar-guzasht*, personal records, reminiscences, *dastān-i ḥaiyāt* or *āp-bītī.*

[8] I am aware that some of the texts may not have been written entirely by the authors themselves. Several of the texts from high ranking officers could have been or have been written by ghost-writers, for example Musharraf (2006) or Ayub Khan (1967). However, the views expressed in the autobiographical narratives are perceived as being those of the author.

[9] The texts were not available for digital coding, as Optical Character Recognition software for Urdu does not exist and the results of OCR for the English publications did not permit a statistical analysis. The coding was restricted to pictorial snippets of the text.

For the analysis, the texts were grouped according to decade of publication, rank of the author, initial language of publication, and type of publishing company.[10] Three aspects of reference in the texts were coded that pertain to 1) the relation and positioning of the text in a cultural field, 2) the historical self-role and interpretation of historical events, and 3) relational and categorical self-identification. The codes assigned to the quotes were generated inductively form the text. Codes and quotes were clustered and brought into relation to each other (Friese, 2012).

1) Reference that relates to the positioning of the text in a cultural field pertained to framing of texts by the authors themselves, as well as publishers, and those who write an introduction or a foreword. To address the heteronomy and autonomy of the field, reference to the motivation for writing an account, the officers' relation to other officers, as well as the direct and indirect bibliographic reference was coded.

2) For the reference to historical events and the self-role of the officers, a first open coding method was used to determine which historical events were most frequently addressed. Reference to the historical events surrounding the partition of the subcontinent in 1947 and the civil and international war in East Pakistan in 1970/1 was strongest. Reference to the authors' own role (the actions and observations the narrator attributes to the protagonist (historical 'I'), the subject position of the narrator (narrative strategies employed, contexts addressed, positioning inside an overarching life narrative) and interpretation of the historical events (context associated with reference, metaphors used) were coded in the second round.

3) Reference to identification of the military 'self' overlaps with the coding of 1) and 2). In addition, quotes relating to the categorisation of 'self' and others as well as the attributes of the categories were coded. A first round of coding revealed that the categories most frequently addressed were Soldier, Muslim, and Pakistani.

[10] In the case of Pakistan, it is more accurate to speak of book publishing companies than publishers (Haider, 1996). For Pakistan I distinguish between four types of book publishing companies see 3.2.3.

## Table: coded sources

| Rank | Author | Title | Year | Language | Trans. | Service |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lt. Col. | ʿAbd al-Qādir | *Be-tegḫ Sipāhī – jang 71 aur qaid kī rudād* | 2011 | U | N | Army |
| Maj. | Aḥmad Āftāb Caudhrī | Aṭak qil'e se | 1990 | U | Y | Army |
| Lt. Gen. | Attiqur Rahman | *Back to the Pavilion* | 1989 | E | N | Army |
| FM | Ayub Khan | *Friends not Masters* | 1967 | E | Y | Army |
| Lt. Gen. | Chishti | *Betrayals of Another Kind* | 1989 | E | Y | Army |
| Air Commodore | Haider | *Flight of the Falcon* | 2010 | E | Y | Airforce |
| Brig. | Mirza | *The Battle Within* | 2003 | E | N | Army |
| Lt. Col. | Kayānī | *Matā'-i qafas* | 1980 | U | N | Army |
| Col. | Ḵẖān | *Shamshīr se zanjīr tak* | n. d. | U | N | Army |
| Col. | Ḵẖān | *Bajang āmad* | 1968 | U | N | Army |
| Lt. Gen. | Khan | *Memoirs of Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan Khan* | 1993 | E | Y | Army |
| Maj. Gen. | Khan | *Raiders in Kashmir* | 1970 | E | N | Army |
| Maj. Gen. | Latif | *...Plus Bhutto's Episode* | 1993 | E | N | Army |
| Maj. Gen. | Malik | *The Story of My Struggle* | 1991 | E | Y | Army |
| Maj. Gen. | Mitha | *Unlikely Beginnings* | 2003 | E | Y | Army |
| Gen. | Musa | *Jawan to General* | 1980 | E | Y | Army |
| Gen. | Musharraf | *In the Line of Fire* | 2006 | E | Y | Army |
| Lt. Gen. | Niazi | *The Betrayal of East Pakistan* | 1998 | E | Y | Army |
| Maj. Gen. | Pataudi | *Al-Qissas* | 1978 | E | N | Army |
| Brig. | Qasim | *Life-story of an ex-Soldier* | 2003 | E | N | Army |
| Maj. Gen. | Qureshi | *The 1971 Indo-Pak War* | 2002 | E | N | Army |
| Gr. Capt. | Rabbani | *I Was the Quaid's ADC* | 1996 | E | N | Airforce |
| Col. | Shafaat | *The Soldier* | 2007 | E | Y | Army |
| Maj. Gen. | Shahid Hamid | *Disastrous Twilight* | 1986 | E | Y | Army |
| Maj. Gen. | Shahid Hamid | *Autobiography of a General* | 1988 | E | Y | Army |
| Air Chief Marshal | Shamim | *Cutting Edge PAF* | 2010 | E | N | Airforce |
| Admiral | Shariff | *Admirals Diary* | 2010 | E | N | Navy |
| Brig. | Siddiqi | *East Pakistan – The Endgame* | 2004 | E | Y | Army |
| Brig. | Sālik | *Salyūṭ* | 1989 | U | N | Army |
| Brig. | Salik | *Witness to Surrender* | 1977 | E | Y | Army |
| Admiral | Sirohey | *Truth Never Retires* | 1995 | E | N | Navy |

### 1.6 The order of battle – chapter structure

In ***chapter two*** I sketch out the main social and cultural developments affecting the military officers identified by secondary literature. The other battlefield sustains itself from the internal and external developments and conflicts the armed forces of Pakistan faced in the past six decades. Several historical events such as the wars of 1948, 1965, and 1971 as well as gradual developments, such as the change in the national economy or the rapid urbanisation had an impact both on the social composition of the officer corps and on cultural aspects of the armed forces.

Chapter two serves two purposes. First it addresses how secondary literature approaches and understands the military and its officers, and second, it provides a literary overview of the social and cultural dimension of the Pakistani armed forces and its officers, and thus the context for the subsequent analysis.

Secondary literature informs us about the professional outlook of the armed men or the military institution. The terms used to describe this are 'military mind' or 'military culture' and refer to civil-military relations, the strategic outlook towards India, or geostrategic concerns in general. Secondary literature focusing on the officers as a social group highlights the composition of the group by identifying generations of officers and changing recruitment patterns. Another interpretation is the conception of the military officers as a social elite with different political and economic aspirations. However, the officers are rarely addressed as cultural producers. Some studies have highlighted the contribution of the officers to Urdu prose and poetry. In general, the Pakistani military officers are described as agents of a total institution, and as a distinct and segregated professional and social group of Pakistani society.

The underlying assumption of this study considers autobiographical narrative writing to be a cultural practice that can be attributed to different fields. In ***chapter three*** I set out to describe the field of military autobiographical narrative production, its evolution and relation to other fields. I argue that the representation of the military 'self' is played out in a field governed by the principle of historical truth claim. The representation is thus fundamentally connected to historiography. Therefore, the representation of the 'self' demands a positioning inside an ever-expanding net of historical representations.

In the first part of the chapter (3.1), I demonstrate how I use Bourdieu's field theory to analyse the practice of writing military autobiographical narratives, before setting out to describe the underlying principle, the positions inside the field and their relations in the second part (3.2). In (3.3) I demonstrate that while the field of military autobiographical narrative production is only accessible for officers with a military socialisation, the field of cultural

production is not. By writing autobiographical narratives the officers position themselves also in the field *historiography* and its subfield *military historiography*. Moreover, in addition to writing factual texts some are valued as contributors to Urdu literature. The practice of writing autobiographical narratives for a wider non-military Pakistani public locates the writing officers outside a narrower military field. The officers thus play a role as cultural producers who are preoccupied with the historiography of Pakistan.

In the fourth part of chapter three (3.4), I trace the evolution of the field of military autobiographical narrative production. From Partition[11] until the 1960s, officers published narratives belonging to established Urdu genres such as *ṭanz o mazaḥ* (wit and humour), *afsāna* (story) and *safarnāmah* (travel literature) with a strong intertextuality on the one hand and scattered English narratives by high ranking officers on the other. Both English and Urdu texts are military autobiographical narratives but unrelated in form or reference to each other. I locate the constitutive moment of the field of military autobiographical narrative production in the late 1960s when the conflict over the integrity of Pakistan in regard to Kashmir spilled over into the practice of writing autobiographical narratives. From the late 1960s onwards, the texts referred to each other or their authors directly or indirectly. For the 1970s and 80s different positions occupied by high-ranking officers can be distinguished. The historical distribution of the publication of autobiographical narratives reaches a high point in the 1990s. In the 1990s lower ranking officers accessed the field of military autobiographical narrative production to settle scores with their peers and accuse military and political leaders. Most of these officers were prisoners of war in India after the Tragedy[12] of 1971 and took to the pen after their return to Pakistan. According to the main narrative strategy they employed, they can be characterised as accuser narratives. The Tragedy of 1971 also gave rise to the genre of prisoner of war narratives that sometimes overlapped with the position of accuser narratives but constitute a subgenre that focuses on the inner turmoil of the imprisoned officers. The 1990s also saw a gradual increase in the use of Urdu as the language of publication and with it the translations of English texts into Urdu – but also from Urdu into English. Partially due to changes in the publishing industry from the 1990s some texts were printed in higher print runs and the possibility of self-

[11] For the partition events of British India, I use the term Partition with a capital P, as practised in both India and Pakistan. Partition refers both to the achievement of two independent states after an anti-colonial struggle, as well as the partition of the Bengal and Punjab provinces which were accompanied by communal violence and mass migration. Pakistanis sometimes prefer the term 'independence' – meaning both independence from the British as well as the Indians – and thus avoiding the connotation of Pakistan being the cleavage product of India and to the 'loss' of national unity as perceived by Hindu Rightists. See Talbot, I. and G. (2009, p. 10).

[12] In the following, I will use Tragedy with a capital T as a term for the reference to the political and military developments that are connected to the secession of East Pakistan or the breakup of Pakistan. See chapter five.

publication emerged. These three developments had an effect on the consumption of military autobiographical narratives in Pakistan and influenced the process of constructing and representing the Pakistani military 'self'.

In the last section of chapter three (3.5), I propose five heuristic types of autobiographical narratives that correspond to positions inside the field of military autobiographical narratives that evolved over time: *political narratives* by high ranking officers, narratives concerned with *military historiography*, *accuser*-type narratives, *prisoner of war narratives* and entertaining *humorous narratives.* These positions correspond to subgenres of military autobiographical narratives in Pakistan (and probably Indian) and serve for the analysis of the subject positioning of the agents during Partition and the Tragedy in chapters four and five.

The patterns of reference to historical events suggest that the two most significant events in military autobiographical narratives are the Partition of the subcontinent in 1947 and the secession of Bangladesh in 1971, commonly referred to as the Tragedy. Both events are used to negotiate the officers' role in history and the identification and categorisation of 'self' and other. In ***chapters four and five*** I analyse the self-representation of the officers in regard to 1947 and 1971. The analysis encompasses three aspects of the representation: narration, interpretation and subject position. At the level of narration, I examine the space the authors devote to the events and which prominent narrative features and modes of narration they employ. Then I look at how the events were interpreted, in other words, in what context the events are presented, and which topics are negotiated with the events. Out of the self-ascribed historical role, the rhetorical strategies, self-styling, narrative features and interpretations presented, I finally construct the officers' subject positions. The subject position being the culturally available role model the agents occupy and negotiate in relation to the narrated historical events.

In ***chapter four*** I first address the representation of the officers in regard to Partition and the historiography of Partition in general. Secondary literature highlights the lack of a "master narrative" (Gilmartin, 1998) and changes in the main categories of identification (Pandey, 2001; Khan, 2007; Shaikh, 2009). Throughout the chapter, I argue that the subject position occupied by the officers are not reducible to their professional military duty, as presented in officially commissioned histories of and about the Pakistani military. The officers engage with different culturally available role models and occupy different subject positions, such as sufferer, muhajir, Muslim, professional soldier or patriotic Pakistani.

In the 1970s, the subject positions can be divided according to the degree of awareness of 'high politics'[13] voiced in the narrative: on the one hand the subject position of aware subjects in a period of personal and historic significance, and on the other, the position as unaware military professionals in a period of mere 'constitutional change'. A feature of the first is a strong identification with the category Muslim and debates about the ideology[14] of Pakistan or historiography. With the diversification of the field in the 1990s different positions emerged. The narration of Partition expanded, and the narration shifted from focusing on high politics in the 1970s and 80s to incorporating personal experiences of Partition and communal violence in the 1990s. Furthermore, Partition was integrated in narratives of coming of age and agents occupied new subject positions: first a position as military professional that stands above religion and race, and second, a position that is linked to strong communal feelings and identifies with the struggle for an independent Muslim homeland. The later articulates a difference to the British and Hindus/Indians. Fighting for Partition and suffering as a Muslim through Partition events echo the official military histories published in the 1960s and late 1970s.

The representation of 1947 and the subject positions the officers occupy draw on distinctions between generations of officers, degrees of activity in and proximity to events, as well as religious denomination and nationality. Over time the officers were compelled to position themselves in relation to these distinctions: in the 1960s and 1970s in relation to British and Indian officers as well as to Hindu/Sikh; in the 1990s in relation to generation of officers and their ideological outlook (represented as Islamic vs. secular).

In ***chapter five*** I analyse the officers' representation in relation to the Tragedy. Secondary literature has highlighted the 'troubled' nature of the historiography of the Tragedy and diagnosed a lack of attention (Khan, 2007) or a 'narrative vacuum' (Cilano, 2011). The officers' representation of the Tragedy shows great variety. It is presented as a step in the military career, or used to accuse senior officers, rehabilitate one's own historical role, recapitulate and correct the historiography of the Tragedy, and argue about the failed national integration and the ideology of Pakistan. Writing about the Tragedy gave rise to different representations of the military 'self' and is connected to negotiating and identifying with the categories Soldier, Muslim, and Pakistani.

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[13] High politics focuses on the constitutional changes and stands in contrast to history from below that focuses on the effects the constitutional changes had on the population. See (Talbot and Singh, 2009) and section 4.1.

[14] Officers refer in their texts to a rarely defined national or Islamic ideology of Pakistan. Ideology is thereby used synonymously with concept or outlook of the state.

In the 1970s and 1980s the subject position of a suffering prisoner of war and a witness of a political failure was introduced. Officers positioning themselves as prisoners of war contrast themselves with the military and political leadership. References to personal piety and suffering are important ingredients in this. Prisoner of war narratives break with the traditional form of self-representations of the personal engagement in the military as a success story, by focusing on betrayal. In addition to the subject position of prisoner of war, some officers occupy the subject position of witnesses of what they see as a political failure.

In the 1990s the representation shifted from witnessing the high politics of the Tragedy or the personal suffering as a consequence of being a prisoner of war, to arguing predominantly on a military and tactical level. This coincides with personal vendettas against peers and senior officers, or a quest to uncover betrayal and rehabilitate of one's own role. Several agents occupied the subject position of accuser, characterised by the primary rhetorical strategy employed. Accusers position themselves mostly in regard to senior officers and depict themselves as active and aware soldiers engaged in military duties – in contrast to earlier generations of officers they present their military assignments of defending East Pakistan as practicable. Some of the accusers' narratives target a readership curious about the military.

The trend to more balanced or nuanced accounts that reflect both on personal experiences and other representations diagnosed for the representation of Partition is also noticeable in officers' narratives of the Tragedy from the 1990s onwards. Some officers even acknowledge personal shortcomings in regard to the Tragedy. With the expansion of the reference to the officers' personal involvement in the Tragedy, the officers position themselves as close observers of the performance of fellow and senior officers. This proximity authorises the officers to evaluate both the military performance as well as the existing historiography regarding the Tragedy. With the contextualisation of the Tragedy through reference to other texts the representation of the Tragedy is accompanied by elaborate arguments concerning the military historiography of the conflict. Some officers establish a historical trajectory and present the Tragedy as an element in a chain of historical misrepresentations.

The representation becomes an exercise in position taking in regard to other officers and writers. The officers' negotiation of the Tragedy triggered different and competing representations that cannot be integrated into a single cohesive narrative.

Drawing on the categories and subject positions occupied and negotiated in regard to Partition and the Tragedy, as well as the reference to the most important categories and their attributes in the coded sources, I analyse the practice of identification and categorisation in ***chapter six***. I argue that the identification and negotiation of the categories Soldier, Pakistani

and Muslim are fundamentally situational, and as such have to be understood in relation to the overarching narrative and to the position occupied inside the field. As "categories of practice" (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000) the attribution varies considerably, and several competing definitions of a category are voiced simultaneously inside the field.

I demonstrate that, in contrast to Muslim and Pakistani, the category Soldier shows less variation regarding its attributes. The category Soldier is generally defined as being in opposition to politicians and frequently negotiated in relation with military performance. Identification with Soldier is articulated over a (sometimes Islamic) genealogy and through a position that identifies with Soldier over a sense of duty. The categories Pakistani and Muslim are negotiated in tandem. There are both identifications with a local religious community (*millat*) as well as identification with a universal religious community (*ummah*). Since the late 1990s, identification with the category Muslim voices a rejection of sectarian or extremist interpretations of Islam. In relation to a British-educated generation of officers, the categories Pakistani and Muslim also carry a 'cultural' notion that encompasses the use of language, preferences in food, religious orthopraxis and cultural adaption.

## 2 The study of the Pakistani military officer corps

The aim of this chapter is to provide a literary overview of the social and cultural developments of the Pakistani armed forces and its officers, and as such the context for the subsequent analysis of the self-representation of the officers inside their autobiographical narratives. In the first part of the chapter, I look at how the Pakistani military and its officers have been studied. The general observation is that research on the civil-military relationship dominates, followed by historical studies that examine the evolution of the military and its political development. In general, the military is studied as an institution that fundamentally shapes the outlook of its members. In the second part of the chapter, I briefly sketch out a historical narrative of social and cultural aspects of the military as highlighted in secondary literature. The aspects referred to in secondary literature pertain to generational changes inside the armed forces, the social composition of its members, the institutional outlook of the military institution, and the officers as part of the Pakistani society. All four aspects provide context for the analysis of the representation of the Pakistani military's 'self'. In the last part of the chapter I turn to Cohen (1998; 2004; 2013) and his characterisation of military generations.

Because of its role in history and politics the Pakistani military is subject to a wide range of scientific and non-scientific literature. Four main factors cultivate the production of literature about the Pakistani military: first the claim of Pakistani civil society, second the claim of Pakistani and international military officers themselves, third the strategic interest of the United States in Pakistan and last the perceived threat by India. The literature of the first group is championed by Tariq Ali, author of *Military Rule or People's Power* (1970); *Can Pakistan Survive?: The Death of a State* (1983); *The Duel: Pakistan on the Flight Path of American Power* (2008). The second group, mostly ex-servicemen or authors who are close to the military as an institution, produce descriptive literature about the history of the Pakistani military. Among this group, the works of Brian Cloughley *A History of the Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections* (1999) and *War, Coups and Terror: Pakistan's Army in Years of Turmoil* (2008) or the seminal work of Nawaz *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its Army and the Wars Within* (2008) are mostly referred to in research literature. The nuclear arsenal of Pakistan and the military's history of working with religious extremists to archive strategic goals are the subject of policy related studies that are produced by international think tanks. In these studies, the authors either promote the stabilising role the military plays in Pakistan – in the form of modernisation, cohesion, and the fight against terror – or highlight its fragile and untrustworthy position. The last group comprises works by Indian authors, for example Jain: *Pakistan Military Elite* (1971)

or Singh: *Military Governance in Pakistan* (2007).

The understanding of the Pakistani military and its officers is driven by studies from political science, military history, and security studies. These studies focus on the civil-military relations and the historical role of the military. While it is difficult to draw a strict distinction between both types of work, Cloughley (1999; 2008), Nawaz (2008), Gaylor (1992) and Cheema (2002) primarily focus on the military itself and analyse the Pakistan Army as an institution, while Abbas (2005), Ahmad, (2004), Ayub (2005), Newman, Pankalla and Krumbein-Neumann (1986), Moore, (1979), Aziz (2007) and Rizvi (2000; 1974) focus on the relations between the state and the military. Other studies describe the officers as part of the national and the economic elite (Qadeer, 2006; Hussain, 1979; Lieven, 2011; Siddiqa, 2007). Several studies focus specifically on the historical period of the military and its relation to Pakistan. Ziring (1971) as well as Feldmann (1967; 1972) examined the role of the armed forces during the reign of the first military administrator F.M. Ayub Khan (1958-62). Choudhury (1988), Burki, Baxer, LaPorte and Kamal (1991), Waseem (1987) and Wirsing (1991) examined the role and rule of the military during the reign of Gen. Zia ul-Haq.

Four studies have touched considerably on the military's social and cultural role: *The Pakistan Army* (1998) by Stephen P. Cohen, Aysha Siddiqa's *Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy* (2007), Christina Fair's *Fighting to the End* (2014) and Aqil Shah's *The Army and Democracy* (2014). These studies integrate the study of the army with the study of its relation to the state, Pakistani society, and the economy. These studies focus on the military as an institution and consider the officer corps as the 'brain' (Cohen 1998; 2013) of this institution. In *Pakistan Army* Cohen (1998) touches on multiple aspects of the officers corps, such as the generational changes, the change in the recruitment base, the output and evolution of the military institutions and the relation of the military to the wider society, national ideology, and Islam. For his study he draws extensively on the literature produced by senior officers as well as on interviews with current and former members of the military. Aysha Siddiqa in *Military Inc*. (2007) explores the evolution of the economic ventures of the military. She integrates the study of social aspects with the economic activities of the military. In *Fighting to the End* (2014) Fair analyses the 'strategic culture' of the Pakistani military. She argues that the military depicts itself as a defender of Pakistan's ideology that is shaped by the two-nation theory and an 'Islamic identity' that stands in opposition to 'Hindu' India. Fair (2014) approaches her research question with a discourse analysis in which the military is understood as an "epistemic community" (p. 35). She considers the text military officers write as "an evolving discourse rather than a collection of prescriptions, descriptions, and assessments

offered by disconnected authors at particular times" (p. 34). For her study she draws extensively on literature produced inside the military context, for example the *Pakistan Army Journal*, the *Pakistan Army Green Book* but also personal memories and accounts of war. For Fair (2014) the texts officers produce are primarily "aimed at the military community" (p. 35). In *The Army and Democracy* (2014) Aqil Shah sets out to describe the genesis and evolution of the military's view on politics form the viewpoint of its belief system. He argues that the military sees the national security as a national interest and positions itself as the sole defender. For his analysis he relies on the training material of the National Defence University and other training institutions. Explaining this approach Shah writes:

> "Hence I aim to examine and explain military politics in Pakistan from the neglected viewpoint of the military's belief system, what is commonly known as the military mind-set or the military mentality. What beliefs do members of the military hold about their proper role and function in the state and civilian politics? Do they perceive democratic institutions as inherently or as conditionally legitimate? Do they consider military intervention in politics an appropriate response to perceived civilian failures or threats to military interests? How do these norms or codes of conduct, in turn, shape the military's relationship with elected governments and condition its institutional responses to major political events, regime changes or crises?" (Shah 2014, p. 8).

The common thread that runs through these studies is the understanding that the military is an institution with a specific professional, ideological, and ethical outlook that most of its members share. This specific outlook is acquired through their socialisation inside the institution, as Cohen (2013) puts it "Armies are total institutions that mould the beliefs of their members for life" (p. 98).

While the military as an institution and the outlook of its members are subject to a wide range of studies, relatively few studies look at cultural aspects of the military or at the military officers as cultural producers. This is not to say that secondary literature does not attend to the cultural aspects of the military – Lieven (2011) for example refers to the literary output of officers:

> "A military friend told me of some retired military men, like Colonel Shafiq-ur-Rehman, who have become well-known Pakistani humourist writers, 'but they write humour, not satire, because they are happy, live comfortably and play a lot of golf'." (Lieven, 2011, p. 167).

However, the literature the officers produce is rarely analysed as cultural products, despite the fact that in Pakistan the output of the officers is valued as a 'contributions' by military officers. Most notably by Sarvar (2013) *ʿasākar-i Pākistān kī adabī k̲h̲idmāt: urdū naṯ̲ar meṉ*

(The contribution of the Pakistani soldiers to Urdu prose) and Baloc (2008) *'asākir-i Pākistān aur urdū shā'irī* (The Pakistani Soldiers and Urdu poetry).

## 2.1 The Social and cultural developments of the Pakistani military

In the following I will sketch a brief historical narrative of the Pakistani military and its officers, focusing on social and cultural aspects. I differentiate between four periods: 1) British era and its legacy 2) from Partition to the Tragedy (nation building and modernisation 1947-71) 3) the short period of Bhutto populist egalitarianism (1972-77) 4) from 1977 until today (Zia and Musharraf). These phases roughly correspond to the different periods of social development in Pakistan as proposed by Qadeer (2006). As such they focus more on the social development in Pakistani society and its impact on the military and rather less on the military's armed conflicts.

### 2.1.1 The British legacy

Secondary literature on the Pakistani military refers to the 'British legacy' or the 'colonial heritage', which continues to have an effect on some aspects on today's military (Barany 2012, Lieven 2011, Shah 2014, Cohen 1998; 2013; Ahmed, 2013). This British legacy designates several features regarding recruitment patterns and military traditions or cultures the Pakistani military inherited at the Partition of India. They concern inner military aspects as well as the relation of the military to the civilian and political administration of the country.

Part of the legacy is the "difficult birth" (Nawaz, 2008, p. 27) of the Pakistani military that was formed from the British Indian Army (BIA). At the time of the Partition, the Pakistani military lacked men, equipment and documentation, and was immediately involved in a war with neighbouring India over the princely State of Kashmir (Cloughely 1999; Nawaz 2008; Cohen 1998; Fair 2014). The difficult start is a central part of the Pakistan military's own narrative and the achievements made in the early days of the military are celebrated.[1]

Although several training institutions and important harbours of the former British Indian Army were situated on Pakistani territory, the newly created army lacked military tanks or an ordinance factory. The transfer of equipment and key documentation from India to Pakistan

[1] Most prominently by Maj. Gen Shaukat Riza (1977), *The Pakistan Army 1947-1949*, and Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqeem Khan (1963), *The Story of the Pakistan Army*, as well as Maj. Gen. Shahid Hamid (1993), *Early Years of Pakistan.*

was delayed, and most of the equipment reaching Pakistan was unusable (Cloughely 1999; Nawaz 2008). At Partition the Pakistan Army lacked approximately 1500 officers above the rank of Major. To compensate and keep the military operational, almost 500 British officers were employed in the technical branches and in the senior command (Cohen, 1998, p. 7).[2] The lack of officers also gave rise to accelerated promotion to fill the ranks, a development that was subsequently criticised.

Still under the British command of Gen. Frank Messervy (1947-48), and Gen. Douglas Gracy (1948-51), the Pakistani military engaged first in a secret and later in an open war with India over the princely state of Kashmir (1947-48).[3] The conflict over the princely state of Kashmir determined the relationship to India from the beginning (Fair, 2014; Cohen, 1998, 2013; Nawaz, 2008, Ahmed 2013, Shah 2014), and means that for the Pakistan Army, Partition is unfinished business (Tellis 1997). As Shah (2014) notes, the conflict over Kashmir politicised "an important section of the Pakistani officer corps" (p. 41), and at the same time made "military force indispensable to the country's survival" (p. 41). The birth of Pakistan and its army is thus seen as a primary factor determining the outlook of the military towards India, as Cohen (2013) writes:

> "From the very beginning, the army held strong views on normalization with India. Received wisdom in the army is that India made a concerted attempt to cripple Pakistan. Army messes still overflow with third-generation memories of the partition, how the Indians stole the library, or the silver, and then how India stabbed Pakistan in the back economically and militarily, and broke its promises on Kashmir" (Cohen 2013, p. 92).

However, Fair (2014) indicates that inside the military the Kashmir conflict of 1947-48 is not considered to be a "war at all" (p. 50). Pakistani textbooks portray the conflict as "merely an extension of the violence of Partition" (Fair 2014, p. 51).

Secondary literature informs us about the bitter experience of Partition on the military. Particularly the communal violence had a deep impact on "psyches of almost all officers in the Pakistan Army" (Cohen 1998, p. 60).[4] An important fact highlighted by Aqil Shah (2014), Zoltan Barany (2012) and Farzana Shaikh (2009) is that unlike the armies of Turkey, Algeria or Indonesia the Pakistani armed forces did "not participate in the war of liberation" (Shah, 2014, p. 31) or "in the struggle for their country's independence, which put them in a curious

[2] 355 Officers stayed in Pakistan after Partition and 129 were recruited from England (Cohen 1998, Rizvi 2000).

[3] Under British command "the two armies knew each other very well" (Cheema, 2002, p. 63) and faced each other.

[4] How the officers came to relate to the Partition, the creation of Pakistan, and how they furnished a historical narrative since the 1960s will be analysed in chapter four.

position once it was achieved" (Barany, 2012, p. 247). Farzana Shaikh (2009) writes that the question about the military's new identity "and its relation to 'nationalist state ideology' surfaced soon after independence" (p. 150).

The military is commonly seen as the champion of the colonial administration; Barany (2012) for example indicates, "no other Indian or Pakistani institution retains as much of its British origins as the armed forces" (p. 246). However, the military system was not a British import, but merged local tradition with the colonial administration, and, as Anatol Lieven (2011) aptly put it, "was able to root itself effectively because it fused with ancient local military traditions rather than sweeping them away (as was the case with education and law)" (p. 177). Components of this legacy are the British military traditions and customs, such as the mess culture and military jargon, but foremost the professionalism, and the patterns of recruitment. The ethnic preference in recruitment practised during the colonial period by the British shaped the ethnic composition of the newly created Pakistan Army. The British practice of recruiting "martial races" meant that the Punjabis were overrepresented in the new institution (Fair, 2014; Cheema, 2002; Cohen 1998).

A tradition retained during the first decades of the Pakistani military was the position of Non-Commissioned Officers (NCO) and Junior-Commissioned Officers (JCO). The Junior Commissioned Officers were "selected member[s] in a particular class of soldiers" (Cohen, 1998, p. 35). The JCO had a cultural as well as a military function, mainly in bridging the gap between officers and soldiers. "The JCO was something of an older brother or village elder, who disciplined and counselled the young peasant sepoy and served as a cultural transmission belt" (Cohen, 1998, p. 35). Fair writes that the JCO "serve as an important link between the enlisted personnel and the officers, who are often better educated and of higher socioeconomic status and who are increasingly likely to have urban roots." (2014, p. 32).

A profound shaping element of the Pakistani military was the British recruitment practice (Fair, 2104, Cohen, 1998, 2013; Rizvi, 2000). The overrepresentation of ethnic Punjabis in the military is not a result of the population imbalance but is connected to the concept of 'martial races' of the British Indian Army (Talbot 2002, p. 59) and geostrategic considerations (Fair 2014, Rizvi 2000). The military has tried to widen its recruitment base over the last few decades and to reflect the population composition of Pakistan in general (Fair and Nawaz, 2011; Fair 2014). The origins of the dominance of the Punjabis in the military are ascribed to the

consequences of the Mutiny of 1857.[5] In the light of the reorganisation of the military in India, the British India Army shifted its recruitment away from the Bengal to the north and north west (Rizvi, 200, p. 37). The Eden Commission concluded that the Punjab was the 'home of the most martial races of India' (Rizvi 2000, p. 38) by 1879. A system of land rewards for military service encouraged recruitment in the poorer rural Punjab (p. 39). The shift in the recruitment base is also explained for geostrategic reasons. The recruitment of Punjabis and 'tribals' from the frontier was understood to be a measure to counter the Russian threat of invasion (Fair, 2014, p. 60).

### 2.1.2 Nation-building and modernisation under Ayub Khan

Qadeer (2006) describes the period from 1947 until 1971 as the "formative period of Pakistan's national society" (p. 23), which was marked by the organisation and consolidation of both the state and society, as well as modernisation of the 'economy and culture', particularly in the second half of the period (1958-71). The national agenda featured economic and social progress and the "secular urban professional and officer classes" (Qadeer, p. 23) played the dominant role in society. At the beginning of the period stood Partition and with it the mass exchange of population that "shock[ed] the foundation of Pakistan's social structure" (p. 24). In East Punjab for example, the replacement of Sikh landlords by new immigrants realigned the tenant/landowner relations, "revising community norms and cast/religion-based division of labour" (ibid.) Local norms and customs were also challenged by newly arriving refugees. With the creation of the new state, power structures were realigned. Leaders of the Muslim League "became the ruling elite along with civil and military officers" (ibid.). In this period the military saw a gradual modernisation, was exposed to international training under defence treaties and took up its economic activities (Siddiqa 2007). Secondary literature underlines that civilian/military relations were formed during this time, with the first military coup of Ayub Khan in 1958.

In 1951, the same year of his appointment as commander in chief, Ayub Khan faced a coup attempt from left-leaning officers and intellectuals against prime minster Liaquat Ali Khan. The attempt known as the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case is regarded as the outcome of the politicisation of the officer corps during the early days of Pakistan (Shah 2014, p. 33). Farzana Shaikh (2009) indicates that the officers involved intended to transform the military "from a

[5] Also known as the Sepoy Mutiny. The consequence was the introduction of the government of Indian act and the dissolution of the East India Company.

‘colonial’ into a ‘national’ institution” (p. 151). Siddiqa (2007) highlights that the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case also brought to attention the “need for building a stronger organizational ethos, or a 'social contract', between the military's high command and other members of the organization” (p. 134). As a consequence, the junior and mid-ranking officers were awarded material benefits for their loyalty to senior officers, and “the organization's welfare needs were effectively catered for by the senior generals.” (ibid.) The principle of the military – catering for “its members from the ‘cradle to the grave’” (p. 134) – is seen at the root of the rise of the economic activities of the military.

The Pakistani military was led by British officers under the appointment of Ayub Khan as commander in chief of the Pakistan Army in 1951. Under Ayub Khan’s command, the military focused on training (Cheema, 2002, p. 56) and reconstruction to meet the new threat by India (p. 57f). Several developments are highlighted in secondary literature regarding the command of Ayub Khan and his later military rule. The first is the entry of the Pakistani military in different defence treaties that had an influence on training and equipment. In 1954 Pakistan entered into a Mutual Defence Assistance Treaty with the United States and later into the multilateral military alliances (South East Asia Treaty Organization) SEATO and Baghdad Pact (after 1959 CENTO) (Cheema, 2002, p. 60). An outcome of the treaties was an international and particularly American influence on the training of the military, what Cohen (1998) described as an “American philosophy” (p. 63f.). Cheema (2002) highlights that “new American ideas began to influence Pakistan’s strategic planning and tactical pursuits. In many ways the American linkage made Pakistan’s military a hard-hitting force and substantially enhanced its mobility and general performance for years to come” (p. 60). One of the outcomes of the American military aid was the establishment of the Special Services Group (SSG) in 1956 under Aboobaker Mitha, originally raised as an anti-communist, to “stay behind forces” (Nawaz, 2008, p. 133). Cohen argues that these developments gave rise to an American generation of officers (recruited between 1950-65) (Cohen, 1998; 2013).

The second development that impacted the military under the command of Ayub Khan was the involvement of the military in economic activities (Lieven 2011, p. 170; Siddiqa 2007). In 1954 the Fauji Foundation (FF) was formed as a welfare organisation. Over the years, military welfare organisations started to invest in several different corporations and infrastructure projects (Siddiqa, 2007, p. 119, 131f.). The involvement in the national economy under Ayub Khan was seen as a contribution to the modernisation of Pakistan, particularly the work done by the Frontier Works Organization (FWO) founded in 1966 that constructed the Karakoram Highway (Siddiqa, 2007, p. 116.).

Conflicts over the constitution carried over onto the streets and eventually led to a coup d'état by Ayub Khan in 1958. Secondary literature points out that the involvement of the military in national politics triggered different developments in Pakistan and inside the military. According to Qadeer (2006) Ayub Khan's rule "symbolized the triumph of the modernist perspective and centrist state over regional or ethnic interests and traditional Islamic values" (p. 26), even if the "modernists in Pakistan were not entirely secularist" (ibid.). On assuming power, Ayub Khan put forward a modernist agenda that included family planning, land reforms and industrial and agricultural initiatives (ibid). Secondary literature points out, that Ayub Khan neglected the army after becoming president of Pakistan (Nawaz, 2008, p. 192) and eventually alienated the "military which had backed his coup d'état in 1958 to save the country from disintegration" (Hussain, 1979, p. 138) by reducing the military budget (p. 138). However, under Ayub Khan's rule the military grew considerably. Nawaz (2008) indicates that from Partition to 1964, the size of the military had doubled (p. 200). The recruitment however was concentrated in the Punjab as most of the officers originated from a "100 miles' radius of Rawalpindi" (p. 200).

In September 1965 skirmishes between India and Pakistan over the Rann of Kutch, a flooded grassland zone on the Indo-Pak border (Nawaz, p. 202), and the operation Gibraltar in Kashmir (p. 205) escalated into a war and is still celebrated as the Defence Day on 6 September. The consequence was that the war "was portrayed as a magnificent victory over India by Ayub Khan's propaganda machine" and it produced disillusionment and catalyses his eventual fall from grace (Nawaz, 2008, p. 214). The political and economic cost of the war of 1965 (Qadeer, 26) eventually brought the downfall of Ayub Khan who, after an election, faced severe opposition in the streets.

The era of Ayub Khan also was a period of centralist rule and economic deprivation of the East. During Ayub's rule regional and ethnical interests were repressed. Qadeer refers to the 1960s as a decade in which "social agenda of Pakistan had remained crammed with competing ideologies and unresolved issues of economic and political disparities" (Qadeer, 2006, p. 27). The rifts divided segments of society that favoured either a unitary or a federal state, positioned elites in concurrence with claims of the rising industrial and commercial classes, and the military officers against politicians. Different ethnic groups and classes fought over representation in national affairs (ibid.). These rifts surfaced in the emergence of the opposition to Ayub's rule in 1968 and "interrupted the march of modernism and recalibrated the balance between regional communities and national society" (ibid). The underrepresentation and economic and social discrimination of Bengalis later triggered the secession of East Pakistan.

As a result of the Tragedy of 1971, Pakistan "emerged as a new country of revised geography, ideology and social organisation." (Qadeer, 2001, p. 27)

### 2.1.3 Period of populist egalitarianism

Qadeer calls the period between 1972-77 "populist egalitarianism" (2006, 27) and the period is essentially the period of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's rule. During the reign of Bhutto, Pakistan's social structure was fundamentally changed, as Qadeer writes:

> "Pakistan's traditional divisions of status and power were questioned and its social structure was shaken. Political parties of all persuasions accepted economic and social justice as a goal. […] Citizens' rights found a place in Pakistan's narrative." (2006, p. 28).

Bhutto's era stood under the banner of Islamic socialism. Focusing on the betterment of the livelihood of the common Pakistani, Bhutto basically "extended the meaning of independence into the economic and social realm" (p. 28). His programme "wove together the diverse religious, economic and social strands of the people's expectations" (p. 28). An outcome of Bhutto's policies saw the rise of party workers as the new power brokers and the "access to public authority had become the route to private fortune" (p. 29). This development also influenced and challenged the military.

Secondary literature refers to three aspects Bhutto's rule had on the military. The first pertains to the apparent rivalry between Bhutto and the military that changed civil-military relations but eventually enabled the military in 'recapturing the state' (Shah, 2014). The second aspect concerns the military's regional and international status. After the war of 1971, India became the undisputed power in South Asia (Fair 2014). The new security environment and the paucity of military aid since the late 1960s eventually led Pakistan to develop an atomic bomb. At the same time, the military tried to widen its influence by supporting Islamic insurgents in Afghanistan. Finally, the military had to deal with the consequences of the Tragedy. After the loss of East Pakistan, the military's image was damaged which triggered a degree of re-examination and introspection. After the war it was preoccupied with the reintegration of returning prisoners of war. Furthermore, as an effect of the debacle, the recruitment base changed.

Immediately after the war, Bhutto was able to exploit the military's "weakened position due to the national belief that it was responsible for the loss of East Pakistan" (Fair, 2014, p. 30).[6] He was not only able to interfere in the military high command by forcibly retiring officers deemed responsible for the loss of East Pakistan,[7] but also challenged the military by creating the rivalling Federal Security Force (Nawaz, 2008, pp. 323, 320). The early period of Bhutto's rule saw a rivalry between the Quaid-e Awam (the people's leader) and the military. However, as Shah (2014) notes, Bhutto changed his initial stance against the military, and increased not only its budget (p. 127), but also the military salaries and benefits (Shah, 2014, p. 126). While the military was detached from direct politics during the period of 1972 and 1976 (p. 120), Bhutto eventually relied on the military to suppress challenges to his authority. When conflicts with Baluch sardars arose, Bhutto deployed the army in the province and as a consequence, the military was involved in administration of Baluchistan. According to Nawaz (2008) Bhutto thus "invited the Pakistan Army back into the political process" (p. 333). This reliance of Bhutto on the military also "renewed officers' belief in their ability to run the affairs of the government better than civilians" (Shah, 2014, p. 121).

The outcome of the Tragedy had a profound physical and psychological impact on the military. Not only did the military lose man and equipment, and 90,000 of its former members remained prisoners of war in India until 1974, but also the image of the army was damaged. Cohen writes that the years between 1965-71 were called the "sawdust years" in which the "military honor and professionalism slipped away from the Pakistan Army" (Cohen, 1998, p. 72). After the war the military engaged in self-study (p. 73). Inside the army, the older generation's authority was openly challenged (p. 72). Nawaz (2008) indicates, "the young officers in particular, felt that the army high command had failed them miserably" (p. 335). The discontent with the performance of senior officers and the role of Bhutto during the Tragedy surfaced in the Attock conspiracy case, where a group of junior officers[8] plotted a coup attempt against Bhutto and senior officers (Shah, 2014, 123). Many of the younger officers who were found guilty performed well during the Tragedy and "the actions and words of the officers under trial made them into heroes among their younger colleagues" (Nawaz, 2008, p. 337). The plotters demanded that the senior military leadership and Bhutto himself be held accountable

[6] Right after the war Bhutto called out the "Bonapartist tendencies" of the military (Shah, 2014, p.122)

[7] For tension with the army, see for example (Nawaz, 2008 p. 324).

[8] Abbas (2005) refers to of three different groups of officers: junior as well as senior, and officers from the air force and navy. However, the senior officers remained silent once the trial started (pp. 73-77).

for the Tragedy. Bhutto appointed Zia ul-Haq to head the trial, which eventually "solidified" (ibid.) the latter's rise to power.

Secondary literature also indicates that the recruitment base under Bhutto changed to incorporate the lower-middle class. After the loss of East Pakistan, the military as a profession lost its previous prestige (Cohen, 1998, 2004; Lieven 2011). Many Pakistani's chose the military as their career to improve their living standard (Cohen, 2004, p. 116).

According to Shaikh (2009) the events of 1971 and the subsequent developments also triggered a "bid to reconcile Pakistan's Muslim (communal) identity, dictating the pursuit of strategic interests against 'Hindu India', with the country's Islamic identity as the focus of a utopian Islamic version guaranteed by a policy of regional military expansion predicated on jihad" (p. 149). From 1973 the military backed the Islamist insurgence in Afghanistan (Fair 2014, p. 121). In 1975 for example, Fair notes that "Pakistan actually enlisted Afghan Islamists into the Frontier Corps while the ISI and the army's Special Service Group trained them" (p. 122).

Bhutto's rule was relatively short. "What began as a promising era of social and cultural restructuring ended up reinforcing the ethnic, provincial and class conflicts that had kept Pakistan internally divided and externally dependent" (Qadeer, 2006, p. 30). Qadeer (2006) sees the "hostility of the middle classes, ethnic minorities, and the disappointed working poor" (p. 30) to the egalitarian and modernist outlook as the core of the opposition against Bhutto and eventually rallied against the PPP under the "banner of Islamic order" (p. 30). Agitation in the streets and Bhutto's deployment of the military brought it "face to face with the people of Pakistan" (Nawaz, 2008, p. 349). Eventually, the military coup 'Operation Fair Play' brought Zia ul-Haq to power. Shah (2014) sees the 1977 coup as an outcome of the perceived threat of "the army's disintegration" (p. 147). He elaborates that the "military seized power when it decided that politicians, […] were not sagacious enough to put aside their selfish political interests and swiftly resolve the deadlock, which had caused political disorder and threatened to erode military integrity" (Shah, p. 149).

### 2.1.4 From Zia ul-Haq to the present

From 1977 onwards, three developments had an impact on the social agenda of Pakistan. First, the "accelerating modernization of the material base", second the "institutionalization of the military's direct domination of government institutions and economy", and third the "revivalist thrust in national ideology and culture" (Qadeer, 2006, p. 35f.). The revival of

national ideology and culture was a form of neo-traditionalism or conservative Islamic ethos that was accompanied by, but did not stand in opposition to, "the integration of Pakistani society in the global circulation of people, technology, and finance" (p. 31). This development already started in the 1970s but picked up pace in the 1990s.

Several developments in the 1980s and 1990s helped to turn Pakistan into a consumer society. The bigger impacts stemmed from the privatisation of national industries and banks (Qadeer, 2006, p. 31) and the integration of Pakistani labour in the Gulf States' economy (p. 32). Qadeer sees Pakistani society running on two parallel tracks during these decades: "At the rhetorical and symbolic plane, it tilted towards the Islamic and vernacular ethos, while in social practice and in life routines it was driven by consumerism and material advancement. This duality began under Zia's rule and it has become a defining condition of contemporary Pakistan" (p. 33).

While the populist movements in the late 1960s, and later Bhutto threatening the military's control of the state (Siddiqa, 2007, p. 83) during the reign of Zia ul-Haq, the military infiltrated into "civilian administration, society, and the economy" and militarised the bureaucracy (Shah, 2014, p. 154). Throughout the 1980s, the military controlled the state directly and furnished its future role as the "kingmaker and arbiter of political contests" (Qadeer, 2006, p. 35). The military under Zia ul-Haq allied itself with religious parties and 'conservative elements' to establish a hegemony over the civil society, as Siddiqa (2007) notes:

> "The GHQ [General Headquarters] co-opted the religious right and used religious ideology to muster support among the general public. The alliance with the religious parties and propagation of Islamic culture were meant to establish the military's hegemony over the civil society" (2007, p. 85).

Zia ul-Haq, who labelled himself as a "soldier of Islam" (Shah 2014, p. 152), saw Pakistani society as lacking cohesion because of secular politics that advocated different identities. For Zia, Islamising Pakistani society was a "way to ensure genuine national integration" (Shah, 2014, p. 152,). For this, Zia's focus on society changed, he introduced Islamic laws, a Federal Sharia Court, and reformed the taxation system.

Siddiqa (2007) suggests that Zia's regime was also interested in advocating different religious and ethnic identities to uphold the political factionalism. The resulting "socio-political fragmentation would naturally result in strengthening the myth of the military as a national saviour" (Siddiqa, 2007, p. 87). The image of the military as the sole national integrator is cultivated to the present (Fair, 2014, Shah, 2014). An important factor that brought Islamic militants in close contact with the intelligence branch of the military was the war in Afghanistan

(Siddiqa, 2007, p. 86). The support and training of militant Islamist groups was already initiated under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1973 (Fair 2014, p. 122; Hussain 2005), but increased with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. With American and Saudi backing, Islamic militants were used as proxies in Afghanistan. However, the military started also to rely on Islamic militants as general tools for foreign and domestic influence. Particularly the Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) morphed from an external secret service to being the dominant domestic intelligence service, while playing the role of facilitator and administrator of the Afghan mujahedin groups. (Shah, 2014 p. 157). Since the 1980s the military relied on the ISI for domestic operations and propaganda and supported various Islamic groups against labour unions, Sindhi nationals, the opposition and leftist student groups at universities (p. 158).

Several authors (Shah, 2014; Cohen, 1998; Fair, 2014) have noted that the Pakistani military "traditionally deployed religious imagery, rhetoric, and myth as devices for motivational purposes" (Shah, 2014, p. 162). Under Zia ul-Haq "Islam began to permeate the army's institutional symbols, structures, and socialization processes" (Shah, 2014, p. 162). Zia for example introduced Islamic training at the Command and Staff College (Fair, 2014, p. 82; Cohen 1998). Shah (2014) also speaks of a "Muslimizaiton of military education and social life" that shaped the "social attitudes and outlook of the officer corps" (Shah, 2014, p. 162). This "pedagogical emphasis on Islam" however did not Islamise the entire officers corps. But the consequence of the Tragedy somehow "undermined the more relaxed attitude toward Islam" that was prevalent under the British and American generation of officers (Shah, 2014, p. 163). Secondary literature also notes that there was a shift in the recruitment base for military officers (Fair and Nawaz, 2011; Cohen 1998). The rural recruitment base increased and Islamic conservatism and "individual displays of piety and devoutness, such as the keeping of beards and the offering of prayers in units and messes, became normal" (Shah, 2014, p. 163). Qadeer explains that most of these new officers came from the emerging middle/lower-middle class:

> "Its officers came from the ranks of the emerging middle/lower-middle classes, largely of the rural north-western Punjab and NWFP [the former Northwest Frontier Province, now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa]. They grew up with vernacular beliefs and Islamic ideals, yet also aspired to modern lifestyle and material progress. They tended to be conservative with strong Islamic colorations but their career ambitions and expectations of living conditions were modern" (Qadeer, 2006, p. 32).

Several authors note that the officer corps also came into contact with conservative interpretation of Islam through non-militant movements like the Tablighi Jamaat (Shaikh, 2009, p. 154; Cohen, 2013, p. 113). This development was also amplified with the officers' missions to the Gulf and other Arab countries. However, as Shah (2014) notes: "Like any other

professional military, the Pakistani military's institutional creed is nationalism, not Islamism, despite the Muslimness of Pakistan's hegemonic national identity" (p. 165).

During the 1990s the military came to dominate the administration and the economy of Pakistan. As Siddiqa (2007) writes:

> "The most noticeable increase in the size of the military's internal economy, and the organization's penetration into society and the economy, obviously took place during the 1990s and after, when the GHQ sought legal and constitutional arrangements to institutionalize its role in decision making and the country's power politics. By the start of the twenty-first century the military fraternity had penetrated all levels of the society and economy. Members of the military fraternity (both serving and retired personnel) were found in all major institutions, including parliament and the civil bureaucracy. There were over 1,000 serving and retired officers working at various middle and senior management levels." (Siddiqa, 2007, p. 110).

Many of the military economic enterprises were created in the 1970s and 1980s, for example the National Logistic Cell (NLC) in 1978 (Siddiqa, 2007, p. 114f), the Shaheen Foundation in 1977 (p. 123), and the Bahria foundation in 1982. During the 1990s companies owned and run by military officers were morphing into conglomerates working in the private security business (p. 158) and developing housing schemes on government-owned land (p. 160), and real estate (p. 186). The military also "commercialized its education system" (p. 163), even if the facilities were paid from the defence budget. By selling the land they received from service the military further alienated itself with the land-elite (p. 184). During Zia's rule "the military came to be the dominant social institution in Pakistani society and state" (Qadeer, 2006, p. 31). "Military rank and connections became the currency of influence and privilege" (Qadeer, 2006, p. 31).

Siddiqa (2007) speaks of the evolution of the military into a class that had to safeguard its political and economic interests:

> "By 2004/05, the military had established political and economic interests which had to be safeguarded by institutionalizing its power. Like other dominant classes in the country, the armed forces were instituted as a separate entity with a firm control over entry into the organization. The military is a separate class that cuts across all other classes. Its members belong to the landed-feudal class, and the indigenous and metropolitan bourgeoisie. However, there are no hard and fast rules that bar those from other social classes from entering the military. In fact, over the years the lower-income groups have also managed to join the armed forces, and gained social mobility as a result" (p. 108).

This goes hand in hand with "intellectual penetration", the "ability to market its image as the only disciplined organization, with superior capabilities to the civilian institutions" (Siddiqa, 2007, p. 108). Shah (2014) also indicates that the "higher levels of non-military

education have reinforced officers' beliefs in their superiority to civilian, especially the 'uneducated' and 'feudal' politicians" (p. 155) This argument is further developed in Shah (2014) and Fair (2014). The notion of the military as the only pragmatic institution that stands above the public sector is accepted almost throughout Pakistan:

> "Although the notion of the military's superiority is not popular in Baluchistan and Sindh, this is certainly the perception in the largest province, the Punjab. Furthermore, in most public-sector educational institutions there is an almost unquestioned acceptance of the classical realist paradigm for understanding strategic issues or international relations. This is primarily the result of the state's ability to market military power as the key option for its security as a state. The military fraternity is the main beneficiary of this image, which is necessary to protect the interests of the armed forces and its civilian allies" (Siddiqa, 2007 p. 108).

Secondary literature has described the Pakistani military officers as an elite (for example Hussain, 1979; Lieven, 2011; Qadeer, 2006; Siddiqa, 2007). While Asaf Hussain (1979) in the late 1970s understands the military elite as a national elite (p. 126) that completes with other elites inside Pakistan, Mohammad Qadeer (2006) characterised the military as a "positional elite" (p. 228). After Qadeer, positional elites "consist of individuals who hold positions of public power. […] Their status as elite, national or local, is tied to their positions. Individuals circle in and out of the elite stratum, but positions continue to be the ladder for climbing to the elite ranks" (p. 228). As a positional elite the military uses its power to acquire "land, build property, and establish businesses or industries" (p. 229) and as such "they have become rich and influential, independent from their positions. Sons and daughters of military commanders and civil servants have become leading industrialists, transporters, or corporate executives, thereby gaining a foothold among the economic elite" (p. 229). The traditional and economic elites rely on the positional elite for services and together form a "system of power exchange" (p. 229) that ties the elites together.

Anatol Lieven (2011) describes the military as an "independent class" (p. 163) that often lives segregated from the rest of Pakistani society in gated communities. Because of the steep promotional pyramid in the military, many officers in their 40s and 50s need to be retired or transferred into the national economy (p. 168). Private companies and corporations that do business with the military employ many senior officers on their retirement, thereby using the knowledge of the institution as well as personal contacts (p. 168). Land compensation and the provision of jobs in the civil services to officers is partly due to the necessity of the armed forces having to retire large numbers of officers. The benefits for the officers and their families are

part of the “efforts to maintain strong morale” (p. 173) and rendered military service attractive for many Pakistanis.

Today, the armed forces are “Pakistan’s largest middle-class employer by far” (p. 181), and as such “also become perhaps the greatest agency of social advancement in the country, with officers originally recruited from the lower middle classes moving in to the educated middle classes as a result of their service to the military.” (p. 181)

> “The Pakistani military, more even than most militaries, sees itself as a breed apart, and devotes great effort to inculcating in new recruits the feeling that they belong to a military family different from (and vastly superior to) Pakistani civilian society. The mainly middle-class composition of the officer corps increases contempt for the 'feudal' political class. The army sees itself as both morally superior to this class, and far more modern, progressive and better-educated” (p. 163).

Secondary literature however points to the fact that ethnic Punjabis are overrepresented inside the armed forces (Fair 2014, Cohen 1998, Siddiqa 2007, Nawaz 2008). After Fair (2014), the historical legacy of a “Punjabi Army” (p. 59) that draws officers mainly from the Districts of Kohat, Peshawar, Attock, Rawalpindi, Jhelum, and Gujrat (Cohen, 1998; Rizvi 2000) is still apparent. Official data regarding the composition of the Pakistani military is not available. Cohen (2013), citing figures from 1979 refers to 70 per cent Punjabi, 14 per cent from NWFT (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), 9 per cent from Sindhi, 3 per cent Baluchi and 1.3 per cent Azad Kashmir (p. 98). Siddiqa (2007) writes that “approximately 75 per cent of the army is drawn from three districts of Punjab, the area known as the ‘Salt Range.’Another 20 per cent are from three to four districts in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP)” (p. 59). While the officers are recruited mainly from the Punjab, the military high command does not reflect this recruitment base. Anatol Lieven (2011) correctly notes that for example of the “four military rulers, only Zia ul-Haq was a Punjabi” (p. 178).

### 2.2 Generations

Cohen (1998; 2004; 2013) and Ahmed (2004) have described generational changes inside the military's officer corps, by integrating military socialisation as well as the social background of the recruited officers. The underlying assumption being that socialisation inside the military institution at a particular point in time and the social dispositions of the officers shape a particular generation of officers. As Cohen (2013) explains:

> “The collective views and assumptions of a particular generation of officers are formed by the curriculum of the PMA, the Staff College at Quetta, and (for the brigadiers) the National Defence College

> in Islamabad. These institutions provide a lens through which the officers view politics, strategic issues, neighbours, and even Pakistan's future. The social and class background of these officers, their ethnic origins, and ideological predilections are also important in shaping their worldview, as is their allegiance to the corporate identity and interests of the army itself" (p. 98).

In his seminal work *The Pakistan Army* Cohen (1998) distinguishes between three generations of officers: a British generation of officers that was recruited into the military between 1947-53, an American generation that entered the military between 1953-71, and a Pakistani generation recruited after 1972. In *The Idea of Pakistan* (2004), Cohen further defines a generation of officers joining in the 1980s and 90s as the 'next generation of officers'. Ahmad (2004) only looks at the British generation of officers and separates two military generations: officers recruited before and after World War Two.

### 2.2.1 British generation

The British generation of officers were socialised in military institutions founded by the British. Secondary literature on Pakistan frequently refers to this generation because of the role the officers played in the political history of Pakistan. The first three military dictators of Pakistan, Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan and Zia ul-Haq all belonged to this generation of officer.

As mentioned in the brief history of the military above, the British military influence on the officer corps was profound. As Guttering wrote in 1965, both the Indian and Pakistani military "were essentially British in pattern. The officers were united by their ability to speak English, by their contact with associated British regiments" (Guttering, 1965, p. 148.). Officers commissioned under British colonial rule were able to express themselves in English and successfully adopt "the regimental tradition and the life of the officers' mess with its in-built codes of behaviour" (Guttering, 1965, p. 148; Shah 2014, p. 32).

Cohen (1998) divides the British generation of officers into two groups, the first group was educated at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, the second group at the Indian Military Academy (IMA) established in 1932 at Dehra Dun (p. 55). Military officers from the first generation were responsible for the establishment of training institutions and "served as a model for younger officers. In their own writings they have stressed the importance of both tasks" (Cohen, 1998, p. 57). During World War Two, most of the officers serving in the British Indian Army were sent to either Burma or Italy (p. 58).

Because of the political role military officers played in the history of Pakistan, secondary literature dwells on the degree of communal feeling the generation recruited under the British

had (Shah, 2014; Fair, 2014; Rivzi, 2000). Cohen (1998) indicates that officers viewed themselves generally as above communal and religious ties, but during Partition they were obliged to take sides (p. 60). Cohen (1998) also writes that especially officers from Sandhurst and the Indian Military Academy "were not especially communal minded" (p. 59). He remarks that most of the recruits were "both secular and conservative in outlook" (ibid.) and were taught that it was "not religion or territorial origin" but the "soldier-like qualities of a particular class that counted" (p. 60).

On the contrary, Asaf Hussain (1979) stresses that the 'apolitical behaviour' of the British Indian Army was a "myth serving colonial interests" (p. 128). For the officers joining in the early years religious attitudes were strong:

> "Religious attitudes, understandably, were found to be quite strong among the soldiers and officers of the Pakistani military. The use of Islamic concepts such as 'jihad' (holy war), 'ghazi' (victorious warrior) and 'shaheed' (martyred warrior in the name of Islam) evoked strong sentiments and were utilized for morale-building. The 'izzat' (honour) and 'ghairat' (self-respect) of the nation were of prime concern to the Pakistani military" (p. 127).

Asaf Hussain (1979) thus divides the officer corps into a political military and a military professional stratum. He writes: "officers within these strata could be of the same rank, except that one would be concerned with the political role of the military and the other with the military aspects of the state" (p. 130). The two roles did not exist in true form. The professional stratum was more concerned with the "managerial responsibilities and the professionalization of the internal organization and skill structure of the force" (ibid.), while the political stratum was "committed to the security role of the military within the state" (ibid.).

Cohen (1998) notes that the social class origin of the British recruited generation of officers changed between 1930-45 (p. 57). At first, the British mostly recruited from "Westernized Indian families" and among the sons of the Viceroy's Commissioned Officers (VCO) (p. 57). During the war, the recruitment base was widened and many officers joined as Emergency Commissioned Officers (ECO) (p. 57). ECOs were trained in shorter courses and employed during World War II. Shah (2014) notes that officers recruited during World War II played a part in the 1977 coup of Zia ul-Haq. He indicates that they understood themselves as "guardians of national security and social order" and viewed the boundaries between politics and military as "ephemeral and permeable" (Shah 2014, p. 120).

Cohen (1998) also refers to a third social group of recruits under the British colonial rule. This group comprised officers who originated from India and moved to Pakistan during Partition. These Muhajirs officers were "probably better educated than those officers who come

from what is now Pakistan and many have been among the able officers of the Pakistan Army" (p. 58).

Regarding the outlook of the British generation of officers, Cohen (1998) notes that they generally opposed the military's involvement in civilian infrastructure projects (p. 61) and were concerned with the preparedness of their troops (p. 62). The British generation of officers rejected a people's army but "claim[ed] that Pakistan's army is a *national* army" (p. 62).

### 2.2.2 American generation

Cohen (1998) calls the generation of officers entering the military between 1950-65 the American generation of officers (p. 63). The American generation did not differ "greatly form the predecessors in terms of social-class origin, region, or commitment to professional duty" (p. 64). According to Cohen three aspects shaped the American generation. First this group of officers was exposed extensively to American training, equipment, military doctrine, problem solving and pop culture (p. 63). Second, this generation of officers lacked direct contact and experience with India (p. 64), and third this generation of officers "came to acquire an overblown estimate of their own and Pakistan's martial qualities, and some came to believe implicitly the myth that one Pakistani soldier was equal to face ten or more Indians" (ibid.).

Because of Pakistan's international military alliances from the 1950s the generation of officers entering into service between 1950-65 were exposed to American training, or attended courses in the United States. Cohen (1998) sees the biggest shift in the exposure of a new way of tactics. The American approach favoured mechanisation and a "lavish use of ammunition and stores" (p. 65) that differed from the "caution and conservation of men and material and the formal adherence to tradition" (ibid.) the British tradition promoted. Cohen (1998) also highlights the point that personal contact to American military "made [a] deep impression on thousands of Pakistani officers who came to professional maturity during these years" (p. 66). On a personal level the officers "retain affection for the country that was so intimately involved with their professional and personal development" (p. 67), on a policy level however, they are aware of the disappointing relationship with the US. Many senior officers were aware of the discrepancies in the US and Pakistan's views of the defence needs (p. 68).

The American generation also saw changes in the mess culture, which was modified and admitted women (p. 67). The experience of the military's somehow successful involvement in the modernisation of Pakistan under Ayub Khan made many of the officers think that they were able to structure and control Pakistani politics (p. 69). According to Cohen (1998) a part of this

"self-delusion" made them convinced that they could also master India" (p. 69).

### 2.2.3 Pakistani generation

Cohen (1998) distinguishes a third generation of officers entering between 1972-82, which he labels as the Pakistani generation. According to Cohen (1998) this generation differs considerably from the previous American generation:

> "They are more representative of the wider society in class origin, they have been less subjected to foreign professional influences and they are drawn form a generation with no direct contract with India. More problematically, they have joined during a period in which the reputation and prestige of the army plunged" (p. 70).

As elaborated above, after the war of 1971 the authority of the older generation of officers was questioned. Cohen describes the period from 1972-77 as the years in which the military engaged in self-scrutiny and re-examination (p. 72). Under the command of Zia ul-Haq, officers were sent to University to study non-military subjects (p. 73), before the National Defence University (established as the National Defence College) was founded. Cohen (1998) also hints at symbolic changes introduced by Zia ul-Haq to change the attitude inside the military. For example, in the form of a new "camouflage battle tunic" worn by all officers until 1982 that "conveyed an alert and combat-ready attitude" (p. 73).

The involvement of the military in politics and the Islamisation of Pakistan is "only tentatively supported by many officers" (p. 91). Cohen indicates that many officers retain the view that "there was great danger in becoming too deeply involved with social change in any area" (p. 91). However, Zia's emphasis on Islam encouraged "Islamic zealotry in the army" as Cohen (2004, p. 108) writes. In 1995 for example, Maj. Gen. Zahir Abbasi led a coup to "Islamize" both Pakistan and its army (ibid.).

Cohen (1998) writes that some of the prisoners of war moderated their views of India, but that most of the officers imprisoned in India were very critical of their superior officers. Other officers who were prisoner of war hardened their "attitude toward[s] the Indians as a result of their captivity" (p. 71). Cohen (1998) notes that many of the officers who were prisoners of war had a substantial influence on the junior officers after their reintegration into the military (p. 72).

Cohen (1998) also indicates that the new recruitment base of young officers also questioned the British or American outlook of the military (p. 89). Many officers from this generation looked to Israel as a role model "they regard the Israeli pattern as nearly identical to their own

and are deeply impressed with Israeli military capabilities" (p. 90).

### 2.2.4 Next generation

Cohen (2004) also outlines the characteristics of the "next generation" of officers, which he also calls the "Zia and post-Zia generation" (p. 110). Officers joining in the 1980s and 1990s chose the military as a career and as a way of improving their living standard. They essentially belong to the middle-class and do not differ considerably from their Indian counterparts (p. 109). This next generation has a "different orientation towards society" (ibid.). They "did not share the idealism of the first generation of officers" (ibid.) and regard the military as only one of many professions. In contrast to the 1960s and 1970s members of the Pakistani elite choose to find a career outside of Pakistan (ibid). Cohen also highlights that the officers do not have the lucrative positions in the Gulf states or inside UN peacekeeping missions they used to have (p. 110). The military career depends on merit and in most cases "extremists, including those who are blatant about their Islamic professions, are not moved up, nor do officers have the opportunity to acquire demagogic skills" (p. 110). After Cohen (2004) only during the command of Gen. Aslam Beg (1988-91) did Islamic criteria play a role in recruitment and promotion of officers (p. 116). In 1991 for example 19 retired officers took part in the annual convention of the Jama'at-i-islami (p. 113). However, under Gen. Nawaz Janjua (1991-93), the military "slowly pushed back politicized Islam in the army and reasserted the tradition of making Islam a component of professionalism, not a separate and equal criterion for making policies and judging officers" (p. 108).

## 3 The field of military autobiographical narrative production

> "I found they [the books] were full of misinformation, distorted facts, wild guesses or biased opinions. So I decided to write the full facts. Posterity should know the truth and draw the correct conclusions. – Lt. Gen. Chishti."[1]

> "I decided to write my autobiography after Pakistan took centre stage in the world's conflicts, including the war on terror. There has been intense curiosity about me and the country I lead. I want the world to learn the truth. – Gen. Musharraf"[2]

> "On my retirement, the real encouragement was given by my respected senior officer and friend, the late Lt. General Atiqur Rehman MC ('Turk'). The 'Turk', having just written his excellent memoirs, advised me to write. – Maj. Gen. Husain"[3]

> "The stories of the prisoners of war are an important event in the political life of Pakistan (pākistān kī siyāsī zindagī kā īk tārikhī sānih) and the reasons behind them need to be presented to the public. – Lt. Col. Afẓal Kayānī"[4]

In the last four decades Pakistani military officers have been giving different motivations for writing an autobiographical narrative. Lt. Gen. Chishti sets out to correct what he perceives as distorted facts written in previous books about himself and his role during the rule of Martial Law Administrator and President Gen. Zia ul-Haq. General Pervez Musharraf intends to satisfy the world's curiosity about himself and his country. Maj. Gen. Wajahat Husain refers to an officer's established tradition of writing memoirs after retirement and the encouragement of a fellow officer. Lt. Col. Kayānī wants to remind the younger Pakistani generation of the importance of remembering the ordeal endured by prisoners of war in India.[5]

Although the officers all belonged to the same army and published an autobiographical narrative, their military and social backgrounds [6] as well as their publications differ

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[1] Chishti, Lt. Gen. Faiz Ali (1989), *Betrayals of Another Kind - Islam, Democracy and the Army in Pakistan*, Asia Publishing House, London, p. xv.
[2] Musharraf, Gen. Pervez (2006), *In the Line of Fire – A Memoir*, Simon and Schuster, London, p. xi.
[3] Husain, Maj. Gen. Syed Wajahat (2010), *Memories of a Solider – 1947: Before, During, After*, Ferozsons, Lahore, p. 12.
[4] Kayānī, Afẓal Lt. Col. (1980), *Matā'-i qafas*, yūsuf pablisharz, rāvalpiṇḍī, p. 5.
[5] The civil war and the war with India of 1971 and the subsequent secession of Bangladesh are commonly referred to as the Tragedy (Urdu: *almiyah*).
[6] Lt. Gen. Faiz Ali Chishti, was born in 1927 in eastern Punjab (now Part of India) and joined the British Indian Army in 1946 before being commissioned in the Royal Indian Artillery in 1947. After Partition he served in Pakistan and played a role in Zia ul-Haq's military coup against Bhutto. He held several ministerial positions. See Nawaz (2008, p. 352). General Pervez Musharraf was born in 1943 in Delhi and moved with his family to Pakistan after Partition. He was commissioned in the Pakistan Army in 1964. Maj. Gen. Wajahat Husain was born 1926 in Aligarh (Uttar Pradesh) and educated at the Aligarh Muslim University before joining the British

considerably. First, the autobiographical narratives were published at different times: Lt. Col. Kayānī and Lt. Col. Faiz Ali Chishti both published their autobiographical narratives in the 1980s, while Gen. Musharraf and Maj. Gen. Wajahat Husain wrote their recollections almost three decades later. Second, although the latter two officers were writing in the same decade, Gen. Musharraf joined the Pakistan Army over two decades after Maj. Gen. Wajahat Husain. And while Lt. Gen. Chishti and Maj. Gen. Wajahat Husain both were born in the late 1920s, the former turned to writing much earlier. Third, the publication context, in other words the language, publishing house and distribution of the autobiographical narratives vary considerably. Gen. Musharraf's autobiographical narrative was first published in English with an international publishing house and reprinted in several editions. Within a few months of publication, it was not only translated into Urdu, but also into Hindi, Bengali, Tamil and Chinese.[7] Lt. Col. Kayānī's autobiographical narrative was published in Urdu and never translated; the edition from 1980 indicates a print run of 1000 copies. Lt. Gen. Chishti's autobiographical narrative was reprinted several times[8] and translated into Urdu as *Bhuṭṭo, Ẓiyā', aur meṉ* (1991).

As much as the texts differ, the intention for writing put forward by the writing officers in the quotes above indicate that the autobiographical narratives were to be understood in relation to each other. They all refer to a tradition of writing autobiographical narratives by military officers and to already existing accounts, positions, and misconceptions (or to a supposed lack of them). For the officers, to write about oneself is a practice that puts them in relation to each other. Therefore, the negotiation of a Pakistani military officer's 'self' is also an exercise in positioning himself inside an ever-expanding network of interrelated autobiographical as well as other texts.

In this chapter, I construct and analyse these relations and positions with the use of Pierre Bourdieu's theoretical concept of field.[9] As elaborated in the introduction, I propose to analyse the writing of military autobiographical narratives by Pakistani Officers as a cultural practice

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Indian Army in 1946. After retiring from the army, he served as Ambassador to Greece and Australia. There is no information about the social or military dispositions of Lt. Col. Kayani.

[7] Published in Urdu as *Urdu Sab se pahle Pākistān*, ferozsanz, lāhaur; in Hindi as *Agnipatha: merī ātmakathā*, Rave Media, naī dillī, in Chinese as Mushalafu (2006), *Zai huo xian shang: Mushalafu hui yi lu*, Feng huang chu ban chuan mei ji tuan: Yi lin chu ban she, Nanjing.

[8] With Asia Publishing House in London in 1989, with Tricolour Book in Delhi 1989, with PCL Publishing House in Rawalpindi in 1990s and with Jang Publishers in Lahore in 1996.

[9] Here, I forgo an extensive discussion of the evolution of the concept of field as well as the problems of the different definitions of field in Bourdieu's theory, as my central argument in this chapter is not a theoretical or methodological one. Analogue to Bourdieu's other concepts, the field should be used as a tool that in the course of research proves its workability. Bourdieu, P., Chamberon, J.-C., and Krais, B. (Eds), 1991), *The Craft of Sociology, Epistemological Preliminaries*, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin.

that can be attributed to a field, in our case, the *field of military autobiographical narrative production*.

In the first part of this chapter, I discuss Bourdieu's field theory and explain how and why I use the concept of the field to analyse the production of Pakistani military autobiographies. In the second part I address the internal logic of the field. Here, I analyse the guiding principles governing the field and how they change. Furthermore, I consider the different positions and 'position-takings' (in Bourdieu's terms) inside the field. The third part briefly discusses how the field of Pakistani military autobiographical production relates to other fields. In the fourth part I outline the historical genesis and evolution of the field.

In the concluding section of this chapter, I address how the field, its principles and economic structure evolved and how it influenced the practice of constructing and representing the Pakistani officers' 'self'. First, I discuss the implication the characteristics of the field have for the construction and representation of the Pakistani military 'self'. Finally, I outline five heuristic positions the agents occupy through the practice of writing autobiographical texts. They correspond to existing and newly created subgenres of military autobiographical narratives and will be used to analyse the subject positioning of the agents in relation to Partition and the Tragedy in chapters four and five.

### 3.1 Bourdieu: The field of cultural production

Bourdieu has formulated his field theory most prominently in *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, *The Field of Cultural Production* and in *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*.[10] In *Reflexive Sociology* he defined a field as:

> "a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions objectively defined, in their existence and in the determinations they impose upon occupants, agents or institutions, by their present and potential situation [...] in the structure of the distribution of power (or capital) whose possession commands access to the specific profits that are at stake in the field, as well as by their objective relation to other positions [...]" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 52).

[10] To follow the English terminology of Bourdieu, I refer to the earliest possible translations of Bourdieu: Bourdieu, P. (1977), *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, Cambridge University Press; Bourdieu, P. (1993), *The Field of Cultural Production, or: The Economic World Reversed*, In The Field of Cultural Production: essays on art and literature / Pierre Bourdieu, edited and introduced by Randal Johnson, Columbia University Press; Bourdieu, P. and Wacquant, L., (1992), *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*, The University of Chicago Press.

In his theory, Bourdieu distinguishes different fields in which agents find themselves and from whose specific profit they try to gain.[11] By competing with each other over positions, agents relate to each other and maintain the field. The field can be understood as a historically grown playground that is constantly evolving and changing (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 98f.). For the literary field and the arts, to which autobiographical narratives also belong, Bourdieu (1993) demonstrated that agents struggle for recognition. Recognition in the literary field enables agents to succeed in other fields, for example to make economic profit or to gain political or social influence. Bourdieu's literary field is thus a "site of struggles in which what is at stake is the power to impose the dominant definition of the writer and therefore to delimit the population of those entitled to take part in the struggle to define the writer" (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 42).

According to Bourdieu (1993), fields are governed by a specific principle or internal logic that he terms "economy" – or "inverted economy" (p. 39) in the case of the field of cultural production. In the arts for instance, only writers who follow the principle of "art for art's sake" will be able to gain recognition inside the field. In his theory, Bourdieu distinguishes four types of capitals: cultural, social, economic and symbolical. Certain forms of capital, for example economic (monetary) or cultural (in the form of formal education) are not valued and do not guarantee the artist's success and recognition. Artists cannot buy recognition and a university degree does not guarantee an author's success. Moreover, if agents neglect the governing principle, they will be excluded from the field. That is why writers writing for economic profit "most often fall into oblivion" (ibid.) and writers who act in a "disinterested" (ibid.) fashion will gain recognition. In this regard Bourdieu speaks of the autonomous principle that governs the field of cultural production, which inverts the principles of ordinary economy.

Nevertheless, as Bourdieu (1993) explains for the field of cultural production, the autonomy regarding economic and political principles of hierarchisation is only relative. The laws of the fields that surround it affect the degree of independence in the cultural field: even for a field as autonomous as the arts, economic profit and political influence have an effect. Recognition inside the field of cultural production depends to some degree on the distribution of the book, and cultural capital inside the field often translates into economic and social capital outside the field. In other words: celebrated authors are making economic profit from book sales and are respected by the public. In this regard, Bourdieu (1993) speaks of the heteronomous principle,

[11] Bourdieu has analysed among others the juridical field in *The Force of Law: Towards a Sociology of the Juridical Field (1987)*, the academic field in *Homo Academicus (1988)* and the cultural field in general *Reproduction in Society, Education and Culture (1977)*.

the principle that is opposed to the autonomous principle in the field. The heteronomous principle has an influence on the field, because "[n]o cultural product exists by itself, i.e. outside the relations of interdependence which link it to other products" (p. 33).

The concept of the field complements Bourdieu's theory of practice. It is the field that restricts or facilitates practice and defines the logic and strategies for achieving success. Bourdieu (1984; 1993) demonstrated how the analytical concept of the field can be used to analyse cultural practices and how it is influencing and is in turn influenced by social processes.[12]

Bourdieu's analytical concepts are fruitful for the analysis of the practice of writing autobiographical narratives by officers because the analytical concept of the field links the analysis of cultural products – in my case autobiographical narratives – to the analysis of social processes such as generational and social changes inside the military. The analysis of cultural products and practices, in our case autobiographical narratives by military officers, thus informs us of the social and cultural role and location of the officer corps. In the case of Pakistani military officers, the practice of writing autobiographical narratives for a wider non-military public locates the writing officers outside a narrower military field. As I will argue in section 3.5, officers thus play a role as cultural producers who are preoccupied with the historiography of Pakistan.

In the following, I will first address the logic and economy behind writing autobiographical narratives by looking at how agents make sense of their practice. Some officers indicate that being motivated to write because they want to rehabilitate themselves in public, others want to be exemplary. Second, it is necessary to understand who is able to succeed in the publication of an autobiographical narrative and thus can take part in the negotiation processes in the field.

### 3.2 The field of Pakistani military autobiographical narratives

To set out a field, the task for the researcher is both to illustrate the rules and regularities of the field (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 98), and to describe the character (temporary or over a period of time) of the struggle that constitutes the field (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 42). In this subchapter I tackle the first task, by proceeding in two steps (tracing the genesis and evolution of the field from the 1960s up to the 2010s will occupy us in subchapter 3.4). In the first step, I

[12] Most prominently in Bourdieu, Pierre (1984), *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*, Harvard University Press and Bourdieu, Pierre (1993), *The Field of Cultural Production, or: The Economic World Reversed*, In: The Field of Cultural Production: essays on art and literature / Pierre Bourdieu, edited and introduced by Randal Johnson, Columbia University Press.

will outline the field of military autobiographical narratives. For this, I describe the underlying logic of the field by examining the regularities of the practice of writing autobiographical narratives in 3.2.1. I argue that the practice of writing military autobiographical narratives by Pakistani officers is governed by the principle of making historical truth claims. In 3.2.2, I show how the positions inside the field relate to each other through intertextuality, and the reference to historical events, primarily events surrounding the Partition of the subcontinent in 1947 and the Tragedy of 1971. Finally, I will address the positions inside the field in 3.2.3. In the second step, I briefly address the relations of the field of military autobiographical narrative production to the wider social, political and cultural field in 3.3.

### 3.2.1 Autonomous principle: Historical truth claim

As Bourdieu (1993) demonstrated for the field of cultural production, the autonomous principle of the field is economic disinterest and agents inside the field produce "art for art's sake". Although the writing of autobiographical narratives can be considered to be cultural practice and agents in the field of military autobiographical narrative do not strive for economic profit, officers would rarely consider their autobiographical narratives as art.

To illustrate the underlying logic that governs the field of autobiographical narrative production, I start with the observation of regularities found inside the text. For this study, I coded the framing of the autobiographical text; indications about the motivation for writing; reference to, as well as praise and critique of other texts. Here I focus on three dimensions in order to describe the governing principle of the field. First, I analyse how the autobiographical texts are framed in general. Second, I explore the motivations of writing autobiographies, or in other words, the authors' self-legitimisation strategies to produce military autobiographies. And third, I analyse how the autobiographies position themselves in relation to other texts inside the field.[13]

The framing locates the autobiographical narrative in relation to other established genres and positions inside a field. Most often editors, publishers, social scientists, historians, and fellow senior officers framed the works as 'history', 'military', 'autobiography' and/or 'literature'.

[13] In addition to positions inside the field of military autobiographical narrative production, agents also position themselves in relation to other texts primarily to historiography. The relation to 'other fields' will be dealt with under 3.3.

The dust jacket text of Admiral Sirohey's *Truth Never Retires: An Autobiography* (1995)[14] is an example for the predominant occurrence of 'history' in the coded sample. It reads:

> "Few autobiographies leave so undeniable an impression on the mind of the reader. 'The truth never Retires' [sic!] as the name implies, is indeed a writing with indelible imprint and cannot be termed as an ordinary bio-graphy [sic!]. It is a virtual testimony of an *eye witness* of the national drama staged over a period of 50 years. Admiral Sirohey's long and variegated part in the national scene, his vivid, *realistic* and *truthful* presentation of the facts has made the book an invaluable *contribution to our national history*, and an inspiring guidelines [sic!] for generations to come.
>
> The animated and solidifying hand of the author makes the book a *choice compendium* of professional ethics, politics, religion and international affairs. Unlike other bio-graphies, the writer shuns mixing of half fiction half truth displaying his *apathy for impaired and tempered information* [sic!]. The last part of the book is the most illuminating segment of this saga. It presents the Admiral's pragmatism and courage of expression. Flawless diction, immaculate grammar and fluency of language has [sic!] made 'The Truth Never Retires' an *objective book of reference* [my emphases]" (Sirohey, 1995, dust jacket).

Several aspects highlight the fact that Sirohey's book, although subtitled as an *autobiography*, is related to historiography rather than autobiography. First, Sirohey's work is not framed as the contribution of an author who presents his innermost feelings or at least his own viewpoints. And second, the attribute *subjective* – normally used in connection with autobiographical writing – is completely omitted and replaced by *objective*. The Admiral's text is framed as a historiographical contribution or even as historical facts. Subjectivity is not entirely absent, but rather a side note: The reference to *subjectivity* in this representation of the author is the indication to the position of an eyewitness – by someone who was there and witnessed "the national drama". The attributes employed in the framing of Sirohey's autobiography apply to a greater extend to the description and praise of a work of historiography. Of course, historiography and autobiography as genres both claim "freedom of invention" (Kreiswirth, 2000, p. 313), but editor Muzaffar Muhammad Ali of Jang publishers clearly advertises the Admiral's work on the dust jacket as history – literally an objective book of reference that makes a contribution to national history. The framing on the dust jacket by the editor reflects Sirohey's own positioning. In the introduction, he emphasises his contribution to writing objective history and to presenting facts (Sirohey, 1995, p. 11). Besides narrating battles, accusing national leaders – especially politicians and describing the present of Pakistan

[14] Sirohey, Admiral Ifthikhar Ahmed (1996), *Truth Never Retires*, Jang Publishers, Lahore.

in chaos, where corruption, favouritism, nepotism and sectarianism are omnipresent – he purportedly commits himself to the representation of historical events.

"History-writing," as Meir Sternberg noted, "is not a record of fact – of what 'really happened' – but a discourse that claims to be a record of fact" (Sternberg, 1987, p. 25). While some Pakistani officers would deny the ability to 'objectively' write what 'really happened', the majority of narratives of Pakistani officers, like Sirohey, make historical truth claims. This corresponds to the motivation for writing autobiographical narratives given by the officers: The most frequently found motivations in the text corpus are: 'to correct historical misrepresentation', 'to uncover the truth', 'to clear the opaque haze', 'to discharge a national duty', 'to be exemplary' and, 'to satisfy readers' interest'.

Besides the framing, there are four features indicating that military autobiographical narratives of Pakistani officers are governed by the principle of making historical truth claims. First, officers referring to the process and the motivation of writing autobiographical accounts frequently allude to some sort of accountability. Maj. Gen. Sher Ali Pataudi (1978)[15] for example writes that he is "very conscious of the fact that nothing should be written which is not the truth. This constant feeling of being watched and of accountability has helped me a great deal in keeping straight in this twisty world" (p. 10). Second, officers indicate that their commitment to historical accuracy led them to consult history books and do research in archives before and during their compilation of their autobiographical narrative. Officer Shafaat Ali (2007) [16] even apologises to the reader for not giving exact details. Third, the commitment to historical accuracy leads some officers to incorporate material from the archives as well as references to history books into their narrative – backing up their claim with extensive paratextual elements, such as attached letters, reports, dispatches, newspaper-clips, certificates, maps, and copied sections of historical works. Finally, the value of the principle of historical truth is further reflected in the praise of other military autobiographical accounts: Journals reviewing autobiographical accounts by officers rarely praise them for literary quality – it is the contribution to history and accuracy that generate positive reviews in journals such as the *National Defence Journal*, *Hilāl* or the *Pakistan Army Journal*.

In order to demonstrate the autonomy of the field of military autobiographical narrative production in Pakistan, I illustrate how truth claim governs the practice of writing

[15] Pataudi, Maj. Gen. S. A. (1978), *Al-Qissas: The Story of Soldiering and Politics in Pakistan*, Wajadalis, Lahore.
[16] Shafaat, Col. Syed Ali (2007), *The Soldier – Memoirs of Colonel (Retd) Syed Shafaat Ali*, Royal Book Company, Karachi.

autobiographical narratives and to exhibit how the dispute about the principle of historical accuracy and truth upholds the field.

Inside the text the autonomy is most noticeably addressed when the authors condemn writing autobiographical accounts for self-promotion. Generally, officers consider writing a first person narrative as problematic and spill a lot of ink discussing the narrative mode. On the one hand, writing in the first person singular – even when written as "dispassionately as possible" (Ayub Khan, 1968, p. v.) or "dispassionate and objective" (Shahid Hamid, 1988, p. xvii.) – poses the problem of *objectivity*. As Siddiq (2004) puts it: "No matter how hard one tries to stay neutral and true to facts, it is practically impossible to remain absolutely accurate and objective in a first person singular account such as the present work" (p. xii). Besides objectivity, writers recognise aggrandisement to be problematic. General Shahid Hamid (1988) elaborates in the introduction to his autobiography why he considers "writing about oneself" as "the most difficult form of writing" (p. xv.). For General Shahid Hamid, autobiographical accounts frequently "degenerate into ego-trips" (ibid.), where authors are inclined to "hide one's faults and shortcomings and appear larger than life" (ibid.). And self-glorification of extraordinary achievements is something, "which the readers are least interested" (ibid.). For Hamid, it is important, but at the same time difficult to produce a first person narrative:

> "It requires courage and conviction to produce a truthful and unvarnished account. This does not mean that the writer should not give his honest and candid viewpoint, as long as it is objective. In our own humble way we are all part of history and our writing should be indicative of the socio-economic ethos of our times; so that the story of our times can be adequately interpreted by latter day historians" (ibid.).

The first person singular narrative mode in many autobiographical narratives is stipulated by the third person singular narrative mode. And numerous times the authors change from the first person to the third person singular in their autobiographical narratives, especially when contextualising events and personalities. As I will show further below, many authors in addition to autobiographical narratives also published historical works, regimental histories and military treaties as third person narratives. Military officers choose the first person narrative mode for specific reasons: witnessing, giving an honest viewpoint, narrating an objective account, the principle of being there, seeing and observing from a short distance are valuable for the officers and appear in most introductions as a motivation to produce a text. Thereby, historical truth claim and objectivity seem guaranteed, when the authors are close to national leaders. Lt. Gen.

Gul Hassan Khan (1993)[17] for example starts his preface with these two sentences: "The motivation for writing this account is that fate placed me in close proximity to personalities who were destined to make history. Thus, I was enabled to witness momentous events from a ring-side seat" (p. ix.).

Most officers value proximity to historic national figures and events. In Lt. Gen Gul Hassan Khan's case, the proximity to the ring also qualifies him to better see what happened, in contrast to those who sat further away. Proximity as a theme is even traceable in titles, for example in Maj. Latif's *...Plus Bhutto's Episode – An Autobiography* (1993) or in Group Captain Mian Ata Rabbani's *I was the Quaid's ADC* (1996).[18] Maj. Rahat Latif capitalises on his proximity to the imprisoned former Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, while Gp Capt. Rabbani benefits from his proximity to the founder of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah.

As I have shown with the example of Admiral Sirohey and others at the beginning of the chapter, the internal logic of the field is commonly addressed in connection to the motivation for writing an autobiographical narrative. The internal logic also points to the autonomous principle of the field. Writing historical truth for officers is a form of *disinterest* and often considered a national duty. Autobiographies and memoirs are part of the field of cultural production, and authors of autobiographical narratives frequently state that they do not write for profit or for the "sake of popularity". Admiral Sirohey (1996) considers it a "national trust worth discharging, [sic!] that would be useful for the future generation" (p. 11). Besides the correction of historical misrepresentation, the second most commonly found theme when explaining why the authors write, is writing for the next generation to avoid the mistakes made in the past. As a consequence, for many officers, writing an autobiographical account is not only a "contribution to the history" (Musharraf, 2006, p. xii.), "but [a] way of fulfilling my small responsibility towards my country" (Haider, 2010, p. xxvi). Writing history is considered to be a selfless duty the officer performs for the future generation.

### 3.2.2 Relations between positions

In the fulfilment of their duty to write historically correct autobiographical narratives, officers are not alone. The authors find themselves in relation to other writing agents and in a field where self-narrations of other officers as well as official histories, both military and

[17] Khan, Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan (1993), *Memoirs of Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan Khan*, Oxford University Press, Karachi.
[18] Latif, Maj. Rahat (1993), *...Plus Bhutto's Episode – An Autobiography*, Jang Publishers, Karachi; Rabbani, Gp Capt. Mian Ata Rabbani (1996), *I Was the Quaid's ADC*, Oxford University Press.

political, exist and exert influence. Reference to other autobiographical texts and works of history is an increasing feature of officers' autobiographical narratives. From the late 1990s until today, it is (more) common to find a bibliography and an index at the end of the autobiographies.[19] For the agents, the field of military autobiographical narrative production demands intertextual reference not only in order to locate the narratives in relation to each other, but also to value the principal of historical truth claim. Coming back to Admiral Sirohey's dust-jacket text quoted at the beginning of this chapter, it becomes clear that the framing distances his work from other biographies that are considered as mixing fact with fiction and give tempered information. In his autobiographical narrative *Flight of the Falcon* (2010), Air Commodore Sayed Sajad Haider refers to 'un-truthful narratives' that have produced an "opaque haze" (p. xx.). In writing his story, Haider sets out to "uncover the reasons why we have suffered ignominy under corrupt, incompetent and dishonest leaders" (p. vii.).

By referencing other texts, officers guarantee that they are writing historical facts. The form of intertextuality is also often connected with accusations. As Chishti (1989)[20] explains his intention: "[It] is not to write against anybody or to carry out character assassinations, but to make an honest effort to record events of Pakistan's recent history correctly and without inhibition" (p. xv.). Sirohey (1995) remarks, "that except for a very few senior officers (not only the military leaders) all others who had been party to the epoch making events in the country or witnessed them from very close quarters, had abstained from writing" (p. 11). He felt the urge to write down his observations in order to preserve them for the next generation.

The focal point of historical truth claims is historical events. A first coding of the autobiographical narratives suggests that the two most significant events referred to are the Partition of the subcontinent in 1947 and the events surrounding the secession of Bangladesh in 1971. Nearly every autobiographical narrative refers to 1947 and 1971 in one way or another – this even holds true for authors who did not live through the events of the Partition. The Partition of British India in 1947 and the Tragedy[21] of 1971 are focal points of conflict in the field. The conflicts and positions occupied by agents of the field in regard to 1947 and 1971 deserve a thorough analysis. As I will demonstrate in chapters five and six, they are used to negotiate the authors' role in history, and to argue about their interpretations of history as well

[19] In the autobiographical narratives considered for this study, mostly persons and places are indexed. Indexes also include military units, training institutions and historical events.

[20] Chishti, Lt. Gen. Faiz Ali (1989), *Betrayals of Another Kind - Islam, Democracy and the Army in Pakistan*, Asia Publishing House, London, p. xv.

[21] The civil war of 1970/71, the international war with India and the secession of Bangladesh is commonly referred to as a 'Tragedy' (*almiyah* in Urdu).

as the national or 'Islamic ideology' of Pakistan.[22] Besides Partition and the Tragedy of 1971, conflicts circle around the professional ethics of the military and their venture into politics, the war of 1965 or the war in Kashmir. However, the events of 1971 are at the focal point of most conflicts.

This is illustrated by the conflict between Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan Khan and Maj. Gen. Aboobaker Osman Mitha emerging after the 1971 war in East Pakistan. Gul Hassan Khan was selected Commander in Chief by Prime Minister Bhutto who discharged A.O. Mitha and other generals. The retired generals were made responsible for the lost war in East Pakistan.[23] Gul Hassan Khan stayed on as Commander for two years until he too was discharged by Bhutto and sent to Austria as an ambassador.[24] Mitha and Khan were dishonourably dismissed, with their retirement benefits as well as their medals withdrawn.

Gul Hassan Khan's (1993)[25] "candid autobiography" as advertised on the book cover, is an attempt to "set the record straight" (dust jacket). Furthermore, the editor promotes Khan's memoirs because of his proximity to Muhammad Ali Jinnah as well as to Prime Minister Bhutto. Gul Hassan Khan, the editor writes, "narrates and analyses dispassionately the events of the Indian-Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971" (ibid.) as well as the "events after the fall of Dhaka" (ibid.). The framing as an objective account of a close observer corresponds to Khan's own self characterisation. In the preface he stresses that he had "resisted the temptation of calling on quarters which in my opinion are dubious: at the same time, I have steered clear of sensationalism, for which I have substituted reality – reality that has long been shrouded in mystery" (p. xii). Gul Hassan Khan acknowledges his own "blunders" (p. xi) for which he wants to share responsibility, however, the nature of these blunders are not addressed in the narrative. Published by Oxford University Press, Khan secured himself a publisher with international reputation. Within two years of the publication of *Memoirs,* Maj. Gen. A. O. Mitha produced a refute entitled *Fallacies and Realities – An Analysis of Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan's "Memoirs"*

[22] Officers refer in their texts to a national or Islamic ideology of Pakistan. Ideology is thereby used synonymously with concept or outlook of the state and loosely defined. While some officers chose to serve in Pakistan because of its ideology – for example Maj. Gen. Sir Ali Khan Pataudi (1978) – others argue that there was no clear ideology and the definition process of an 'Islamic' Pakistan failed. For the interpretation see chapter five and six.

[23] After the lost 1971 war, young officers under Brigadier Ali called for Yahya Khan to step down. This episode is narrated in many narratives, most prominently in Gul Hassan Khan's. More on the conflict see Nawaz (2008, p. 320f.).

[24] Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto replaced Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan Khan in 1973, together with the then air force chief Rahim Khan, see Nawaz (2008, p. 451).

[25] Khan, Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan (1993), *Memoirs of Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan Khan*, Oxford University Press, Karachi.

(1994).[26] *Fallacies and Realities* is the first direct critique of an autobiographical narrative of a writing officer. Over the next two decades several texts refuting previous autobiographical narratives were published.[27] In his refutation Mitha abstains from criticising the publication of autobiographies by officers as a contribution to history in general. He, however, cautions:

> "Autobiographies can be a valuable source of history when supported by reference to documents, or even a meticulously kept daily diary. If not, they tend to consist of highly selective memories of people and events, seen through the distorting lens of the writer's own ego" (Mitha, 1994, p. 15).

As demonstrated above, Mitha refers to the principle of historical truth claim. Furthermore, he delineates the prerequisites for writing an accurate account: to substantiate it with facts and documents. Mitha (1994) even asserts that very few accounts of other soldiers exist about the events and personalities described in Khan's book – a lack he and his editor in the foreword regret (p. 7, 14), adding:

> "Unless senior officers give accounts of what and why they took certain decisions, the story will remain shrouded in hearsay. Except for General Muhammad Musa, no senior commander has given his version. [...] The official histories of both wars have yet to be written. It is time that this was taken in hand" (p. 13).

In *Fallacies and Realities,* A. O. Mitha aims to deconstruct Gul Hassan Khan's personality. He accuses him of wrong intentions for writing an autobiographical account. Mitha (1994) hails Khan's self-characterisation of being humble and selfless as "hollow" (p. 15), alleging that Gul Hassan Khan tried to "create the impression of a frank and straight forward, no-nonsense military personality, who makes no bones about the people he dislikes or disparages" (ibid.). Mitha accuses Gul Hassan of shedding responsibility "with the aim of clearing himself of the accusations levelled against him of inefficiency as CGS [Chief of General Staff] and DMO [Director of Military Operations], disloyalty and utter immaturity" (ibid.) Another accusation directed at Gul Hassan Khan is his characterisation as a "mai-baap" (Urdu lit. mother-father) – a commander who demands personal loyalty of his subordinates; a practice inherited from the "imperialistic era" (p. 27) that is "not suitable to an independent country" (ibid.). In his memoir,

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[26] Mitha, Maj. Gen. Aboobaker Osman (1994), *Fallacies and Realities - An Analysis of Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan's "Memoirs",* Maktaba Fikr-o-Danish, Lahore.

[27] In later years the practice of publishing personal refutations of autobiographical narratives of other officers became common. Col. Ashfaq Hussain published a refutation to General Musharraf's Memoir *In the Line of Fire*, see Hussain, Col. Ashfaq A. (2008) *Witness to Blunder*, Idara Matbuaat-e-Sulemani, Lahore. Outside the field of military autobiographical narrative production, refutations to Musharraf's autobiography are numerous. A compilation of critiques in Urdu can be found in Nadīm, Ḥāfiẓ Muḥammad (2006), *Sab se pahle kaun? Janral Parvez Musharraf kī āp bītī naqd o naẓar ke ā'īne meṉ*, dārulkitāb, lāhaur.

Mitha alleges that Gul Hassan Khan never complains about the British senior officers during his service in the British Indian Army, but after the transfer to the newly created Pakistan Army all of a sudden, "all senior officers were inexperienced and inefficient dead wood. This attitude was common amongst many "westernised" officers who belonged to this part of the subcontinent" (p. 31). Mitha also refutes Khan's assessment of military leaders as well as the "lurid imaginings of 'coteries' and 'mafias' within the army" (p. 73). He concludes that Khan wrote his book to

> "silence the accusations against him. The positions he held in GHQ in '65 and again in '71 were such that he cannot escape responsibility, try as he does to pin it on others – with whom he failed to make a working relationship. The army 'expects every man to do his duty' irrespective of personal likes and dislikes. To distract the reader from the actual flow of events, he writes in a sensational manner, making venomous innuendos against seniors and colleagues" (p. 76).

### 3.2.3 Positions inside the field

So far, I have demonstrated that, in the case of Pakistani officers, writing autobiographical narratives as a practice is connected to historiography, rather than fiction. As Bourdieu has elaborated, fields do not exist independently, and autonomy in terms of economic and political hierarchisation inside the field of cultural production is only partial. Because autobiographical narratives are cultural products, the distribution of their book is a prerequisite for agents to gain access to the field. Distribution, however, is governed by the economics of the book market, and factors such as the military rank of the author and the positions he occupied during his military and/or civil career have an influence. Several factors thus define the positions agents occupy inside the field. The most prominent are military rank, previously held military positions, language of publication, and the form of publication.

Military rank as an institutionalised cultural and symbolic capital in the military and a wider social field often translates into high social status. This is particularly true in Pakistan where high-ranking officers form part of a social elite with considerable political, economic and cultural influence.[28] In the field of military autobiographical narrative production, however, military rank does not always guarantee an officer's recognition or praise for his work. Some officers struggle to get access to the field at all, and resort to self-publication, while others

[28] For a discussion of the social position of military officers in Pakistan see chapter two. For a discussion of the military as positional, economic and social elite see for example Qadeer (2006, p. 220f.), Hussain (1979, p. 126f.), Aziz (2008, p. 83f.), and Siddiqa (2007).

secure a wide readership through a book company.[29] As I will show below, the distribution of the autobiographical narrative, and with it the ability to gain recognition in the field in Pakistan are connected to the book company the author secures. While a high military rank does not secure an officer the ability to publish, it facilitates publication with an international publishing house or a local capitalistic publisher with a high print run.

Agents with economic and military capital – in the form of military rank and merit – are able to convert their capital into the symbolic capital of the field of military autobiographical narrative production. As the publication of military autobiographical narratives in book form seems prestigious for officers, some try to convert economic capital into symbolic capital by publishing their works by themselves.[30] Conversely, recognition inside the field of military autobiographical narrative production can be converted into economic profit. Furthermore, officers who are successful in the field of military autobiographical narrative production can convert their accumulated symbolic capital in the form of merit in other fields.

While the language of publication and the rank of its author have an influence on the position agents occupy inside the field, the distribution of the autobiographical narrative and with it the possibility of finding a readership depends on the publishing house and print run.[31] In Pakistan the institution's publisher, printer and bookseller are usually integrated in a single company without a specific line-up of publications (Haider, 1996, p. 307). It is thus more adequate to speak of book companies than of publishers, printers or booksellers. Besides the private commercial book companies, learned bodies[32] and government agencies produce books, although very seldom narratives by Pakistani officers.

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[29] In the case of the publishing industry in Pakistan it is more adequate to speak of "book companies", as the publisher, printer and distributer are integrated into a single company. See 3.2.4.

[30] However, self-publication does not secure a wide readership. See 3.2.4.

[31] To describe the positions occupied by the writing officers, differences between publishers and the change of the publishing landscape over time need to be taken into account. Unfortunately, little research has been conducted on book publishing in Pakistan that focuses on the social setting of publishers or uses a historical perspective that would help to describe the field of book production in Pakistan. See for example Khurshid, A. (2000), *Planning and Management of Library and Information Services in Pakistan,* Library & Information Services Group, Karachi, *a* collection of articles by the author on the challenges libraries face due to the book industry in Pakistan. Three monographs help to give an overview on book publishing in Pakistan. There is Ali, A. (1967), *Bookworld of Pakistan,* National Book Centre of Pakistan, Karachi, and Ibrahim Saad, I and Kats, I. (eds.) (1994), *Reader on Book Publishing in Pakistan,* Royal Book Co., which incorporate different perspectives on the topic and draw a general picture of book publishing in Pakistan. Information scientists and librarians in Pakistan conduct research on books and publishing; however, they focus more on policy aspects for libraries and government agencies. The most valuable contribution to the analysis of the book world in Pakistan using a historical approach is Haider, S. J. (1996), *Book trade in Pakistan,* In: Gutenberg Jahrbuch, pp. 298-314. Haider outlines the history of publishing and the book industry in the subcontinent form the 16th century up to the 1990s. He highlights the different institutions and government policies and sums up most research conducted in the field.

[32] Learned bodies are associations that try to preserve a heritage or produce scholarly work. See Ali (1967, pp. 35-40), and Haider, (1996, p. 308).

Specific to Pakistan is the abundance of publishers, as there are "as many publishers as there are books" (Saad and Kats, 1994, p. 29) and a growing number of "one-book publishers" – mostly authors who fail to find a regular publisher for their work. Nevertheless, certain circumstances and criteria help to group book companies: In Pakistan publishers distinguish themselves by the quantity and physical quality of books they produce, by the language of publication, and to a certain degree by a thematic focus and the means of distribution. The fact that there are only about 20 publishers who publish more than ten books per year in the whole of Pakistan (Saad and Kats, 1994, p. 29), further helps to sketch the setting of the book companies in the book world of Pakistan. Books are not common goods in Pakistan and the print run in 90 per cent of cases is between 500 and 2,000 copies only, with the standard being about 1,000 copies per title (Saad and Kats, 1994, p. 30. By distinguishing book companies according to quality and quantity of output, language, thematic focus and distribution, it is possible to group four types of companies: (1) one-book publishers, (2) international companies, (3) local-traditional and (4) local-capitalistic book companies.

(1) One-book publishers are very common in Pakistan, comprising self-publishing authors as well as institutions and learned bodies that produce books. One-book publishers usually publish one title, in almost all cases in only a single edition. Since they produce books at their own cost and sometimes with no institutional backing, quantity and quality vary according to the financial means of the author. As Saad and Kats (1994) indicate, self-published books are hard to distribute through the open book market, although some of the titles are likely to be found in bookshops and in libraries. The circulation of works by one-book publishers is thus limited and most likely the titles are distributed among the author's friends and family members. Example of military autobiographical narratives produced and distributed by one-book publishers are Mukhtār Aḥmad Gīlānī's *Saikshan se baṭāliy'an* (1981)[33], Col Muḥammad Ẓahūrulḥaq's *Dāstān-i ḥayāt*,[34] and Brig. Sayd Shah Abul Qasim's *Life Story of an Ex-Soldier*.[35] Ẓahūrulḥaq published his book through the *Āfisars opin akaiḍamī* – an institution he founded and presides that helps candidates to prepare for the PMS (Provincial Management Services) and the CSS (Central Superior Services) examination and does not publish other books. Brigadier Qasim published his book with the company Publicity Panel, the company's only available publication.

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[33] Gīlānī, Mukhtār Aḥmad (1981), *Saikshan se baṭāliy'an – dūsrī jang-i 'aẓīm, Kashmīr kī jang-i āzādī, Sitambar 1965 aur Disambar 1971 kī Pāk-o Bhārat jangon ke tajribāt par mabnī maẓāmīn*, Mukhtār Aḥmad Gīlānī.

[34] Ẓahūrulḥaq, Col. Muḥammad (2007), *Dāstān-i ḥayāt: ek ma'mūlī shakhs kī ghair ma'mūlī āp bītī = Extra-ordinary Auto-biography of an Ordinary Person,* lāhaur: āfisars opin akaiḍamī nigārishāt.

[35] Qasim, Brig. Syed Shah Abul (2003), *Life Story of an Ex-Soldier*, Karachi, Publicity Panel.

(2) International publishers are distinguished by a national and international readership in English, the most prominent example being Oxford University Press of Pakistan, which published seven of the first editions of the autobiographical narratives used for this study. Oxford University Press Pakistan was established 1952 as a branch of Oxford University Press and like its motherhouse focuses on academic and educational texts, as well as on academic reference books, primarily in English. On their website, Oxford University Press Pakistan presents itself as the only respected multi-national publisher of high-quality texts in Pakistan, running an online bookstore and nine bookshops countrywide. Books published by Oxford University Press Pakistan are of good quality, with numerous illustrations and photographs and are considerably more expensive than books from other book companies. Oxford University Press can be characterised as a publishing house with prestige and an international setting. If Oxford University Press (OUP) commissions the publishing of an autobiographical narrative, it is likely to find an international readership outside Pakistan. In contrast to other book companies that have only started publishing autobiographical narratives recently, OUP Pakistan has a tradition of publishing autobiographical narratives by officers, and national as well as international leaders dating back to the 1970s. Frequent among OUP publications are texts by high-ranking officers, from the rank of Major General to General and by officers who pursued a political career after serving in the armed forces. Publications with OUP are thus closely associated with academic texts in English and autobiographical narratives of historical and political leaders, both national and international. Autobiographical texts of the military officers at OUP are categorised in the Academic/Trade Books section under Biography/Memoir, as well as under Strategic Studies and History/Pakistan Studies.

(3) Vanguard, Dost, Nigarishāt, Royal Book Company, Jumhūrī, Sang-e-Meel[36] Ferozsons, Paramount and Al-hamra can be categorized as traditional book publishing companies. These companies publish more than ten titles per year in addition to a large number of textbooks for schools. Most of the book companies carry autobiographical narratives by military officers. Books from traditional publishers are of mixed physical quality and vary in price, although they are considerably cheaper than books from international publishers like OUP and are thus affordable for a wider readership. In contrast to international publishers, traditional and progressive publishers produce books for the local market and for a readership that cannot afford to purchase books from international publishers. Traditional book companies also produce books and textbooks for the local market. According to their self-labelling, local

[36] Sang-e-Meel could also be described as a local capitalistic publishing company. It is one of the few publishing houses that pays its authors.

traditional publishers can be further divided into traditional and progressive. Progressive publishers such as Jumhūrī Publications specialise in progressive, critical perspectives and publish their own translation of authors they categorise as social activists such as Noam Chomsky, Howard Zinn and Ramsey Clark. Progressive publishing houses like Vanguard or Jumhūrī Publications were founded in the 1970s to counterbalance the National Book Foundation by publishing books that countered national propaganda.[37] Officers publishing with progressive publishers write books that accuse leaders or the so-called establishment or demolish national myths. Examples of these texts are Air Commodore Sajad Haider's *Flight of the Falcon*[38] or Maj. Aftab Ahmed's *General! I Accuse You.*[39]

(4) Local capitalistic publishers produce current affairs texts with a high circulation, as well as translations of successfully reprinted autobiographical narratives.[40] In their thematic orientation they are close to progressive publishers but differ in the advertising possibilities and the authors they commission. Their focus lies on officers that played an important role in current affairs, like Lt. Gen. Ali Chishti under Zia ul-Haq, Maj. Rahat Latif under Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto or Maj. Gen. Tajammul Malik in the coup against Zia ul-Haq in 1980. Local capitalistic publishers are exceptions to the rule of having relatively small print runs in Pakistan. The Publishing house Jang, an offspring of the Jang Group of Newspapers, produces books with 5,000 to 10,000 copies per edition (Saad and Kats, 1994, p. 34).

## The field of military autobiographical narrative production

[37] Vanguard for example was established in 1978 by the journalist Najam Sethi who was detained as a political prisoner by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto from 1975 to 1977 for protesting against military action in Baluchistan province. For the publication of controversial books in the 1980s Sethi was detained several times and his publishing house Vanguard closed.

[38] Haider, Air Cdre S. Sajad (2010), *Flight of the Falcon,* Vanguard Books, Lahore.

[39] Ahmad, Maj. Aftab (2004), *General! I Accuse You – From Attock Fort*, Jumhoori Publications, Lahore.

[40] A prominent example is the translation and publication by Jang publishers of Maj. Gen. Tajammal Hussain, *The Story of my Struggle* from 1992 as *Merī jidd-o jahd kī dāstān* in 1996.




### 3.3 Relations to other fields

The field of military autobiographical narrative production does not exist by itself but is situated (and partly) governed by the wider fields surrounding it. The following graphic gives an overview of the overlapping of different fields within the field of military autobiographical narrative production in Pakistan:

**Field and subfields**




The field of military autobiographical narrative production is part of the field of cultural production and overlaps with the subfields of historiography (particularly military historiography), literature and military professional literature, such as training and tactic guides, and treaties on leadership. The field of cultural production itself is a constituent of the wider field of power and class relations in Pakistan.[41] In contrast to the wider field of cultural production, military autobiographical narrative production constructs its own "playing field",

[41] In the sense of Bourdieu (1989), class designates active classes or groups with common interests.

with restricted access. The prerequisite for taking part in the field of military autobiographical narrative production is the military socialisation of the agents.

Officers position themselves not exclusively in the field of military autobiographical narrative production but are also agents in other subfields of the field of cultural production. In certain fields of cultural production, officers compete with agents from a non-military background, such as historians and writers and are relatively successful. For example, there are numerous low-ranking officers who have written texts regarded to be valuable contributions to Urdu literature[42] – most prominently Mējar Sayyid Ḍamīr Jaʿafrī[43] or Līfṭīnanṭ Karnil Ġẖulām Jīlānī Kẖān.[44] In the field of historiography officers also occupy an influential position. The two main reasons lie with the historiography of Pakistan. First, besides attending to the formation of the state, the historiography of Pakistan is a chain of key events of high politics in which officers play an important part: the Tragedy of 1971, the war of 1965, the conflict over Kashmir, the military rule of Ayub Khan, Zia ul-Haq and Musharraf. Because of the proximity to high politics, officers write confidently and authoritatively about these events. Second, as I will further elaborate in chapter four and five, the historiography of the two key events Partition and the Tragedy lack a "master narrative" (Gilmartin, p. 1068) or constitute a "narrative vacuum" (Cilano, 2011, p. 2). In regard to the Tragedy, the vacuum is even recognised by the officers themselves, as Maj. Gen. Sher Ali Khan Pataudi (1978) in his autobiography about the historiography of 1971 remarks:

> "Indians have written 'books' on their wars. Critical ones. They have tried to learn from their mistakes by trying to analyse the events as they understood them or as they saw them or as they even pretended to see them. At least something must come out. Are we so short of talent in this field that except for one or two schoolbook type of books on basic soldiering nothing else can be written? Or is it because of the atmosphere that has prevailed in our country that to write anything about Defence Forces was taboo or anything of a critical form by anyone be he a soldier, was near 'treason'." (p. 394).

The field of military professional literature is constituted of the relation of agents concerned with the production of literature regarding aspects of the military profession, such as tactics, training and leadership. The production of military treaties on tactics, training and leadership

[42] Numerous examples can be found inside Sarvar, Ṯāhirah (2013), *ʿAsākar-i Pākistān kī adabū kẖidmāt: Urdū naṣar meṉ*, Akādimiyāt, Lāhaur; and Kanḍān, Shākir (2000), *Urdu Adab Aur ʿAsākir-e Pākistān*.

[43] Mējar Sayyid Ḍamīr Jaʿafrī was most famous for his humorous poetry. However, he wrote numerous texts about army life, for example *Jang kī Rang* (1953), about army life during World War II; *Gōrē Kālē Sipāhī* (1988), a collection of autobiographical narratives with fictional sections; and *Ḍamīr Ḥāḍir Ḍamīr Ġāʾib* (1989), a diary of his life in the army. For more information about Ḍamīr Jaʿafrī see Sarvar (2013).

[44] For more on the works of līfṭīnanṭ karnil ġẖulām jīlānī kẖān see Sarvar (2103, pp. 247-63).

are heavily institutionalised, i.e. the agents are affiliated with military institutions, such as the National Defence College or Pakistan Military Academy and the contributions are published in the military publications such as the Pakistan Army Greenbook, Defence Journal etc. However, there are several agents that have published professional military literature for a wider audience and outside of the military institutions. The most prominent example is Lt. Gen. Attiqur Rehman.[45]

As demonstrated in chapter two, outside the field of cultural production, officers form part of a social elite with considerable political and economic influence.[46] One of the main arguments I make in the construction and representation of the Pakistani military 'self' is the influence in the cultural field, particularly on historiography officers exercise through the practice of writing military autobiographical narratives.

### 3.4 Historical evolution of the field

The relations of the positions that constitute the field military autobiographical narratives has evolved over time. By publishing autobiographical narratives the agents locate themselves in relations to other positions and compete for recognition inside the field. Every publication has to be understood as an act in position-taking that either values the rules of the field or attempts to shape it. In this subchapter I tackle the task of describing the character of the struggle that constitutes the field (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 42). Adhering to a chronological description of how the field evolved, I first turn to military autobiographical narratives as a British-military text tradition before the creation of Pakistan. Then, I describe what I see as the constitutive moment of the field of military autobiographical narratives in Pakistan in the late 1960s and the formulation of positions in the 1970s and 1980s. In the last subsection, I highlight three developments that emerged in the 1990s: first, the increase in military autobiographical narrative production; second, the tendency to write or translate autobiographical accounts into

[45] Attiqur Rahman's autobiographical narrative *Back to the Pavilion* will be analysed in chapter four. Attiqur authored five books on military professional subjects: Attiqur Rahman, Mohammed (1973), *Leadership: Junior Commanders*, Ferozsons; Attiqur Rahman, Mohammed (1973), *Leadership: Senior Commanders*, Ferozsons; Attiqur Rahman, Mohammed (1976), *Our Defence Cause: An Analysis of Pakistan's Past and Future Military Role*, White Lion Publishers; Attiqur Rahman, Mohammed (1978), *Reflections on Infantry*, Wajidalis; Attiqur Rahman, Mohammed (1981), *Reflections on the Principles of Surprise and Deception*, Wajidalis.

[46] For a discussion of the social position of military officers in Pakistan see chapter two. For a discussion of the military as positional, economic and social elite see for example Qadeer, A. Muhammad (2006), *Pakistan Social and Cultural Transformations in a Muslim Nation*, (p 220f).; Hussain, Asaf (1979), *Elite Politics in an Ideological State: The Case of Pakistan*, (p 126f.), Mazhar, Aziz (2008), *Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State,* (p. 83f.); Siddiqa, Ayesha (2007), *Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's military economy*.

Urdu; and third, the effects of the change in the publication industry for the consumption of military autobiographical narratives in Pakistan. I argue, these three developments determine which agents are able to take part in the negotiation process of constructing and representing the Pakistani military 'self'.

### 3.4.1 Military autobiographical narratives before Pakistan

The practice of writing military autobiographical narratives was a tradition established long before Admiral Sirohey dictated his autobiography to this *subedar.*[47] The genre of texts soldiers or men at war write has been analysed most prominently by Samuel Hynes, Alex Vernon and Yoval Harari.[48] The military writing characterised by Lawson-Peebles (2005) as writing that "make[s] claims to truth sustained by details, reflect[s] upon life and hope[s] to be exemplary" (p. 61) was a tradition particularly honoured in the British Indian Army.

Pakistani officers entering the service of the British Indian Army and being educated at British military institutions like the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst or Indian Military Academy at Dehradun were well aware of this literary genre. Texts from Winston Churchill *My Early Life: A Roving Commission (1930); A River War* (1899); *The Story of the Malakand Field Force: An Episode of Frontier War (1898)* or from T. E. Lawrence: *Revolt in the Desert (1927), The Mint* (1936)*,* were on the reading list of officers' courses and later served as a textual role model.[49] On the sub-continent, officers from the British Indian Army who were the chiefs of the first generation of Pakistani officers wrote autobiographical texts that are regarded as classics. Among them are texts by Bill Slim (1956), Yeats-Brown (1930) and Tuker (1950). The reference by Pakistani military officers to these texts, such as Field Marshal Sir William Slim's *Defeat into Victory (1956),* Major Francis Charles Claypon Yeats-Brown's *The Lives of a Bengal Lancer (1930)* or Sir Francis Ivan Simms Tuker's *While Memory serves (1950)* is frequent.[50]

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[47] Subedar designates the highest rank of non-commissioned officers in the British Indian Army. In the Pakistan Army the Subedar is a middle grade Junior Commissioned Officer (JCO). See Faiz (2003, p. 167).

[48] Hynes, Samuel (1998), *The Soldiers' Tale: Bearing Witness to Modern War*, Penguin Books, Vernon, Axel (ed.) (2001), *Arms and the Self: War, the Military, and Autobiographical Writing*, Kent State University Press, Harari, Yoval Noah (2007), *Military Memoirs: A Historical Overview of the Genre from the Middle Ages to the Late Modern Era*, In: War in History, 2007 14 (3), pp. 289-309.

[49] Ali (2007) for example indicates that texts by De Gaulle, Atatürk and Napoleon have a good reputation inside the Pakistani military. Reference to these texts is found inside several autobiographical narratives, for example inside Musa (1984) and Khan (1993).

[50] Lt. Gul Hassan Khan (1993) for example dedicates his memoir to William Slim. Ayub Khan (1967) refers to Francis Tuker (p. 18). Mitha (2003) refers to Field Marshal Wavell, (p. 55, 276).

Besides the military autobiographical narratives in English, there were established diverse Urdu literary genres besides autobiographies such as *ṭanz-o-mazaḥ* (wit and humour), *afsāna* (story) or *safarnāmah* (travelogue) which were written in the first person singular. As Oesterheld (2015) notes, the genre of autobiography in Urdu itself varies greatly in style, and texts often overflow with anecdotes and fragments from other texts, such as letters and verses. Before the Partition of the Indian subcontinent, exclusively a social elite wrote Urdu autobiographies – writers considered from the middle-class produced autobiographies only after the Partition.

### 3.4.2 Early narratives and genesis of the field

By 1968 only two autobiographical narratives by officers were published and they could not differ more: Field Marshal Ayub Khan wrote his autobiography *Friends not Masters* (1967) and Col. Muḥammad K̲h̲ān his narrative *Ba jang āmad* (1968).[51] The former was written in English and published with the international publishing house Oxford University Press. *Friends not Masters* is aimed at an international audience and the English-speaking elite in Pakistan. Ayub Khan adds a glossary for Urdu terms used in the narrative and compiles a list of short biographies about political leaders in Pakistan. The book has a tendency to explain Pakistan and Ayub's dealings to an international public and presents a story of an international leader, his career in the army, and national and international politics. *Friends not Masters* was translated into several languages and reviewed in international newspapers and journals.[52] K̲h̲ān's text, on the contrary, is written in Urdu and parts of it were published in the Army Magazine *Hilāl* (K̲h̲ān, 1968, p. 12) and later as a book with the local publishing house Urdu daijist. The text is a humorous story of the author as a lieutenant joining the armed forces under the British filled with episodes of his life inside the army. The text is aimed at young soldiers joining the army (K̲h̲ān, 1968, p. 17) and was never translated into another language. K̲h̲ān's text, typical for entertaining Urdu narratives, was reprinted numerous times,[53] although in small numbers.

[51] K̲h̲ān, Col. Muḥammad (1968), *ba jang āmad*, dūst pablikishanz, islāmābad

[52] For example: Fluno, R. Y. (1968), Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography by Mohammad Ayub Khan. In: *The Western Political Quarterly* 21 (2), pp. 350-51; Moon, P. (1968), Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography by Mohammad Ayub Khan. In: *The English Historical Review* 83 (329), pp. 812-14; and Symonds, R. (1968) Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography by Mohammad Ayub Khan, In: *International Affairs* 44 (1), pp. 145-46.

[53] Besides the original 1968 published with East Indies 2000 and with Dost 2008 and 2009.

The two authors in that period were not referring to or competing with each other and they can be located in different fields: Ayub Khan's text belongs to the tradition of the autobiography of the great men and Muhammad Khan's text can be classified as belonging to the genre of Urdu humorous literature.[54] While Ayub Khan tries to gain recognition with an international readership, Col. Muḥammad K̲h̲ān relates to other agents in the subfield of Urdu humorous literature. Neither of them is concerned with historical truth claims.

However, in the 1960s and 1970s there were agents that competed in the subfields of Urdu literature and military historiography at the same time. The best example is Brigadier Gulzār Aḥmad[55] who first wrote a collection of stories titled *jalōh ṭūr* (As featured...) published in the 1950s. Aḥmad's autobiographical narratives mostly deal with this life in the Indian Army, with episodes about his postings in Turkey and Egypt as a British Indian Officer.[56] In the late 1960s Aḥmad authored a travelogue (safarnameh)[57] and eventually a historical account of the 1965 war.[58] After *jalōh ṭūr* Gulzār Aḥmad wrote a second personal narrative titled *yadd-e-aiyām* in the 1970s, covering again his experiences in the British Indian Army about his graduation from the Military Academy on 14 August 1947.[59] In *Yadd-e-aiyām* Gulzar mainly describes the cultures and histories of the people he visited during his postings and seldom deals with contemporary political developments. *Yadd-e-aiyām* is written as a first person narrative, but often referred to as a travelogue (safarnameh) (Sarvar, 2013, p. 60). Gulzār Aḥmad's first two narratives are praised as literature (ibid.), and it is only with the history of the 1965 war that he introduces himself in a military field, which requires him to refer to other historical works – mostly authored by Indian officers – and choosing a subject position as a military professional and witness, rather than that of an Urdu humorous writer.

As the three examples demonstrate, in the late 1960s the texts of the writing officers could hardly be brought into relation with each other, that is, they did not yet constitute a field. The texts belong to different genres, follow different textual traditions, adhere to different principles, and do not refer to each other. There seems to have been no market for autobiographical narratives by officers – even though some officers were writing self-narratives. Mirza's narrative *The Battle Within* (2003) for example was written in the early

[54] Muḥammad K̲h̲āns *bi-salāmat rawī* published in 1975 can be categorised as a humorous travel narrative.
[55] Gulzār Aḥmad was educated at Government College Lahore and Aligarh and served in the British Indian Army from 1932. Besides memoirs and recollections he wrote a five-volume treaty on the Prophet's concept of war *ġazawāt-i rasūl*, eventually translated into English. See Sarvar, Ṭ (2013), *ʿasākir-i pākistān kī adabī ḫidmāt - urdu nažir mēṇ*, akādimiyāt, lahaur, p. 51f.
[56] Aḥmad, G. (1950), *Jalōh ṭūr*, sayyid ḍamīr jaʿafarī, rāvalpinḍī.
[57] Aḥmad, G. (1962), taḏkirah-i-afrīqah, Maʿārif limīṭiḍ pablišarz, karāčī.
[58] Aḥmad, G. (1968), *difāʿ-i-pākistān kī lāzauwāl dāstān*, maktabah al-muḫtār, rāvalpinḍī.
[59] Sarvar, Ṭ (2013), *ʿasākir-i pākistān kī adabī ḫidmāt - urdu nažir mēṇ*, akādimiyāt, lahaur, p. 59.

1970s but only published in 2003. In the late 1960s authors find themselves in fields that lack the attribute "military" – Ayub Khan in the field of political autobiographies, Col. Muḥammad Khan in the field of Urdu literature. It is only in the 1970s and later that the field of military cultural production with institutions such as the Defence Journal (est. 1975), which reviewed the texts and brought them in relation to each other, was fully established.

In early 1970s the conflict over the integrity of Pakistan in regard to Kashmir and its history brought autobiographical texts in relation to each other and constituted the field of military autobiographical narrative production. The publication of *Raiders in Kashmir* by Maj. Gen Akbar Khan directly challenged FM Ayub Khan's position laid out in his political autobiography *Friends not Masters*. Maj. Gen. Akbar Khan's narrative focuses on the conflict between Pakistan and India over Kashmir, and his role in the first Kashmir war of 1947-48. *Raiders in Kashmir* attempts to rehabilitate the author in public. By connecting the Kashmir war with military developments in the 1950s, Akbar Khan accuses Ayub Khan over the treatment during the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case. In 1951 Maj. Gen. Akbar Khan, together with several officers and intellectuals, was involved in a failed coup attempt against Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Kahn – Ayub Khan, at the time commander of the armed forces, stood in direct opposition to Maj. Gen Akbar Khan.[60] Maj. Gen. Akbar Khan was court-martialled and imprisoned for four years before he restarted his career, first in the army and then in politics with the Pakistan People's Party and as an adviser to Bhutto.

With the publication of *Raiders in Kashmir* the conflict between high-ranking generals FM Ayub Khan and Maj. Gen. Akbar Khan over promotion and the army's role in politics was carried out through the publication of a military autobiographical narrative. Both texts address an English-speaking public but argue on different levels. Ayub Khan's text promotes the author and his policies in the face of the opposition against his military rule and entrance in politics. Akbar Khan is chiefly concerned with making historical arguments about Kashmir. He intends to give the reader "a bird's eye view of the war and the problem as a whole" (Khan, 1970) and advocates that the tribesmen of Jammu and Kashmir – and with them, he himself – are remembered and added to the "first chapter of Pakistan's history" (1970, p. 210). Writing about

[60] Akbar Khan (1970) blames Ayub Khan for his imprisonment (pp. 158-170). For the Rawalpindi conspiracy case see: Ahmad, Talat (2008), Writers and Generals: Intellectuals and the first military coup, in: *Indian Economic & Social History Review*, January 2008 45: pp. 115-149, Zaheer, Hasan (1998), *The Times and Trial of the Rawalpindi Conspiracy 1951: the First Coup Attempt in Pakistan*, Oxford University Press, and Nawaz, (2008, p. 71, 82f.).

Kashmir became a mandatory topic in military autobiographical narratives and eventually officers published thematic autobiographical narratives dealing exclusively with Kashmir.[61]

The relation between the positions of Ayub Khan and Akbar Khan sets the foundation of a field of military autobiographical narratives in Pakistan. In the following years, most high-ranking military officers who published autobiographical narratives were constrained to relate to distinguished positions: either to Ayub Khan's position or to *accuser*-type of personal narratives like Akbar Khan's who claimed to break with the propaganda of previous narratives and/or the official history.

By the early 1980s high-ranking military officers who produced other texts dominated the field of autobiographical narratives. These officers authored several historical narratives about experienced events before pinning down an autobiographical narrative. The most prominent examples are Gen. Shahid Hamid, Brig. Ṣiddīq Sālik and Gen. Musa Khan. Gen. Musa Khan for example published a history of the 1965 war[62] before writing his autobiographical narrative. Gen. Shahid Hamid wrote a recollection of the Partition of India,[63] a history of the cavalry of the Indian Army,[64] a history of the Hunza tribe[65] and a handbook for Pakistani officers[66] before his autobiography. Brig. Ṣiddīq Sālik, working at the public relations office of the Pakistan Army wrote books both in Urdu and English about the 1971 war[67] as well as a treaty on the state of politics in Pakistan,[68] two novels,[69] and eventually published his humorous autobiographical narrative *Salyūṭ*.[70]

Historical developments in the 1970s had a profound impact on the field of military autobiographical narratives, particularly the events surrounding the secession of Bangladesh, commonly referred to as the Tragedy. In 1971 the Pakistani military first fought a civil war in East Pakistan before entering into conflict with India. Eventually East Pakistan became Bangladesh and 90,000 Pakistani soldiers became prisoners of war in India. Many of the returning officers were reintegrated into the armed forces, but faced strong opposition by a

[61] For example: K̲h̲ān, Col. Mirzā Ḥassan (n.d.), *Shamshīr se zanjīr tak*, maktab pablisharz, islāmābād.
[62] See Musa, Gen. Muhammad, (1983), *My Version: India-Pakistan War 1965*, Lahore, Wajidalis.
[63] Shahid Hamid, Maj. Gen. Shahid (1986), *Disastrous Twilight*. London, Leo Cooper.
[64] Shahid Hamid, Maj. Gen. Shahid (1984), *So They Rode and Fought*. Karachi, Sani.
[65] Shahid Hamid, Maj. Gen. Shahid (1979), *Karakoram Hunza: The Land Just Enough*. Karachi, Ma'aref.
[66] Shahid Hamid, Maj. Gen. Shahid (1980), *Courage is a Weapon*. Karachi, Sani.
[67] Sālik, Brig. Ṣiddīq (1974), *Hamah yārān̲ doza̲kh*, maktabah-yi sarmad, rāvalpinḍī; Salik, Brig. Siddiq (1977), *Witness to Surrender*, Oxford University Press Pakistan, Karachi.
[68] Salik, Brig. Siddiq (1997), *State and politics: A case study of Pakistan*. Lahore: Al-faisal Nashran.
[69] Sālik, Ṣiddīq (1984), *Praishar kukar*, maktabah-yi sarmad, rāvalpinḍī; Sālik, Ṣiddīq (1985), *Aimarjansī*, maktabah-yi sarmad, rāvalpinḍī; Sālik, Ṣiddīq (1983), *Tā dam-i taḥrīr*, maktabah-yi sarmad, rāvalpinḍī.
[70] Sālik, Brig. Ṣiddīq (1989), *Salyūṭ: 'askarī zindagī ke māh o sāl*, maktabah-yi sarmad, rāvalpinḍī

younger generation of officers who held them responsible for the debacle of 1971.[71] In chapter five I will demonstrate how the controversy over who is to blame for the loss of East Pakistan was played out in the field of autobiographical narrative production. In the 1990s many officers accessed the field of military autobiographical narrative production to settle scores and accuse military and political leaders – some of the officers indicate that they were denied influence on reintegration into the Pakistani military after repatriation. The texts can be characterised as *accuser narratives* and later dominated the field in the 1990s.

Several of the returning officers authored autobiographical narratives focusing on their experience as prisoners of war in India. These texts were mainly written in Urdu and addressed a younger Pakistani readership, although some of the texts were subsequently translated into English. Examples of the first wave of *prisoner of war narratives* in the 1970s are Brig. Siddiq Salik's *Hamah yārān dozakh: aik asīr-i jang kī sarguzisht* (1974), Brīgaḍī'er Manṣūrulḥaq Malik's, *Jangī qaidī kī dā'irī* (1976), ʿAun Muḥammad Riẓvī's *Dasht-i īṣār* or Lt.-Col. Afẓal Kayānī *Matāʿ-i qafas* (1980). The second wave of publishing prisoner of war narratives occurred in the late 2000s, examples are ʿAbd al-Qādir, Lt. Col, *Be-tegẖ Sipāhī – jang 71 aur qaid kī rudād* (2011) or Ikram Sehgal's *Escape from oblivion: the story of a Pakistani prisoner of war in India* (2012).

High-ranking officers who published their autobiographical narratives in English with international publishers such as Oxford University Press or Wajidalis occupied the most dominant positions in the 1970s and 1980s. The themes that run through the texts are the distance to the British officers and criticism of the military's entry into politics with Ayub Khan's rule. Many authors refer to each other's texts, either approvingly or taking distance. The fact that sponsored official histories of the Pakistan Army appeared, fuelled debates in the decade to come.[72]

To summarise, for the 1970s and 1980s three interrelated positions inside the field of military autobiographical production can be distinguished: prisoner of war narratives, accuser narratives and autobiographical narratives of high-ranking officers. The genre of humorous autobiographical texts in Urdu introduced at the beginning of this subsection did not relate to other texts inside the field. Urdu humorous texts lack reference to other positions occupied in

[71] More on the reintegration of the POW in chapter four and in chapter five.
[72] For example: Riza, Maj. Gen. Shaukat (1977), *The Pakistan Army 1947-1949*, Natraj Publishers; Ahmad, Saeed (1973), *The Indo-Pak clash in the Rann of Kutch*, Army Education Press, Rawalpindi and Khan, Maj. Gen. F. M. (1963), *The Story of the Pakistan Army*, Oxford University Press.

the field of military autobiographical narration and their agents – although ridiculing some high-ranking officers – were less concerned with making historical truth claims.

### 3.4.3 Diversification and expansion – the field from the 1990s

As the graphic above shows, the field was fully elaborated by the early 1990s. There were different positions and conflicts, and an increasing number of autobiographical narratives were published.[73] Three developments in the publication of autobiographical narratives starting in the 1990s can be observed: first, a sharp increase in the publication of military autobiographical narratives; second, an increase in the publication of Urdu military autobiographical narratives; and third, the access of agents with different military dispositions – notably a lower rank. With this increase in agents the positions inside the field diversified.

As the distribution of publications by rank and year in Appendix I shows, during this decade the numbers of titles published increased steadily. While for example by 1980 there were only eight autobiographical texts by military officers on the market, a decade later twelve more were added to a total of 20.[74] In the year 2010 alone five autobiographical narratives were published.[75] The quantity of copies printed and reprinted increased even more rapidly – a development largely owned to the capitalisation of the print industry in Pakistan. While it is difficult to estimate the numbers of copies sold,[76] most of the texts were reprinted several times. Brig. Siddiq Salik's 1989 autobiography *Saliyut* was reprinted for the 9th time in November 2003, Wajahat Husain's 2010 published *1947: Before, During, After* was reprinted in the year of publication and Sajad Haider's *Flight of the Falcon* was reprinted three times in the year of publication, 2010. Frequently titles and their translations were published with different publishers. The East and West Publishing Company in Pakistan and the ABC Publishing House in India first published Gen. Musa Khan's *Jawan to General* in 1984. There is also a 2008 edition published with the Royal Book Company.

In the late 1980s the publication of autobiographical narratives written in Urdu gradually increased. The emergence of Urdu becomes evident in the 1990s, as many autobiographical

[73] Whereas in the 1970s and 80s relatively few texts were published, in the 1990s and 2000s up to four texts were published every year.
[74] See Appendix I.
[75] These were Husain, Maj. Gen. Syed Wajahat (2010), *Memories of a Solider – 1947: Before, During, After*, Ferozsons, Lahore; Shamim, Air Chief Marshal M. Anwar (2010), *Cutting Edge PAF – Reminiscences*, Vanguard Books, Karachi; Shariff, Admiral Muhammad (2010), *Admirals Diary: battling through stormy sea life for decades*, Army Press, Islamabad; Haider, S. Sajad (2010), *Flight of the Falcon*, Vanguard Books, Lahore.
[76] Some Urdu books indicate the print run, for example Afzal Kayanis book had a run of 1000 copies.

narratives that were reprinted are also translated from English into Urdu.[77] In the late 2000s it became common practice to simultaneously publish an English as well as an Urdu version of the autobiographical narrative. General Pervez Musharraf's *In the line of fire* was published as *Sab se pehle Pākistān.* The emergence of Urdu is noteworthy, as the army remains an institution that is quintessentially English. In the British Indian Army, the use of English was encouraged and the use of a vernacular or even the use of the national language Urdu was punished (Rahman, 1997, p 1985). The role and status of Urdu and English inside the army until the end of the 1990s saw minor changes, despite the Islamisation policies under Zia ul-Haq (ibid.).

The practice of writing and translating autobiographical accounts in Urdu correlates to the social and military disposition of the writing officer, as well as to a new emerging Pakistani readership. As can be seen in Appendix I, it was predominantly officers from the ranks of Colonel and lower who published Urdu autobiographical narratives. The translation of originally English-written high-ranking officers' texts into Urdu indicates a new Pakistani readership. In the 1970s and 1980s authors were generally writing for an international English-speaking public and published their works with international publishers. There were only a few local publishers that carried autobiographical texts by officers. In the 1990s, local publishers and local capitalistic publishers produced books for the Pakistani market in Urdu and with a greater print-run, which are considerably cheaper. This expansion of the field to reach a new Urdu-speaking readership carried into the last decade.

Parallel to the expansion of the field, new agents to the field challenge the position of high-ranking officers by accusing them of historical misrepresentation. The new agents seek to break with the established historiography by questioning the military performance of their senior officers during 1965 and 1971, as I will show in chapter five. In the last decades officers thus produce autobiographical texts that claim to "demolish myths" or uncover conspiracies. As we have seen above, many writers indicate that they were motivated to write because previous military autobiographies had misrepresented the history. As I will show in chapters four and five, in the last decade, officers have produced self-critical and balanced accounts of the events they lived through.

[77] For examples: Tajammul Malik (1991), and Mitha (2003).

### 3.5 The field and the negotiation of the 'self'

In the following, I first sketch out the implications the characteristics of the field of military autobiographical narrative production has for the reconstruction and representation of the Pakistani Military 'self' and then outline five heuristic positions the agents occupy through the practice of writing autobiographical texts. For the first part, two aspects of the field are important: the underlying principle of historical truth claim, and the developments regarding claims of new agents inside the field.

As I have demonstrated, the practice of writing military autobiographical narratives is closely connected to historiography. In other words, in the field of military autobiographical narrative production, different agents are competing with each other over recognition of their historical contributions – the assertive claim works mainly with reference to history, particularly to the historical events of 1947 and 1971. This has two effects inside and outside the field

Because the writing of officers' life stories is governed by the demand for historical accuracy, the authors have to locate themselves in close proximity to historically known personalities and historical events. The demand for historical accuracy thus restricts the representation to episodes the author experienced during historical events and forms the narratives into the "my story in x"-scheme. As I will demonstrate in the following two chapters, the officer is thus less of an active participant and more of a keen observer. The field also demands a self-positioning of the agents in regard to already existing positions, connecting the proximity to the assessment of military and political leaders.

Officers directly and indirectly contribute to the historiography of Pakistan by producing autobiographical narratives that are framed as historical works. Thereby officers become cultural producers outside the field of military autobiographical narrative production and take part in the negotiation of the history of Pakistan in the field of historiography. Although it is not possible to measure the contribution by officers to the historiography of Pakistan, the fact that most of the early military autobiographical narratives are used as sources for historical analysis point to the prominence of the officers' voice.[78]

In the fourth section of this chapter I demonstrated how in the 1990s officers with lower ranks struggled for positions inside the field by writing about their experience in prisoner of war narratives and accusing the senior military leadership. From the 1990s agents with new dispositions are thus taking part in the representation and construction of the Pakistani military

[78] For example by Talbot (2002), Ziring (1971), Nawaz (2008), Shah (2014) and Fair (2014).

'self'. Most agents position themselves in opposition to the high-ranking officers that played political roles or formed part of the political elite and cater for a new Urdu readership.

In Pakistan, the use of language is connected to social status, and only a small elite uses English.[79] By turning to Urdu, officers thus address a national readership that does not form part of the English-speaking elite, and at the same time disowns the elite marker that adheres to English writing authors.

In the last four decades Pakistani military officers have published over 100 autobiographical narratives. With their contributions, the agents occupy different positions inside the field and relate to already established positions. I have demonstrated how the positions have correlated to conflicts inside the field as well as developments outside the field. In this chapter I have referred loosely to several heuristic types of military autobiographical texts and positions occupied in the field: *political narratives* by high-ranking officers, narratives concerned with *military historiography*, *accuser-type* narratives, *prisoner of war* narratives and entertaining *humorous narratives* (chiefly Urdu wit and humour). Here I will sketch out the main characteristics of these texts and the agents' positioning inside the field of military autobiographical narrative production. In the next two chapters I analyse which narrative strategies the agents producing these narratives employed, and which subject positions they occupy in regard to their self-representation during the Tragedy and the Partition. Since the genesis of the field in the 1970s five positions that correlate with the military dispositions of the agents can be distinguished:

High-ranking officers that occupied an important national political role published *political narratives.* This position caters to an English-reading national and international public, and sets out to explain military and political developments in Pakistan. The most prominent examples of autobiographical narratives occupying this position are the political autobiographies of Ayub Khan (1968) and Pervez Musharraf (2006). *Political narratives* are published with international publishing houses and translated into several languages. Over time, they have become focal points of critical reference by accuser narratives.[80] The position occupied by high-ranking officers saw a transformation from referring chiefly to the field of politics to the military field.

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[79] English was used by a small elite and especially in the 1950s and 1960s and it was considered as "a marker of class, urbane upbringing, affluent family background and sophistication and gave psychological and social advantage to those who were fluent in it" (Rahman 1997, p. 184). The Army as an institution tried to give itself a more national outlook – for example by representing Pakistani society when recruiting officers (Cohen 1998, p. 32). Over the years the military has adopted Urdu, but English skills are still important among the senior most officers (Fair 2014).

[80] For a Critique of Ayub Khan: Akbar Khan, several others; critique of Perves Musharraf: Witness to blunder, etc.

Whereas Ayub Khan's narrative in the late 1960s is preoccupied with his role as a political leader, the narratives of the next generation laid more emphasis on the military career. This shift is reflected in the titles of the works: Gen. Sher Ali Khan Pataudi's *al-qissas: the story of soldiering and politics in Pakistan* (1978) features politics in the title, General Musa's *Jawan to general,* or Gen. Shahid Hamid's *ek janrail ki sarguzisht* (Recollections of a General) as well as his *Autobiography of a general* (1988) drop the political connotation. In military texts the authors try to be exemplary like in Musa's *Jawan to general* (1984) and target their texts more at the military personnel.

Another position occupied by high-ranking officers can be characterised as professional military historiography. These kinds of text are mostly concerned with strategy, leadership and historical accurate battle narratives. A battle narrative is structured around action, the location of troops, changes in the battle, assigned duties and responsibilities. When narrators turn to this kind of narration, they follow an established tradition of war narrative, prominent in older British military texts. It is what Lawson-Peebles (2005) calls 'indirect' form of narrating, where the author is concerned with "truth-telling with objectivity by excluding himself from his work" (p. 68). The most prominent example of this position is Attiqur Rahman's *Back to the pavilion* (1989).

*Accuser narrative*s form the biggest part of the autobiographies and memoirs by officers. They are written by all the ranks in both English and Urdu especially from the 1990s until today. Accuser narratives depend on predecessors – the *political narratives of leaders* or official history that they can refute or criticise. Connected to the position of accuser narratives are autobiographical narratives that focus on the author's proximity to national leaders and started to appear in the 1990s. Narratives such as Lt. Gen. Chishti's *Betrayals of another kind: Islam, democracy and the army in Pakistan* (1989), in Urdu as *Bhuṭṭo, Ziyā', aur main* (1991) (lit. Bhutto, Zia and I), Mian Ata Rabbani's *I Was the Quaid's ADC* or Maj. Rahat Latif's *...Plus Bhutto's Episode – An Autobiography* directly link the autobiographical narrative to national historical figures. As I will elaborate in chapters four and five, in these narratives the authors defend their role in historical events, and at the same time accuse fellow officers.

*Prisoner of war narratives* focus on the events that lead to the defeat in East-Pakistan in 1971 and the experiences of the mid to low-ranking officers during their imprisonment. The prisoner of war narratives first came in an official envelope. For example narratives by Brig. Siddiq, a mid-ranking officer working for the army's public relations office, or by the low-ranking officer Lt.-Col. Kayani. Both advocate awareness of the prisoner of war in the public discourse while criticising the leadership of the army chief Gen. Yahya Khan and Gen. Niazi.

Although, Siddiq (1974) indicates that he restricts his book to psychological matters (p. 10), there are many historical references and accusations of high-ranking generals. The intended readership for both authors is the Urdu-speaking public and to some extent the military itself.[81] Both books can be seen as an attempt to write the 90,000 prisoners of war into the history of Pakistan.

A prominent position is occupied by *humorous narratives* in the form of *ṭanz-o mazāḥ* (wit and humour)-literature written by mid to low-ranking officers (OF-2 up to OF-6) who write entertaining episodes for the younger generation of Pakistanis. The most prominent authors are Muhammad Khan and his *ba-jang āmad* (1968), Siddiq Salik with his memoir *salyūṭ* (1989), or Ashfaq Husain with his humorous gentlemen series *gentlemen bismillah* (1979). These narratives are written in Urdu and focus more on the individual experience of the young officers in the armed forces. However, they nonetheless accuse or at least ridicule the British generation of Pakistani officers in top positions, revealing their misdeeds and tendency to clear themselves from responsibilities. While these low-ranking officers restricted themselves to publishing humorous literature in the 1970s, by the 1990s they also resorted to publishing accuser-type narratives. There are several authors that were able to publish both types of narratives. Jīlānī for example first wrote a humorous account *Ẓiyāfat-i raftagān* (2007) of his life in the army in 2007 and later produced an accuser-type narrative *Shorish-i bāṭin* (2010) in which he reframes his first book as a critique of leaders of the Pakistan Army. Similarly Col. Ashfāq Ḥusain produced a string of humorous autobiographical narratives, known as the *bismillah* series: *Janṭalmain! bismillāh* in 1979, *Janṭalmen! al-Ḥamdlillāh* in 1984, and *Janṭalmen Allāh Allāh!* in 1994.[82] The last book *Janṭalmain sūbḥānallah* published in 1999 is a refutation of General Musharraf's rule.[83]

[81] Siddiq writes in this preface that his book in Urdu came out in six editions in the first decade (Siddiq 1984, p. ix).

[82] Ḥusain, Col. Ashfāq (1979), *Janṭalmain! bismillāh*, Idārah-yi Maṭbū'āt-i Sulaimānī, Lāhaur; Ḥusain, Col. Ashfāq (1984), *Janṭalmen! al-Ḥamdlillāh*, Idārah-yi Maṭbū'āt-i Sulaimānī, Lāhaur; Ḥusain, Col. Ashfāq (1994), *Janṭalmen Allāh Allāh*, Idārah-yi Maṭbū'āt-i Sulaimānī, Lāhaur.

[83] Ḥusain, Col. Ashfāq (1999), *Janṭalmain sūbḥānallah*, Idārah-yi Maṭbū'āt-i Sulaimānī, Lāhaur.

## 4 The officers' representation in regard to the Partition

> "It was about passed mid-day when our train crossed the border. Here we were greeted with NARA-E-TAKBIR, ALLAH-O-AKBAR. On seeing the Pakistani flag fluttering at the border post I felt an emotional thrill, which I had never experienced before. It was all spontaneous." – Maj. Gen. Malik[1]

> "On August 14, 1947 we became independent. With independence we who had been Indians became Pakistanis, nobody felt any different." – Brig. Khan[2]

On 14 August 1947, the officers of the Royal British Indian Army started serving new independent states. Muslim officers, originally from the territory today composed of Pakistan and Bangladesh, automatically became servants of the Dominion of Pakistan; Muslim officers from the territory of India were given the choice of a career in either the Indian or Pakistan Army. Secondary literature rarely addresses the question of how the Pakistani officers relate to Partition.[3] The literature discussing this question focuses on the division of an institution, assuming that the agents are acting and feeling exclusively 'military'. But it neglects to account for other representations of the serving officers. Looking at Partition from what is argued as a purely military professional point of view, Brian Cloughley for example suggests, that the change in nationality had a lesser effect on the officers than the division of military regiments, assets and facilities:

> "Soldiers who may have only the shakiest notion of the cause for which their country commits them to operations will perform heroic deeds for the sake of the honour of their units. […] The splitting of regiments in 1947 was a serious business, as was apportionment of units to one country or the other. The outward signs of regimental tradition – battle honours, the badges, the ceremonial minutiae – are important to soldiers. To many, these things might seem petty, trivial, inconsequential, and even irrelevant to modern life. This is no more the case than it was in 1947, and both armies have continued to build on their regimental traditions since the days of Partition" (1999, p. xii.).

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[1] Malik, Maj. Gen. Tajammul Hussain (1991), *The Story of My Struggle*, Jang Publishers, p. 11.
[2] Khan, Brig. Z. A. (1998), *The Way It Was – Inside the Pakistan Army*, Natraj Publishers, p. 6.
[3] For the partition events of British India I use the term Partition with a capital P, as practised in both India and Pakistan. Partition refers both to the achievement of two independent states after an anti-colonial struggle, as well as the partition of the Bengal and Punjab provinces which were accompanied by communal violence and mass migration. Pakistanis sometimes prefer the term 'independence' – meaning both independence from the British as well as the Indians – and thus avoiding the connotation of Pakistan being the cleavage product of India and to the 'loss' of national unity as perceived by Hindu Rightists. See Talbot, I. and G. Singh (2009), *The Partition of India*, Cambridge University Press, p. 10.

While Cloughley's suggestion adequately explains Brigadier Khan's quote above about how he experienced Partition, it clearly contradicts Maj.-Gen. Malik's experience and representation of Partition – or in his case 'independence'. For Malik, Partition is not only an episode in his military career, but a historical as well as a personal key event. That the events surrounding Partition of British India and the establishment of Pakistan play an important role in many autobiographical narratives is reflected in the outstanding and emotional reference to 1947. And as becomes apparent by the two quotes above, Partition meant and means different things to different officers and thus was experienced and narrated differently.

As Partition is a key event for the negotiation of the self-ascribed roles of the Pakistani military officers, it is important to distinguish and understand the different positions. Before addressing the role Partition plays in the officers' narratives, how the officers present their role during Partition, and how the main categories of identification of the officers are affected, I will turn to secondary literature.

### 4.1 The presentation of the officers' role in secondary literature

Secondary literature referring to the role of the Pakistani military during Partition can be divided according to two positions.[4] There is literature that focuses on the army and (sometimes) deals with its role during Partition on the one hand,[5] and literature that concentrates on Partition and (sometimes) pertains to the role of the army on the other.[6] The first type of literature – excluding the official histories commissioned by the Pakistan Army itself –[7] rarely concentrates on the officers as agents and their role during Partition,[8] while literature about the

[4] Alternative ways of grouping secondary literature would be according to source-type or chronology. As for example undertaken by Talbot, I. and G. Singh (2009).

[5] For example, Nawaz (2008) or Cloughley (1999).

[6] Secondary literature on Partition is growing rapidly, however, a work on the interpretation of the officers' own role during partition is lacking. Some of the recent notable works include: Khan, Y (2007), *The Great Partition – Making of India and Pakistan*, Yale University Press; Zamindar, V. (2007), *The Long Partition and the Making of Modern South Asia – Refugees, Boundaries, Histories,* Columbia University Press; Pandey, G. (2001), *Remembering Partition*, Cambridge University Press; Talbot I. and G. Singh (2009), *The Partition of India*, Cambridge University Press; Jalal, A. (1985), *The Sole Spokesman – Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan*, Cambridge University Press.

[7] See both Khan, Maj. Gen. F. M. (1963), *The Story of the Pakistan Army*, Oxford University Press and Riza, Maj. Gen. S. (1977), *The Pakistan Army 1947-1949*, Natraj Publishers. Both works will be considered further below.

[8] There is no reference to an effect on the Pakistani officers found, for example in: Cheema, P. (2002), *The Armed Forces of Pakistan*, Oxford University Press or Ahmed, I. (2013), *Pakistan – The Garrison State*, Oxford University Press.

Pakistan Army is more concerned with the division of the British Indian Army, the 'high politics'[9] of Partition and the territorial dispute over Kashmir.[10]

The common perception put forward by Cohen (1998) and others indicates that the officer corps of the Partition inherited an "apolitical professional ethos" (p. 117) from the British Indian Army – it was only later that the army developed a political outlook (Shah 2014, p. 33). In the British Indian Army, Indian officers did not voice political opinions because of the apolitical tradition of the army. Shah (2014) for example notes that "Informal socialisation in army messes among senior and junior officers discouraged political discussion" (p. 32). However, as Cohen (1998) notes, it was not unlikely that Muslim nationalists with strong political views joined the army: "During World War II, the British had no difficulty in persuading young Indians to join the army. Some were opportunistic job seekers, but many were interested in the military and at the same time were sincere nationalists" (p. 57).

Although being to some extent separated from political developments, Cohen and Shah both point to two effects Partition inflicted on the officers: the first being a sense of mistrust felt towards India, and the second being the development of a political orientation. Cohen (1998) argues that Partition experience had an impact on the 'psyche' (p. 57) of the officer corps. The events of 1947 confirmed an already existing suspicion of Pakistani officers towards Indian officers:

> "The experience of partition – the killing, the bloodletting, the random cruelty exceeded only the organized variety – confirmed the worst suspicions of these officers. By all accounts, the Sandhurst-trained officers, the IMA [Indian Military Academy] products, and even most of the ECOs [Emergency Commissioned Officers] were not especially communal minded. Those who went into the army tended to be both secular and conservative in outlook, but Partition was a profound and determinative experience

[9] The term 'high politics' refers to the constitutional negotiations between the British and the Muslim and Indian leaders. 'High politics' stands in opposition to 'history from below' that demonstrates the consequences for the people affected by Partition. See Talbot I. and G. Singh (2009, p. 81f.). In the military context, 'high politics' is mostly concerned with the Indianisation as well as the division of the British Indian Army.

[10] See for example Nawaz, Shuja (2008), *Crossed Swords – Pakistan, its Army, and the Wars Within,* Oxford University Press. As detailed as Nawaz's account is, the chapters dealing with Partition and pre-Partition rely heavily on the two official stories of the Pakistan Army – Khan, Maj. Gen. F. M. (1963) *The story of the Pakistan Army,* Oxford University Press, and Riza, Maj. Gen. (1977), *The Pakistan Army 1947-49,* Natraj Publishers. Nawaz also refers to the autobiographical narrative of Hamid, Maj. Gen. Shahid (1993), *Disastrous Twilight – A Personal Record of the Partition of India*, Leo Cooper, as well as personal stories of family friends in the armed forces. He moves almost directly to the Kashmir issue after discussing the split of the Indian Army, leaving Partition aside. There is no reference to the effect Partition had on the Pakistani officers Cheema P. (2002), *The Armed Forces of Pakistan*, Oxford University Press and Ahmed, I. (2013), *Pakistan – The Garrison State*, Oxford University Press. Brian Cloughley for example gives details about the division of assets, training facilities and troops, but does not explore the role of the army during Partition.

> for most of them, precisely because they all regarded themselves as above crude communalism" (Cohen, 1998, p. 59f.).

As Cohen (1998) explains, this "sense of injustice and fear in relationship to the Hindu majority"(p. 58f.) of some Muslim officers – particularly those that moved with family members from the territory that became India – meant that "the vast majority of Muslim officers came to the conclusion that they could lead a better life in an Islamic state" (ibid). And, "for Pakistani officers of succeeding generations, this distrust of India is a fundamental assumption, no more subject to question than is the very existence of Pakistan." (1998, p. 60) As Cohen (2013) puts it:

> "From the very beginning, the army held strong views on normalization with India. Received wisdom in the army is that India made a concerted attempt to cripple Pakistan. Army messes still overflow with third-generation memories of the partition, how the Indians stole the library, or the sliver, and then how India stabbed Pakistan in the back economically and militarily, and broke its promises on Kashmir" (p. 92).

Bonney and Malik's (2011) study *Warriors after War* refers to this aspect as well. The events surrounding Partition, particularly the violence in the Punjab and Bengal, had an impact on the new Pakistani officers even when they were not personally affected by it. The study mentions Khan Sahib Dad Khan, a colonel of the Pakistan Army, who was 18 years old at the time of Partition. He explains:

> "Since I had not personally witnessed the bloodletting there was no thought of revenge in my mind. Moreover, I was not alone in this kind of thinking or feeling. Overall, there was no wish for revenge against India or the Indian Army in the early period of Partition. I had assumed that the two countries were on good terms. Nevertheless, as the news of the massacres spread, even the educated and liberal Muslims stated thinking negatively about India" (Bonney and Malik, 2011, p. 232).

Shah (2014) identifies a further effect of the Partition on the officer corps: the development of a political orientation inside the armed forces. With the creation of the new state, the military had to adjust the "political and ideological compass" (Shah, 2014, p. 34). And as Shah (2014) explains, Kashmir occupied an important place on the political map as it became "central to the self-image and identity of each state" (p. 40). Shah (2014) sees the Kashmir issue as being responsible and central for shaping the military's role in politics, by politicising a section of the officer corps and legitimising the claim to the state recourses (p. 41). Secondary literature

frequently highlights Kashmir as the single most important topic for the officers in the early history of Pakistan.[11]

The political orientation that developed out of the conflict in Kashmir, according to Shah (2014) manifested itself later in the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case[12] and in the support of wide sections of the army of the autocratic coup of Ghulam Mohammad and eventually Ayub Khan (p. 33f.). With regard to the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case Shah (2014) notes that it helps to shape the army's role and self-image as the only guardian of the state:

> "In fact, the declassified record of the trial suggests that it was an important precursor of the crystallization of the army's future role in politics, particularly its collective self-image as the only guardian of Jinnah's Pakistan and its members' belief in the inappropriateness of full democracy in Pakistan" (p. 44).

With respect to Partition, the second type of literature is concerned with the historiography of the modern subcontinent. It is devoted to the questions of 'identity' of the nation state of Pakistan. Secondary literature about historiography and the troubled 'identity' of Pakistan refers to a lack of a master narrative and the 'identity' change that affected the soldiers at Partition.

There is a vast historiography of the modern subcontinent. And as Ian Talbot (1999) notes, it is both highly polemical (Pakistan and India biased) and/or elitist in tone (p. 253). It rarely refers to or explores the role of the army during Partition. Because of the popular interest in Partition, the theme of Partition was introduced in fiction – and with it into autobiographical narratives. The Partition theme, taken up by writers such as Saʿādat Ḥasan Manṭo, Intiẓār Ḥusain, and Krishan Candar as Talbot notes "point to the sense of torn identities and uprootedness which was redeemed for some Muslims by the feeling they were involved in a true hijrat, with its opportunities for renewal and self-awareness" (Talbot, 1999, p. 254).

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[11] See for example Nawaz, Shuja (2008), *Crossed Swords*, Oxford University Press; Cheema, P. (2002), *The Armed Forces of Pakistan,* Oxford University Press; Cloughley, B. (1999), *A History of the Pakistan Army*, Oxford University Press.

[12] The Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case was a failed coup attempt against Pakistan's Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951. Maj.-Gen. Akbar Khan, together with several other military officers as well as left-wing politicians and writers such as the poet Faiz Ahmad Faiz and Syed Sajjad Zaheer were made responsible for the coup attempt. The Bengali politician and later Prime Minister of Pakistan, Husain Suhrawardy was the defence lawyer. After serving their prison term, most of the convicted occupied important government positions during the reign of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. For the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case see: Ahmad, Talat (2008), *Writers and Generals: Intellectuals and the first military coup,* in: Indian Economic & Social History Review, January 2008 (45), p. 115-149, Zaheer, Hasan (1998), *The times and trial of the Rawalpindi conspiracy 1951: the first coup attempt in Pakistan,* Oxford University Press.

Whether Pakistani officers address the themes of torn identities, uprootedness and identification as a mohajir is not addressed in secondary literature.

Talbot and Singh (2009) point out that the sheer volume and partisan nature of the material concerning Partition avert integrative texts, themes or a master narrative:

> "In the absence of integrating texts or themes, the reader is presented with a bewildering array of conflicting standpoints which variously explain the division as a fulfilment of the Indian Muslim community's natural destiny, a human tragedy on a vast scale, a fatal miscalculation by Congress, or still, as the parting gift of the British strategy of 'divide and rule'" (p. 23f.).

Gilmartin (1998) argues that the problematic lack of a master narrative of the Partition stems to a large part from the focus on either 'high politics' or 'history from below',[13] and as a consequence Partition occupies an "uncertain place in historical narrative" (p. 1068). What is the case for historians reconstructing the narrative of Partition, could also affect officers. Officers who reconstruct and present their story are somehow located between producers of 'objective' narratives centring on the state (in other words 'high politics') and the producers of multiple narratives as 'history from below'.

In her seminal work on the perception of Pakistan, Shaikh (2009) elaborates on the change in 'identity' Partition caused for the military officers.[14] Shaikh (2009) writes that right after Partition the military professionalism, which was part of the military's identity and defined to stem from a secular British tradition, stood in conflict with the newly-arisen military identity (p. 149f.). The question was how the new military identity related to the 'nationalist state ideology' and the nature of eventually a 'national army' (Shaikh 2009, p. 150). Right after Partition and up until the 1960s the military struggled with the accommodation of a 'colonial military identity' and a 'national military identity' (Shaikh 2009).

Yasmina Khan (2007) highlights the change in identity for the officers, as "the religion into which a soldier was born became the sine qua non of his new national identity" (p. 114). This change affected every Muslim officer whether "they had expressed support for the creation of

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[13] Gilmartin (1998) notes, that "For historians the roots of the problem lie in the marked disjunction in the historical literature between the story of the 'high politics' of partition, the negotiations between the British, the Congress, and the Muslim League that led to the creation of Pakistan, and the narrative of popular history of 'history from below'" (p. 1068); Talbot and Singh (2009) note that "The phrase the 'high politics' of Partition has become shorthand for the constitutional negotiations between the British and the Indian leaders during the 1940s, and is normally contrasted with the term 'history form below' which reflects a focus on the human consequences of partition. Students of high politics, in contrast, are especially distinguished by their efforts to 'blame' individuals, parties and states" (p. 8f).

[14] For example Shaikh, F. (2009), *Making Sense of Pakistan*, Hurst; Khan, Yasmin. (2008), *The Great Partition – The Making of India and Pakistan*, Yale University Press and Pandey, G. (2001), *Remembering Partition – Violence, Nationalism and History in India*, Cambridge University Press.

the new states or not" (Khan, 2007, p. 114), as religious denomination even dominated over loyalty or commitment to either the League or the Congress.

Finally, Pandey (2001) indicates that Partition violence had the most important impact on officers. As Pandey (2001) argues, the communal violence that broke out in Punjab and Bengal created new subjects and new subject positions:

> "What the violence of 1947 did was to create new subjects and subject positions […] After Partition, individuals, families and communities in the subcontinent remade themselves in radically altered settings. They had to struggle to overcome new fears, to gradually rebuild faith and trust and hope and to conceive new histories – and new 'memories' that are, in some reckonings, 'best forgotten'." (p. 29f.).

For historiography the main problem addressed in the secondary literature is the lack of a master narrative, despite the fact that today in Pakistan "Partition is portrayed as a victory in spite of the Hindu mission to keep Muslims in a subordinate position" (Cohen, 2013, p. 91). With regard to the role of the officers during Partition the information is scarce. Secondary literature on both Partition and the military does not address how the officers interpret their role during Partition or how they narrated or interpreted the events. Furthermore, secondary literature points to the change in the main categories of identification that occurred during Partition and altered the subject positions. Pandey even suggests that Partition created new subject positions. In regard to the military subject position and the change Partition made, secondary literature hints at a change in identification categories affecting the officers. The relations between the religious and regional denominations and loyalty to a secular and apolitical army ethos were altered. However, secondary literature primarily focuses on the military as an institution and less on the agents.

### 4.2 Early narratives – Partition as an episode

There are few autobiographical narratives by officers dealing with Partition events published before the 1971 conflict, and, as I elaborated in chapter three, they cannot be located inside a field of military autobiographical narratives at the time of their publication. They are integrated into the field only by reference of subsequent texts that situate themselves in relation to them. As I have shown, two types of autobiographical narratives can be distinguished: autobiographies and memoirs from relatively high-ranking officers (Maj. Gen. and up) on the one hand, and Urdu autobiographical narratives belonging to the *ṭanz-o-mazaḥ* genre on the other.

Early autobiographical narratives on Partition often refer to the official history of the Pakistan Army written by Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqeem Khan *The Story of the Pakistan Army*.[15] It serves as a point of reference for the later interpretation of Partition events from a military point of view. Therefore, I briefly introduce *The Story*, before I proceed to the discussion of the proper autobiographies.

### 4.2.1 The Pakistan Army's master narrative of Partition

Sixteen years after Partition, Maj.-Gen. Fazal Muqeem Khan (1963) wrote the first official commissioned history of the armed forces during the early years of Pakistan. The work represents the point of view of the leadership of the armed forces. Khan authored the book on advice of his superiors Musa and Ayub Khan.[16] Khan's official history emphasises the pre-independence period. But after a long prelude describing the composition of the British Indian Army and the relations of Hindu, Muslim and British officers, he eventually investigates the role of the army during Partition.

Khan (1963) hints at a distinct self-awareness of Muslim soldiers that was gradually formed after World War II. During the British rule, Khan depicts Muslim soldiers as detached from politics, loyal to the British and somehow "simple" (p. 10). Muslim soldiers were unaware of high politics and trapped in *khush fahmi* – an Urdu term meaning roughly 'vain illusion[17]':

> "The Muslim soldiers, brought up in an atmosphere far removed from modern education and politics, did not realise the increasing danger to their people until very late. They could not believe that the Hindus would refuse to share political power with the Muslims except on the most humiliating terms. Likewise it never occurred to them that the British, in whom they had come to place great faith, would ever let the situation get out of hand or be unjust to the Muslims. […] The Muslim soldier was too simple and trusting to perceive the significance of the demand of a separate homeland and a separate army. *Khush fahmi,* meaning roughly complacency and trust, is a Muslim vice of which he was still the slave" (Khan, 1963, p. 10).

Khan (1963) lists four key events during pre-Partition period that made the Muslim soldier aware of his position and eventually let him to "consider the Muslim League as their party" (p.

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[15] Khan, Maj. Gen. F. M. (1963), *The Story of the Pakistan Army*, Oxford University Press.

[16] The book is dedicated to the "maker of the Pakistan Army Field Marshal Mohamad Ayub Khan and the officers and jawans who followed his good lead [sic!]". Gen Musa wrote the foreword and praises Ayub Khan, the Pakistan Army and the author who with this book "has rendered a valuable service to Pakistan and her people." Kahn, Maj. Gen. F. M. (1963), *The Story of the Pakistan Army*, Oxford University Press, p. v. chapter five *The Army in Independence Troubles*, p. 61-82, deals directly with Partition.

[17] Ferozsons Urdu-English Dictionary, p. 338.

15). The first was the support of the Congress and "Hindu masses" for the Indian National Army (INA).[18] The INA was formed during World War II with Japanese help and sided with the Axis powers against the British. When the members of the INA returned after the war, Khan (1963) explains that the British acted indifferently about their punishment because they were "afraid of turning them into martyrs, inadvertently lent a hand in setting them up as heroes" (p. 15). The second incident that affected the Muslim soldier, was the "massacre of Muslims in various parts of the country" (p. 16) in November 1946 and March 1947. The third development that had an impact was the Indian press, which "invented stories to incite hatred against the Muslims" (p. 17). The last event was the British Governor's support of Sir Khizar Hayat Khan Tiwana[19] in the Punjab who confronted the Leader of the Muslim League, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, and depended on Congress support, which eventually "made him a traitor to his people" (Khan, 1963, p. 17).

However, Khan (1963) does not depict Muslim soldiers as fierce adherents of the idea of Pakistan. On the contrary, he emphasises the professionalism of the army and their loyalty to the British, formed by tradition and discipline during pre-Partition time. After Khan (1963), only some newly-recruited Hindu tribes who did not belong to the traditional martial races were 'blinded' by nationalism and acted 'irresponsibly' in the wake of the communal violence:

> "During all this muddle and confusion the army stood true to its traditions and discipline. There were, it is true some irresponsible actions and stray incidents, but they were mostly confined to units raised during the war from Hindus of no fighting traditions and young officers brought up in the prevailing electrified atmosphere. With these few exceptions, the army's loyalty, discipline and soldierly spirit stood up to the test of very provocative circumstance" (p. 20).

Khan (1963) notes that already before August 1947 Muslim troops were "busy quelling riots in remote parts of India and their commanders were reluctant to part with them" (p. 36). When Partition took place, Khan writes that the Pakistan Army was "in a most critical position"

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[18] The Indian National Army (INA) was formed under the Japanese after the surrender of the British troops in Singapore in February 1942. The soldiers joining the Indian National Army understood themselves as patriots who fought against the foreign rule of the British in their homeland. Some Muslim officers joined the INA and later opted for Pakistan. However, former INA officers were not fully integrated into the Pakistan Army, as Nawaz (2008) notes, "For one, some of their ex-INA officers would have superseded the serving officer, being senior to them in rank and often with greater military command and battle experience. Professional jealousies also played a part" (p. 18f.). See Nawaz, S. (2008), *Crossed Swords – Pakistan, its Army, and Wars Within*, Oxford University Press, p. 18-19.

[19] Sir Khizr Tiwana was the Punjab's Unionist Prime Minister and eventually led a Coalition with the Congress that stood in opposition to the Muslim League. More in Talbot, I. (2002), *Khizr Tiwana, the Punjab Unionist Party and the Partition of India: The Subcontinent Divided: A New Beginning*, Oxford University Press, pp. 193-214.

(p. 42). According to Khan Pakistan inherited a "paper army" (p. 42), which was in a disorganised state and faced massacres in the Punjab:

> "A carefully laid plan for the genocide of Muslims in East Punjab and the border areas was unfolding itself and gradually gained momentum. The wave of killing, looting and arson moved south and east, leaving in its wake desolation and misery throughout the unprepared, unarmed Muslim-minority areas. […] The army, though still disorganized at this stage, was hurriedly given the task of escorting and looking after them" (p. 42f.).

After the exposition of pre-Partition context and the background of the Pakistan Army, Khan turns to Partition itself. At the outset, Khan (1963) portrays "independence" (p. vii.) as a challenge and a test of "communal hatred, armed conflict, natural calamities and man-made upheavals" (ibid.), which only a professional army could overcome. But because, according to Khan, many soldiers came under political pressure, communal tensions also crept into the army:

> "Only the old Indian Army could preserve the peace during these chaotic days. It had already held the country together long enough under trying circumstances and, with its long experience and considerable prestige, it was still the only force which could have checked the drift towards total anarchy. Unfortunately, the army itself had been subjected to strong political pressure. It was not surprising that many soldiers whose families had suffered during the troubles should have become an easy prey to such pressure. […] The so-called 'comrades party' given in Delhi by the Indian officers to bid farewell to their Pakistani counterparts was spoiled by partisan feelings" (p. 65).

Khan proceeds to present the obstacles the armed forces faced confronting the communal violence in the Punjab. He portrays the army in Partition as "standing between life and death of the Muslims in the Punjab" (1963, p. 75), and depicts the army as diligent and selfless, giving away food and clothes to refugees, helping and protecting non-Muslims, and, refraining from revenge. Eventually the soldiers also helped the civilian administration to deal with the refugee influx in newly-created Pakistan.

Khan (1963) in his highly polemical "story of unique achievements" (p. vii.), interprets Partition as a challenge/test the unprepared and unaware Muslim soldier inside the British Indian Army had to face. India's hostility towards Pakistan and the Pakistan Army at its birth is the main problem – a conception that is echoed in the secondary literature about the Pakistan Army. Equipped with a soldierly spirit, a solid tradition and professionalism the Muslim soldier grew conscious of the changing environment, mastered the challenges and shifted his loyalty from the British to Pakistan. For Khan, the events before and during Partition and the creation of Pakistan eliminated the *khush fahmi* mentality and augmented the soldierly spirit and loyalty,

– "Faith in the future of Pakistan alone held it [the Pakistan Army] together and preserved its discipline" (p. 82).

### 4.2.2 Reference in early narratives

Urdu literature belonging to genres such as *ṭanz-o-mazaḥ, afsāna* and *safarnāmah* written by officers in the 1950s and 60s rarely deals with the author's role in Partition. As described in chapter three, early Urdu narratives do not belong to an established field in which the military or the self are negotiated, but to a literary field that lacks the military attribute. Texts written by military officers up until the 1960s thus refer mostly to pre-Partition times, and reference to Partition is only found in texts published in the 1970s.

Field Marshal and president Ayub Khan (1967) wrote his autobiographical narrative while in office and at a time, when he faced countrywide opposition in the late 1960s.[20] It is in this context that his representation of his role during Partition has to be understood: In *Friends not Masters* Ayub Khan tries to legitimise his seizure of power and is presenting 'his' country to an international audience.[21] Defending his authoritarian rule, Ayub Khan focuses on social, economic, and political developments in Pakistan while mostly leaving historical events of Partition aside. The text of Ayub Khan gives justification for his declaration of martial law and the political struggle against his political opponent Fatima Jinnah.

On a narrative level, the text of Ayub Khan is a bold list of achievements, particularly concerning the implementation of his policies, and historical reference is confined to the first five chapters, where the author recounts the advance of his military career to become the first army chief. Although in the preface Ayub Khan (1967) writes that he tried "to revaluate the past and interpret significant developments which have influenced the history of Pakistan" (p. v.), the historical events of Partition occupy little space in the text and are reduced to episodes of professional duties of the protagonist in the Punjab Boundary Force.[22] The

[20] Ayub Khan, FM M. (1967), *Friends not Masters – a political autobiography*, Oxford University Press. Ayub Khan does not address the opposition inside his book and presents the events in the 1960s as a democratic choice between him and Fatima Jinnah – who was chosen by his opponents. For the opposition against Ayub Khan, see Talbot, I. (2012), *Pakistan – A new History*, Hurst, p. 47f.

[21] Ayub Khan (1967) writes extensively about the foreign policy and the ideology of Pakistan, addressing an international English speaking public. See chapter nine to eleven: *Foreign Policy I* (p. 114f.*); Foreign Policy II* (p. 154f.); and *The Constitution and Ideology* (p. 186f.).

[22] Here see Ayub Khan, FM M. (1967), *Friends not Masters – a political autobiography*, Oxford University Press, pp. 15-17. General Rees established the Boundary Force on the first of August 1947 to protect both Hindu and Muslim refugees in the Punjab from each other, Cheema, P. (2002), *The Armed Forces of Pakistan*, Oxford University Press, p. 19f. and p. 123. The Boundary Force only existed during August 1947 and was later disbanded, after severe criticism from communal leaders. The Pakistani writers usually stress that the Indian leaders were responsible for the disbandment of the Force and the massacres that were committed by

Boundary Force was raised for the protection of the Muslim and Indian refugees during the division of the Punjab, a task it utterly failed. Quoting Memoirs of British officers,[23] he argues that his role was "purely advisory" (p. 15) and that he had no men under his command to prevent the massacres in the Punjab (p. 15-17).

Ayub Khan emphasises the continuity between the period preceding Partition and the early years of Pakistan. In contrast to Khan's *The Story,* Partition is not presented as a rupture that created new identities or affected the protagonist. Furthermore, Ayub Khan (1967) points out that upon Partition Pakistan inherited a "legacy of old attitudes and habits" (p. vi.).

In his narrative Ayub Khan (1967) depicts himself as a patient[24] and stresses that during Partition he was placed "in a hopeless situation" (p. 15) and unprepared for his assignment to protect the refugees in the Punjab. Partition and his days in the Boundary Force are reduced to an episode that he labels the "unhappiest period of my life" (p .17). This episode lacks historical context and does not connect to an over-arching narrative – for example to the rising awareness of the Muslims in the subcontinent, or the suffering for the creation of Pakistan. This lack of historical context is accompanied by a lack of reference to his own subject position: In the text, Ayub Khan refrains entirely from referring to his feelings or emotions, as he becomes a Pakistani.

Maj.-Gen. Akbar Khan, a high-ranking officer, wrote his autobiographical narrative *Raiders in Kashmir* in 1970,[25] shortly after Field Marshal Ayub Khan's resignation. At the time of publication his autobiographical account was understood as a direct attack on the government policy in Kashmir during 1947-48.[26] *Raiders in Kashmir* is written in the first person singular, although the book focuses to a greater extent on political and military developments around Kashmir. The historical reference in *Raiders in Kashmir* centres principally on the developments in Kashmir after Partition, but occasional reference to Partition itself is given.

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Sikhs in the Punjab. See for example Husain, Maj. Gen. Syed Wajahat (2010), *Memories of a Solider – 1947: Before, During, After*, Ferozsons, Lahore, pp. 54-78. For an in-depth history of the Punjab Boundary Force, see Jeffrey, Robin (1974), *The Punjab Boundary Force and the Problem of Order, August 1947*. In: *Modern Asian Studies,* 8:4, pp. 491-520, the official *Story of the Pakistan Army* refers to the Boundary Force in a short instalment titled *About the PBF.* It writes that "The P.B.F. was doomed to failure from the very start […] It stood between sanity and complete confusion, and although not strong enough to control the slaughter in rural areas where mobs ruled supreme, it kept some of the cities, large towns and main roads comparatively safe." Khan, Maj. Gen. F. M. (1963), *The Story of the Pakistan Army*, Oxford University Press, p. 66.

[23] He refers to Tuker, Sir Francis Ivan Simms (1950), *While Memory Serves*, Cassell, London, (Ayub Khan, 1967, p. 402), Moon, Penderel (1961), *Divide and Quit: An Eyewitness Account of the Partition of India*, Chatto and Windus, London, (p. 95) and Campbell-Johnson, Alan (1951): *Mission with Mountbatten*, (p. 176).

[24] As an acted upon protagonist.

[25] Khan, Maj. Gen. A. (1970), *Raiders in Kashmir*, National Book Foundation, Karachi.

[26] For a Review of Maj. Gen. Akbar Khan's memoir, see *Raiders In Kashmir by Akbar Khan*, In: Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 23, No. 3. (1970), p. 332.

The narrative commences in October 1947 and ends with the protagonist's trial in the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case in 1951.

Akbar Khan first elaborates the strategic and economic situation of Kashmir at the time of Partition before turning to the historical developments. The narrative can be divided into three parts: first, Akbar Khan (1970) presents his struggle to gather support from the Pakistani government for the Kashmiri tribesmen's fight against India, concluding that his self-assigned mission on the political level "ended in complete failure" (p. 68). In the second part, as a consequence of the failure on the political level, he elaborates his transformation from a politician into a fighter and narrates how the tribesmen confronted the Indian Army. Here Akbar Khan takes credit for his tactical support of the tribesman that led to the seizure of several towns in Kashmir. In the text, Akbar Khan (1970) accuses the Pakistani military's high command and government of hypocrisy, because they first supported the covert operations of the tribesmen but withdrew later because they feared an all-out war with India (p. 152). The second section of the narrative ends with his accusation of the government: "a simple step like sending help to the people of occupied Kashmir was never to be taken, and I was ultimately to land in prison" (p. 157).

In the third section Akbar Khan recounts his trail in the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case. He writes about inconsistencies in the trail and puts the Kashmir conflict within context of further developments in Pakistan. His accusations are directed against the Pakistani leaders who took "wrong decisions, flowed wholly or partly from real or imagined fear" (p. 184). Following Akbar Khan, Pakistani leaders are to blame for the unresolved Kashmir issue, which in turn is responsible for the high military defence requirements that hindered the overall development of Pakistan (p. 181). Akbar Khan writes that the leaders were looking for allies instead of developing their own infrastructure and were afraid of confrontation with India. Referring to historical battles of small mobile armies that triumphed over larger ones and multicultural India that he sees as fragile, Akbar Khan concludes that Pakistan should not fear a war: "War is likely to make us more united – but not India" (p. 203).

The subject position emerging from Khan's reference to his own role is that of a facilitator and organiser for the struggle of the Kashmiris. The author portrays himself as a selfless freedom fighter and patriotic Pakistani siding with the tribesmen and Kashmiris, despite the lack of government support. Similar to Ayub Khan's justification for his declaration of martial law and political struggle against Fatima Jinnah, Akbar Khan also uses his book to vindicate his role, particularly after the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case: "I was described as driven by

personal ambition, without any cause whatsoever, to have threatened the law and constitution of the country" (p. 162).

As described above, Urdu autobiographical narratives written before the 1990s do not refer to Partition events. However, there are autobiographical narratives by officers writing in Urdu that present their role as officers during the pre-Partition period. An example is Col. Muḥammad Ḵẖān who wrote *bajang āmad* (Come to Fight) in 1968.[27] *Bajang āmad* is full of humorous episodes of a young Muslim officer who undergoes training in the British Indian Army. The protagonist of *bajang āmad* is subsequently posted to Egypt, Iraq and Burma during World War II, and eventually returns to the sub-continent to the newly-created state of Pakistan. *Bajang āmad* ends with the independence of Pakistan and the protagonist's engagement in a hotel room in the town of Murree:

> "In this room the first sunrise of Pakistan on the 14th of August came to us. In this room we first heard the voice of Radio Pakistan. One can say that in this room the love for the free homeland started. But also in this room my freedom ended. Meaning, that the woman with whom I spent the night became the companion of my life, and the freedom of a lieutenant who was safe out of the reach of love from Cairo to Myanmar upon the arrival in Murree, was now a prisoner of love" (Ḵẖān, 1968, p. 221f.).

Although Partition is only an episode and no information about the protagonist's role is given, it is an important point of reference for the subtext of the narrative. Most of the wit and humour in *bajang āmad* is only understood in the context of Partition – with the hindsight of the reader or in retrospect. The role the narrator and protagonist occupy in the narrative draw from the differences of the Pakistani officers to their British and Indian opponents – a difference that was resolved after the establishment of Pakistan. Frequently the narratives compare British and Indian habits, music, language and food:

> "The difference between local [desī] and English food was equivalent to the difference between speaking English and Urdu. The way the words and idioms were slipping from the new learners' tongue, the English 'Mister Meat' [miṣṭar gosht] too, was not staying under the hooks of our unskilful [anāṛī] knifes" (Ḵẖān, 1968, p 26f.).

Autobiographical narratives by officers published in Urdu in this period share the subject position of junior officers or teenagers who entertain the reader in highlighting foreign cultures

[27] Ḵẖān, Col. Muḥammad (1968), *bajang āmad*, dūst pablikišanz, islāmābad. Karnal Muḥammad Ḫān is considered a master of Urdu wit and humour (ṣāḥib-i ṭanz-o mazāḥ nigār) for example by Sarvar, Ṭ. (2013), *ʿAsākar-i Pākistān kī adabī ḵẖidmāt: Urdū naṯar meṉ*, Akādimiyāt, Lāhaur. Bajang āmad was originally serialized in the army periodical ḥilāl. See Sarvar 2013, p. 207.

and characters. This position might only understood by a readership that had lived through Partition, the young Urdu-speaking readership of Pakistan. The protagonist of *bajang āmad* is a 2nd lieutenant joining the army, and the narrative is written for younger people and by a younger person's perspective, as Khan highlights:

> "This is a war-autobiography [jang bītī] of a second lieutenant. There is no sufism [taṣṣawuf], jurisprudence [fiqh] or theology [ʿilm al-kalām] in it. Only these things that in a life of a Second Lieutenant especially in war occur are treated. Second lieutenants usually are mostly young people and their main aspect is the heart" (Khān, 1968, p. 14).

The analysis of the three early military autobiographical narratives by Ayub Khan, Akbar Khan and Muḥammad Khān indicates that there is considerable diversity concerning the space allocated to Partition events, the context in which the officers refer to them, and the subject position the agents occupy. In contrast to the official history of the Pakistan Army, where Partition occupies a prominent position inside the text, the three analysed texts use Partition to refer to different contexts. While the official history elaborates high politics, the reorganisation of the army and the change in soldiers' lives during Partition, Ayub Khan although referring to international high politics, reduces Partition to a mere episode. Akbar Khan refrains from referring to the split of the British Indian Army and shifts the focus to military developments in Kashmir, but refers to national politics and internal military affairs. Urdu narratives, as demonstrated with the text of Muhammad Khan, do not refer to Partition events per se, but rely heavily on it for the subtext.

It should be noted that the reference to the subject position and the role the authors assign themselves to during that period do not seem to be of the same importance as the protagonist's dealings in previous or subsequent developments. Muhammad Khan for example writes chiefly about his life in the British Indian Army, Ayub Khan about his dealings as president of Pakistan and Akbar Khan about his political and military struggle, the Kashmir issue, his trial in the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case and national politics.

In conclusion, in the text published in the period before 1971 the negotiation and interpretation of the officers' own role in historical processes is less connected to their role during Partition events – other periods preceding Partition or subsequent developments feature more prominently. I argue that the lack of prominent reference to the Partition can be explained by the generation the officers belong to, as well as the symbolic position Partition occupies in the period before 1971. The cases of Ayub Khan and Akbar Khan represent officers writing in the 1960s and 1970s for whom writing about Partition was less connected with historiography

than to elaborate their own achievements. Rather, Partition was the episode that marked the end of the British rule. Urdu narratives, mostly circling around the relations of seniors to juniors and British to Indian Officers, accentuate their role and struggle under the British, and restrain from arguing about different versions of the Partition or the leadership. While the official history stresses the professionalism and tradition that helped soldiers to tackle the unpredicted challenges of the Partition, the protagonists hardly discuss how Partition events affected them personally.

### 4.3 Partition after 1971 – place for ideological disputes

> "The early history of Pakistan is an inspiring saga of courage and conviction that any people can be proud of. Our youth must make a careful study of this history. [...] I am sure that awareness of the heavy price paid in terms of human suffering will create in them great love for the homeland that is theirs to hold and build." – Musa Khan[28]

In 1971 another partition took place: East Pakistan was separated from West Pakistan and became independent Bangladesh. As I elaborated in chapter three, this Tragedy, in which the Pakistani military played an important role, had an impact on the field of military autobiographical production in Pakistan: A generation of lower ranking and Urdu writing officers gained access to the field and tried to settle scores with the officers they held responsible for the break-up of Pakistan. The first autobiographical narratives by officers written after 1971 were prisoner of war narratives. And as I will demonstrate further below, these texts focus mainly on the experience of suffering. A second recurring theme is the accusation of the preceding generation of officers during the break-up of Pakistan in 1971. The Partition of India in 1947 is no longer an issue. In prisoner of war narratives there is only marginal reference to the pre-Pakistan period and the events of 1947. Furthermore, most officers writing prisoners of war narratives were born around the Partition and as a consequence did not serve in the army during Partition – some officers belonging to this generation eventually turned to writing about the Partition period, but only in the late 1990s.

Here I will turn to the British generation of officers that first revisited Partition in the late 1970s. With the break-up of Pakistan, the context in which the early years of Pakistan were interpreted was altered. Before turning to autobiographical narratives, I will present how the

[28] Musa, Gen. M. (1984), *Jawan to General*, Oxford University Press, p. 88.

army referred to the Partition after 1971, by analysing a history that was commissioned by the Pakistan Army itself.

### 4.3.1 Revision of the Pakistan Army's master narrative

Six years after the break-up of Pakistan, Maj. Gen. Shaukat Riza authored the first official monograph concerned solely with the role of the army during the Partition: *Pakistan Army 1947-49.*[29] After *The Story of the Pakistan Army*, a second treaty of independence seemed necessary after the Tragedy of 1971. Although the recent events of the secession of Bangladesh were not given as reason for writing, Riza (1977) states that the Period of 1947-49 originally was "included in the volume *Pakistan Army – War 1965*" (p. 3), but eventually the period "deserved a separate volume" (ibid.). In retrospect, as Shaukat Riza writes, in the early years the Pakistan Army was "too busy in making history and not sufficiently aware of the importance of recording actions" (ibid.). Equal to *The Story* by Khan (1963), Shaukat Riza devotes more space to the pre-Partition period and covering Partition events only in a few pages. Besides giving references to the British Indian background of the army and to Muhammad Ali Jinnah's role in sculpting an independent army, Riza mainly explores the structures and handicaps of the newly-established Pakistani forces.

A theme that runs through the text is the failure to reform the inherited structure of the army at independence. For Riza (1977), right after Partition the army missed the opportunity to reform and build "an army springing out of the roots of our Central Asiatic traditions" (p. 145). Responsible for this development were the British traditions and officers remaining in the army for the first few years after independence, as Riza writes:

> "In 1947 the Pakistan Army was in effect controlled by British officers. Quite naturally it was oriented towards thinking in British terms. Our organisation, equipment, training, strategy were all guided towards British preferences. In the very early stages the army was plunged into lavish ceremonials, sport extravaganzas, and extra-curricular activities. These progressed into habits and the habits prevailed. […] We were in little position to change the picture in 1947. But we certainly had the opportunity in 1948 to set our priorities right. This we failed to do. The germs of this failure wormed their way into our blood stream" (p. 248).

[29] Shaukat, Maj. Gen. R. (1977), *The Pakistan Army 1947-1949*, Natraj Publishers. *The Pakistan Army 1947-1949* is also labelled as the first official history of the army on the Kashmir operation. The Kashmir operation takes up much space in the book.

Shaukat Riza interprets the British rule over India as military subjection, and in contrast to Khan (1963) two decades earlier, eschews from describing how the Muslims of British India became aware of their communal identity and situation. On the contrary, he states that the British takeover of the Indian sub-continent from the Mughals had negative effects on the development on the "nation" of Muslims:

> "Military subjection is a debasing occupation. It destroys the soul of the subject people. The conquered survive only in the fashion and to the extent that they provide pleasure to the conqueror. During the hundred years of British occupation our normal development as a nation was retarded and degraded. We produced few great scholars, soldiers or statesmen. The four generations born and brought up during British occupation lived and died as coolies, clerks and toadies. These four generations are lost for ever" (Riza, 1977, p. 5).

The usual praise for the professionalism of the British trained officers, especially during the communal riots at Partition, is almost missing in Shaukat Riza's short treaty on the developments during Partition events. Riza's (1977) chapter "Without Fear and Without Favour" (pp. 249-257) dealing with the role of the army during Partition is just nine pages long. A systematic description of Partition events and high politics is lacking, and Shaukat Riza (1977) refers only to several "acts of humanity which saved the Sub-cobtinent [sic!] from being swallowed by ever-expanding waves of violence" (p. 249) by Muslim soldiers during Partition.

In connection with the reference to the failure of reforming the army, Shaukat Riza devotes much text to the critique of the British generation of officers that remained in the Pakistan army. He holds them responsible for the further negative developments. Shaukat Riza (1977) argues that the officers recruited under the British were unable to consolidate the newly-created loyalty:

> "During training and after graduation the Indian officer was thoroughly indoctrinated with British ideas and British manners. He was acquired a veneer loyalty to British crown. However, he could not remain utterly impervious to the attitude of most British officers who regarded everything Indian as second rate. Most of them developed split personalities which they could not discard even well after Independence" (p. 99).

Although Shaukat Riza praises the army's performance during Partition, his fixation on the pre-Partition period and the castigation of the British Indian officers connect the Partition period with subsequent developments. Writing about Partition becomes a place to criticise the generation of officers that he sees as being responsible for the tragedy of 1971. He concludes, that the army failed to discard old colonially inspired habits and attitudes – a problem that

eventually leads to the secession of East Pakistan. In contrast to Khan, Riza does not elaborate on the personal effects Partition had on the officers.

### 4.3.2 The Tragedy of 1971 demands a revisit of Partition

The first example of a text of the late 1970s dealing extensively with an individual officer's role in Partition is Maj. Gen. Sher Ali Pataudi's autobiography *Al-Qissas: the Story of Soldiering and Politics in Pakistan*[30] written in 1978. The narrator introduces *Al-Qissas* as his personal story in the period from 1947 to 1971 (Pataudi, 1978, p. vii.), and refers substantially to his role during pre-Partition time and during the year 1947. Besides exploring his role in the events – mainly his post as the ADC of Field Marshal Auchinleck – Pataudi touches on what he calls the identity and ideology of Pakistan and reinterprets and negotiates historical events.

Pataudi's autobiographical narrative exceeds the description of his role and the events the protagonist lived through and uses Partition as a place to argue about a national identity. In the introduction, Pataudi (1978) discusses the concept of Muslim nationhood, highlighting that it stood above "older racial identities" (p. ix.), and stressing the importance of a "religious identity" (p. x.). The emphasis on what Pataudi terms "ideology" frames Partition differently from officers writing before him. For Pataudi Partition is a main point of reference for both his life story and ideological arguments. The centrality of Partition is reflected in the choice of title: Pataudi writes that the title *Al-Qissas* refers to the 8th Surah of the Quran in which he sees an analogy between the creation of Pakistan and the story of Moses:

> "The Twenty-Eighth (XXVIII) Surah consists mostly of the story of Moses, his early struggle and ultimate triumph, revealed at a time when the Prophet's condition seemed desperate. Today Pakistan's case seems desperate too. The early struggle for Pakistan and ultimate victory could be the story of Moses. The story of Moses' tribe, moving through the Red Sea and then through the Sinai, reminds one of the long caravans of Muslim refugees emigrating from India to the promised land of Pakistan" (p. vii.).

The passage of Patuadi's autobiographical narrative that refers to Partition events pivots on high politics at an international level. The protagonist in *Al-Qissas* travels internationally between the sub-continent and the United Kingdom and witnesses political events before and during the creation of Pakistan (p. 93). Pataudi stresses the proximity to the chief of the Indian

[30] Maj. Gen. S. A. Pataudi's text was published with three different publishers in the 1970s and 1980s and under a new title in the 1990s. First in 1979 with Wajidalis in Lahore, four years later, in 1983 with al-Kitab and 1988 with Syed Mobin Mahmod & Company. The same text appeared in 1994 under the title *Quest of identity: the entanglement of Muslims in India and Pakistan*.

Army, Field Marshal Auchinlek, to whom Pataudi attributes an important historical role. The narrative employs features of the genre of political narratives, to which high ranking officers regularly turn – the author takes responsibility for his actions, the conversation between persons in the narrative are crafted exchanges of ideas, and the narrator frequently assesses other persons.

On an interpretational level, Pataudi (1978) utilises Partition as a setting to debate the national ideology of Pakistan. In the introduction to the third chapter, he elaborates his understanding of Pakistan:

> "I have said earlier in this book that I had no intention of writing an academic thesis on the Pakistan movement, the 'two nation' theory and all that. Many books have been written on the subject by people more qualified than I am. My aim in this chapter is to describe to the reader, as I understood it, the concept of Pakistan, before I joined it in 1947. This is important for me as it gives the reason why I came to Pakistan – being a Pakistani by choice and not by Radcliffe Award. (The Partition of the subcontinent – as marked out by Mr Radcliffe) [...] Whenever I heard of Pakistan, I heard of religion. [...] to a Muslim, religion and politics were one." (p. 90).

In contrast to the autobiographical narratives presented so far, Pataudi expands on his decision of opting for either India or Pakistan, portraying himself as an active subject who became Pakistani – not an unaware Muslim soldier. In contrast to Ayub Khan for example, Pataudi (1978) indicates that he was fully aware of the political developments before Partition (pp. 70-72) – partially because knowledge of the politics and policies of the British formed a prerequisite for entering the Royal Military Academy of Sandhurst. Furthermore, he depicts himself as someone who travelled extensively during Partition time and could "follow the political developments" (p. 110), recollects several encounters with political leaders, some of them at his ancestral home. While Pataudi describes and interprets his role during Partition, he does not refer in any way to the army's role during Partition.

In his autobiography *Jawan to General* (1984)[31] General Musa devotes an entire chapter to Partition. In contrast to other chapters, it is conspicuous and loosely integrated into the overarching narrative. Foremost, the Partition chapter lacks reference to Musa's advance in career and is entitled *Qiyamat-e-Sughra* (p. 70)*,* a reference to the day of resurrection. The religious connotation is deliberate, and Musa describes the creation of Pakistan as a divine act: "it was the will of God that our country should come into being" (p. 88). The reference to Partition events is enclosed between two reflective and argumentative instalments where he

[31] Musa, Gen. Muhammad, (1984) *Jawan to General,* Oxford University Press.

contextualises Partition as a source for patriotism for the younger generation and accuses India. In the same instalments he refers to the change he felt becoming a Pakistani.

Musa's (1984) text is a list of his own achievements, decisions and subsequent absolutions, highly argumentative and interspersed with reference to Indian aggression. Furthermore, the protagonist's frequent change of location is striking, moving between the Punjab and Kashmir. Musa starts his narration with an episode referring to the awareness by the Indians of the British bias in their favour (p. 72), before elaborating on the political developments in the Punjab that led to the break-up of the Punjab Boundary Force and eventually the "massacre of Muslims across the border" (p. 73). Musa, appointed as General Staff Officer in the Lahore Area, describes the problems of the Pakistan Army which "had hardly come into existence" (p. 74) and had to escort Muslim refugees on the Indian side safely to Pakistan. He writes about the ordeal of the refugees, how the deteriorating situation after floods affected the refugee camps, and about the atrocities committed by non-Muslims before describing the struggle of the Kashmiris against the "Hindu tyrant rulers of Kashmir who had let loose a reign of terror on them for the demand that their legitimate grievances be redressed" (p. 79). Musa writes how he anticipated the operation of the Indian Army in Kashmir and intercepted a message by the Western Command to fly a brigade to Kashmir valley (p. 80), but did not get any support:

> "It seems that the tribesmen, who had gone there to help the Muslim population of the State in their revolt against their ruthless oppressors and in resisting their tyranny, were not properly guided by the so-called leaders, who were actuated by personal motives of self-glorification" (p.81).

Moving his narration back to the Punjab, Musa (1984) writes how he dealt with the international press, which praised him and the troops for their effort, in contrast to India that restricted access (p. 82). In a different passage, he describes an incident, where he delayed refugees going to India in order to guarantee Muslim refugees' safe passage. As a consequence, he had to justify his decision before the Prime Minister, who eventually agreed with his assessment (p. 84). Musa indicates that the Pakistan Army supported the civilian administration of the new state of Pakistan. He praises the troops for protecting the refugees, sharing their food rations despite the "medical advice that their own health would suffer" (p. 85). He describes how he took over 103 Brigade and administered the refugee camps (p. 87). Musa describes the refugees fleeing across the border: "Thousands of uprooted families were very likely wiped out by the non-Muslim population, assisted by the State Army and Militia" (ibid.). Throughout the chapter, Musa accuses India of "mischievous" (p. 83f.) moves, trying to trap the Muslim refugees and "malign us internationally for alleged failure on our part to look after their people

properly" (p. 85). In contrast to India, Musa writes, Pakistan "had nothing to hide and looked after non-Muslim refugees better as compared to the attention being paid to this human problem in India" (p. 82). On several occasions he highlights that India could not be trusted and it appeared that it tried to "undo Pakistan at its birth" (p. 85) and the "Muslims of India and the State of Jammu and Kashmir were made the victims of a deliberately planned genocide" (p. 88). The narration ends with his transfer to general headquarters in July 1948 (ibid.).

Musa (1984) feels impelled to share the "traumatic events that attended the birth of Pakistan" (p. 70) with the younger generation in order to put the "nation's history in proper perspective" (ibid.). He sees the nation's history under threat from intellectuals and political leaders who focus on the struggle of the Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah and ignore the "physical implementation of the political decision" (p. 71), arguing that "the foundations of this state rest truly on the sacrifices of those who chose to be uprooted and face death on the way rather than comprise on their demand for a Muslim homeland" (ibid.).

In contrast to Pataudi's focus on the ideology, for Musa the physical suffering and the commemoration of the suffering lay at the foundation of Pakistan. He argues that inobservance of the suffering at Pakistan's birth, may lead the younger generation to "not look upon it [Pakistan] as a priceless land, which must be preserved and developed" (p. 88). Assessing the conditions in which Pakistan came into being, Musa stresses that Pakistan "is priceless because the bloodshed, the abduction of Muslim women, and the atrocities suffered by our people for its creation, cannot be worked out in financial terms to determine its value" (ibid.).

Two shifts in regard to earlier subject positions are discernible in Musa's narrative: Firstly, in contrast to Ayub Khan for example, Musa does not portray himself as a patient that was unaware of the historical developments. On the contrary, he claims responsibility for his actions and the narrator in *Jawan to General* regularly "cannot refrain from giving [his] assessment" (Musa, 1984, p. 88) and depicts himself as a close witness to the events. Secondly, besides underlining the importance of Partition for the patriotic feelings of the younger generation, Musa also calls attention to the transformation that affects him, as he becomes a Pakistani. Musa does not refer to himself as a nationalist before Partition; it is rather Partition that transforms him into a patriotic Pakistani. He writes that although he pursued a successful professional career as a soldier in the British Indian Army, before the creation of Pakistan he inwardly felt that he "was leading the life of a mercenary" (p. 72). This changed with the creation of Pakistan where he writes that he felt a "significant change in this attitude" (p. 72).

While autobiographical narratives up to the 1980s regularly referred to Partition as episodes of the narrated life story, by the mid-1980s, thematically autobiographical narratives dealing

exclusively with Partition events started to appear. Maj. Gen. Shahid Hamid wrote the first such book in 1986 entitled *Disastrous twilight – A personal record of the Partition of India*.[32] The book is a compilation of six essays[33] and his diary from 1946 to November 1947, framed in the introduction by editor and historian Philip Ziegler as a rarely heard Muslim, Pakistani and military "voice" that stands in contrast to the "politician or the civil servant whose opinions are most commonly expressed" (Hamid, 1986, p. xi). Ziegler locates Hamid's contribution in the historiographical debate about the Partition of the sub-continent – referring to the larger field of historiography about Partition with several positions and internal conflict. According to Ziegler, Hamid's position is that of a partisan soldier reflecting the already established Pakistani position:

> "Shahid Hamid's is the age-old protest of the straightforward soldier against the devious politician, of the idealist against the pragmatist, of the traditionalist against the progressive. It is not necessary to accept the premises of this argument to feel sympathy for the raw pain and anger that permeate this chronicle. His book deserves to be widely read. Any student of the period who accepted it as the whole truth would be gravely misled, but if he were to ignore it altogether he would be missing a statement of real importance" (p. xiii.).

Shahid Hamid (1986) himself characterises his book as "not just a record of events" (p. xvii.), but also of the "reactions to what I saw, what I heard and what came across my desk" (ibid.). The narration mode inside the diary – differentiated by Hamid's six essays – is a record and description of day-to-day events in a political autobiographical style. The description of political events is interspersed with interpretations and assessments of military leaders and politicians.[34] In the narrative itself there is hardly any reference to Hamid's own actions.

The reference to the field of historiography of Partition, as mentioned above, interconnects with the role the narrator inside *Disastrous Twilight* occupies. Shahid's position, as framed by Ziegler, is that of a contributor of a neglected Pakistani position and a close observant of high

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[32] *Disastrous Twilight* was translated into Urdu and published as Shāhid Ḥāmid, S. (1990), *Duniyā badal ga'ī*, Jang pablisharz, Lāhaur. For the reception of Shahid Hamid's text see Sarvar, Ṭāhirah (2013), *ʿAsākar-i Pākistān kī adabī k̲h̲idmat: Urdū naṯ̲ar meṉ̲*, Akādimiyāt, Lāhaur, p. 77f. Shahid Hamid's second autobiographical narration *Autobiography of a general* covers his childhood and professional career during the pre-Partition period, centring on his Muslim identity and his family. Shahid Hamid writes that he was aware of the political developments of pre-Partition India, as politics were frequently discussed at Aligarh where he was a student. The narration of *Autobiography of a general* ends with his appointment of private Military Secretary to Gen. Auchinleck.

[33] Shahid Hamid writes that the six essays provide the context for his diary. Contexts addressed in the essays are the establishment of the Congress party and the alienation of its Muslims members, the organisation and responsibilities of the British Indian Army, as well as the history of the Indian National Army.

[34] For example of Sri Francis Tuker (p. 47);,Lord Mountbatten (pp. 197-9, pp. 154-5, p. 298), Mahatma Gandhi (p. 51), Lord Montgomery (pp. 76-7) or Douglas Gracey (p. 284).

politics. The narrator moves from detailed accounts of day-to-day changes of the high politics preceding Partition to the assessment of politicians and political developments. Frequently Shahid Hamid comments on high politics, defending his perspective against an Indian biased version of history.

Being preoccupied with historiography Shahid Hamid frequently resorts to third person singular narration. In a lengthy passage he explains why it was the Hindus, who were responsible for Partition. He interprets Partition as an inevitable outcome of the politics of the Congress that alienated the Muslims of the subcontinent:

> "The Hindus had the power to keep the subcontinent under one government as long as they decentralized the power to the Provinces. They lost three great opportunities of keeping India together: the first when they refused to form Coalition Ministries in the provinces in 1937, the second when they refused Cripps' offer of the steps to be taken towards self-government in 1942 and finally when they rejected the Cabinet Mission Plan in 1946. They regret it now. They had no statesman among them. Whenever they conceded anything to the Muslims it was grudgingly given and was always too late. They lacked foresight and the essence of responsibility and greatness. Their brain could be termed as a brain of the professional middle-class. The Congress High Command was arrogant and lived in a world of make-believe and was not prepared to face the reality of the situation, which helped indirectly in bringing about the establishment of Pakistan. They now maintain that this was a by-product of their effort to free India. By their short-sighted policies they antagonized the Muslims, who gradually came to believe they were out to destroy them as a community and that there was no racial, cultural or linguistic unity between them and they could not live together. Their approach to human problems is totally different from that of the Muslims. They have a split personality. Their actions are different to what they practise and they have developed an inferiority complex[,] which is understandable as they were ruled by the Muslims for many centuries. On the other hand, though the Muslims were destroyed by the British, they did not suffer from anti-British sickness. After 1857 the Hindus received all the encouragement and support from the rulers but they slandered the British, maligned them and blackmailed them, but at the same time gained every advantage from their presence" (Hamid, 1986, p. 213f.).

The subject position of Hamid is marked by the strong reference to Hindus, which to him is the counterpart of Indian biased historiography. Although written as a first person narrative, this passage also demonstrates the subject position of Hamid as that of a historical witness, who assesses events and personalities for a historical interested readership. The assessment of events and personalities require a position of proximity of the protagonist. Hamid interprets his role – similar to that of Musa – as a close witness to historical events, a role that enables him to counter and accuse prevailing historical Hindu narratives.

Lt. Gen. Muhammad Attiqur Rahman wrote several books on military subjects before penning his autobiography *Back to the Pavilion*[35] in 1989.[36] Although Attiqur Rahman joined the Indian Army ten years prior to Partition and occupied a relatively high position as military instructor during the events, Partition occupies limited space in *Back to the Pavilion*. Attiqur Rahman focuses on military developments before and during Partition that he sees affected by the end of the Second World War and rarely refers to the political developments. His assignment to establish the Pakistan Military Academy (PMA) features prominently in the text.

Attiqur Rahman (1989) explains that for him the creation of Pakistan was a "constitutional change" of which he as a soldier was unaware. At the time of Partition, he writes that he "was totally immersed in soldiering and paid little attention to the major constitutional changes that were in the offing in the country" (p. 58). He stresses his ignorance about Partition and the creation of Pakistan, adding that he hoped for a good rapport between the two dominions:

> "The Partition of India was finally announced and became a reality. I still did not know what it was all about! [...] I did not realise the enmity, which would grow between Pakistan and India and felt that we would be two dominions who would continue to have good relations with each other. The killings on the Border and the Kashmir problem put paid to all such wishful thinking" (p. 58f.).

In the narration of Partition Attiqur Rahman (1989) depicts himself as a pure professional soldier. Calling to attention his recruitment in the British Indian Army, he indicates that his military training nourished a disregard and disinterest in politics. This applied especially to communal politics. "Race or religion never entered our minds" (p. 58), he writes and the possibility of splitting the Indian Army for him was unimaginable. In several passages he identifies himself as a "British trained officer" (p. 223) with what he sees positive values that came with a British military education. For example, in the last chapter he recapitulates his story as follows:

> "At the time I was a cadet, in 1937, the British predominated in India and I learnt, in my opinion, many of their goods [sic!] points; to play the game, that this or that is 'not done,' to work hard and

[35] Attiqur Rahman, Lt. Gen. Mohammad (1989), *Back to the Pavilion,* Ardeshir Cowasjee, p. 62. Also published with Oxford University Press.

[36] Attiqur Rahman has written five books on military matters: Attiqur Rahman, Mohammed (1973), *Leadership: Junior Commanders*, Ferozsons; Attiqur Rahman, Mohammed (1973), *Leadership: Senior Commanders*, Ferozsons; Attiqur Rahman, Mohammed (1976), *Our Defence Cause: An analysis of Pakistan's past and future military role*, White Lion Publishers; Attiqur Rahman, Mohammed (1978), *Reflections on Infantry*, Wajidalis; Attiqur Rahman, Mohammed (1981), *Reflections on the principles of surprise and deception*, Wajidalis; as well as a history of the Frontier Corps: Attiqur Rahman, Mohammed (1980), *Wardens of the Marches: a history of the Piffers 1947 – 1971*, Wajidalis.

> devotedly and relax afterwards, to love your men in a patriarchal way, and to enjoy life, always putting your regiment first" (p. 224f.).

Attiqur Rahman's self-description echoes Brian Cloughley's argument put forward at the beginning of this chapter. The apolitical and the purely military professional point of view of the officers of the British Indian Army took the aspiring Pakistani officers unaware of the political developments of Partition. The role of a military professional that Attiqur Rahman ascribes himself to is highlighted by his lack of reference to a personal change when Partition was announced. For Attiqur the developments that led to Partition equate an increased work load and his choice to serve in the Pakistan Army was disconnected to his ideological or his religious identity.

Before I analyse how autobiographical narratives published in the 1990s referred to Partition, I will recapitulate some of the main features of the reference, self-ascribed role and interpretation of Partition autobiographical narratives published after 1971. It should be noted that after the secession of East Pakistan the military and social disposition of the officers writing about Partition did not change substantially. Most of the officers writing autobiographical narratives referring to Partition were high-ranking officers who joined the British Indian Army before the Second World War. This 'British generation'[37] of officers as indicated in chapter two authored several other texts on military subjects, such as regimental histories, training manuals and treaties on command and leadership.

The autobiographical narratives written after 1971 devote more space to Partition events, as the example of Shahid Hamid shows. Partition events become worthy of a monograph. Although the space Partition takes up in the narration grew, the manner in which Partition was narrated remained largely the same. The focus of the narration rests on the historical developments regarding high politics. Most narratives can be characterised as chronologies of episodes interspersed with digressions into high politics, assessments of political developments and personalities, as well as discussions about historiography. The narratives of officers from this period thus resemble the political autobiographies and memoirs of their English counterparts.

Changes from the preceding narratives can be located at the interpretation level, and in regard to the subject position the narrators and protagonist in the narratives occupy. On the one hand, the reference to Partition after 1971 is used as a place to negotiate the national ideology of Pakistan and on the other to correct what the authors see as "distorted" historiography. Musa

[37] For the British generation of officers see 2.4.1.

for example advocates that the suffering experienced by ordinary men and women at Partition should be a source for patriotism. He refers to other histories and interpretations of Partition that he perceives as overly preoccupied with Muhammad Ali Jinnah's role and struggle. Pataudi draws an analogy between the struggle of Moses' tribe and the struggle for Pakistan. He contextualises the Pakistan movement as a religious demand for a national state. Shahid Hamid puts the demand for Pakistan in the context of a rival Hindu demand that alienated the Muslim political leadership of the Muslim League. His interpretation of Partition closely mirrors the official history presented by Maj.-Gen. Fazal Muqeem Khan in 1963 that makes the Hindus' actions responsible for the demand for Pakistan.

Finally, it should also be noted that Partition is interpreted as the starting point of a decline that eventually led to the crisis of 1971. In the official history the role the armed forces played during the events are praised but the focus lays on the subsequent failure to reform the colonial outlook of the army.

The analysis has shown that after 1971 writing officers were aware of other versions of the history of Partition and ideological disputes connected with the creation of Pakistan. Whether they try to contribute to historiography as demonstrated with Gen. Shahid Hamid or argue against a fixation on the Quaid-e Azam like Musa Khan, they position themselves in relation to other texts.

Regarding the self-ascribed role during Partition, two representations of the officer can be distinguished: On the one hand, officers such as Musa Khan and Shahid Hamid portray themselves as active and engaged officers, who tried to counter Hindu actions against the Muslims – at the level of high politics in the case of Shahid Hamid and at the level of the affected refugees in the case of Musa. Moreover, the officers depict themselves as aware subjects in a period of personal and historic significance. On the other hand, Attiqur Rahman portrays himself as a passive and uninterested military professional, unaware of the developments in a period of mere 'constitutional changes'.

The preoccupation with national ideology and historiography that developed in narratives after 1971 affected the subject position occupied by the officers. The narrators' position in some passages of the analysed texts can be described as debaters of national ideology or historiography. Some of the officers highlight their awareness and physical location during Partition events. The frequent change of physical location and the role as close witnesses of historical events legitimises them to argue on the level of historiography and ideology. In contrast to earlier narratives, there is reference to the effect Partition had on the officers. Musa

writes about the change he felt when he became a Pakistani and Pataudi calls attention to his conscious decision to join a religious state.[38]

Finally, the self-representation as a debater of national ideology who witnessed the high politics of Partition and therefore is in a position to accuse mostly British and Indian opponents, there existed a separate subject position shared by several officers in the late 1980s that could be termed 'military professional'. This self-representation is closely connected to the identification with the category Soldier, whereas the former is connected with the negotiation of the category Muslim and Pakistani. The position of the military professional will be analysed in the following subsection.

### 4.4 Diversification of narratives – representations of Partition since the 1990s

The demarcation of a period starting in the 1990s is not as straightforward as the division of the periods before and after 1971. As I have argued in chapter three, in the 1990s several parallel developments emerged in the field of military autobiographical narratives in Pakistan, characterising a new period: Agents with different prepositions accessed the field, there is a rise in Urdu publications and thematic narratives, larger numbers of copies and editions are printed, and the intertextual reference becomes a universal feature. These developments had an influence on the field of military autobiographical narratives.

Before describing the narrative features, interpretations, and subject positions of the officers writing about Partition from the 1990s onwards, I will point out the developments regarding the language and the social disposition of the officers that changed in the 1990s. In terms of language the emergence of Urdu texts should be noted: Not only were more autobiographical narratives published in Urdu, but also several existing narratives were translated from English into Urdu. In the 1990s the social dispositions of the writing officers diversified. While in earlier periods the writing officers were to a greater extent socialised under the British, from the 1990s onwards, all three generations of officers published their autobiographical narratives simultaneously. In 2010 for example both an autobiographical narrative form Admiral

[38] As demonstrated above, Gen. Musa does not portray himself as a nationalist before Partition or being involved in the demand for Pakistan. He indicated that it is the events of Partition that changes himself into a nationalist. This position contrasts Pataudi's who portrays himself as a nationalist before Partition.

Muhammad Shariff, belonging to the British generation, as well as Air Chief Marshal M. Anwar Shamim, belonging to the American generation was published.[39]

### 4.4.1 Military professionals

In the 1990s several autobiographical texts can be categorised as 'military professional narratives'. Military professional narratives were also published before the 1990s and are not a distinct phenomenon of this period. Military professional narratives are written by officers of the British generation and mostly only marginally refer to the author's role during Partition. The minimal reference inside these texts that can be characterised as a bold list of achievements, renders an adequate description of the officers' own role during Partition difficult. However, the narrative features and the interpretations of Partition found in these texts can be described. For the description of military professional narratives, I will analyse Gul Hassan Khans *Memoirs*[40] published in 1993 and Z. A. Khan's *The Way it Was*[41] published in 1998.

Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan Khan narrates his *Memoir* in short episodes interspersed with argumentative passages following a chronological order. Gul Hassan's *Memoirs* resembles political narratives, employing crafted dialogues, assessments of military and political leaders, and short background information that stage the dialogues. Contrary to political autobiographical narratives Gul Hassan Khan's text addresses a military interested public, or in other words, other military officers. His compulsion to assess other military and political leaders is reflected in Gul Hassan Khan's indication that he wrote the book because of his proximity to important personalities in Pakistan's history. Reference to Partition in Gul Hassan Khan's memoir is confined to his personal observations of Mohammad Ali Jinnah, to whom he was posted as aide-de-champ during the Partition period. Arguing about military matters and subsequent domestic political developments dominate over the reference to high politics or the effects Partition had on his personality.

On the interpretational level, Gul Hassan argues that Mohammad Ali Jinnah stood for a secular state for the Muslims, which started to descend into chaos after birth. He makes the national political leaders responsible for decline: "[Pakistan] became a playground for enduring

[39] Muhammad Anwar Shamim joined the Pakistan Air Force College Risalpur in July 1950, see Shamim, Muhammad Anwar (2010), *Cutting Edge PAF: reminiscences*, Vanguard Books, p. xiii. Sharif was recruited in 1936 as a Signal Boy Recruit for the Royal Indian Navy, see Shariff (2010): *Admiral's diary*, p. 3.
[40] Khan, Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan (1993), *Memoirs of Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan Khan*, Oxford University Press, Karachi.
[41] Khan, Brig. Z. A. (1998), *The Way It Was – Inside the Pakistan Army*, Natraj Publishers, Dehra Dun, p. 6.

gangsters, inveterate opportunists, and chronic freebooters. And of these species there appeared to be no dearth in our country" (Khan, 1993, p. x).[42]

He reasons that the concept of a secular state presented by Mohammad Ali Jinnah stood in contrast to those conceived by religious scholars:

> "The Quaid-i-Azam's concept of Pakistan was diametrically opposite to that of the mullahs, if the latter had any views, or any concept at all. Mohammad Ali Jinnah had envisaged the new state as a homeland for the Muslims of India, in which anyone could follow any religion he professed as long as he was loyal to Pakistan" (Khan, 1993, p. 78).

Gul Hassan also employs Jinnah as a role model and contrasts him with subsequent political leaders:

> "[Jinnah] was no prophet and never professed to be one, though I don't doubt that if anyone else had been in his shoes, the history of Islam would assuredly have been in danger of being recast. Mohammad Ali Jinnah was above petty sentiments. He was robust enough to withstand influences exerted by sycophants and other similar creatures" (p. x.).

As indicated above, because of the absence of any reference the self-assigned role or subject position of Gul Hassan during Partition cannot be conclusively described. In the overall narrative however, Gul Hassan depicts himself as a professional military soldier who argues less about the ideology of the state but mostly criticises the national political leaders to whom he was a close witness.

Z.A. Khan's *The way it was* is similar to Gul Hassan Khan's narrative and can be best described as a bold list of mainly military achievements. In regard to the reference to Partition Khan's narrative misses many of the features described for the military autobiographical narratives of the three preceding decades. For example, there is no reference to the high politics of Partition or to the two-nation theory. Instead, Z.A. Khan (1998) describes changes in the Indian Survey Office where his father worked at the time of Partition (p. 6). Khan briefly refers to the communal violence in the Punjab (p. 4) and riots against Hindus (p. 3) without voicing emotional reactions. The reference to Partition is best characterised as a brief report:

> "After the riots in early March, Murree remained peaceful. With the announcement that India would be partitioned the Hindus and the Sikhs quietly moved away. There were newspaper and radio reports of massacres and migration of Hindu and Sikhs from the areas that were to constitute Pakistan and of

[42] Gul Hassan Khan blames the political leader for the first military coup by Ayub Khan. For Khan, Ayub did not have political aspirations and was preoccupied with the establishment and reorganization of the army.

> Muslims from India. Schools and colleges closed elsewhere but Lawrence College was not affected, the students remained unconcerned and waited for the school year to end so that they could go home. On August 14, 1947 we became independent. With independence we who had been Indians became Pakistanis, nobody felt any different" (p. 6).

### 4.4.2 Expanding on Partition: Tajammul Malik

Maj. Gen. Tajammul Hussain Malik joined the British Indian Army one year before Partition, indicating that the division of India and the creation of Pakistan "as a homeland for the Indian Muslims" (1991, p. 5) at that time were unimaginable. Tajammul Malik thus belongs to a generation of army officers that were only briefly trained under the British.

The space devoted to actual Partition events in *The story of my Struggle*[43] is limited.[44] Tajammul Malik was undergoing training during the Partition period and the description and assessments of the conditions under the British officers takes up considerably more space. As for example Shahid Hamid and Musa Khan have indicated, Malik also highlights the alienation of the Muslim soldiers from the rest of the Muslim population. He refers to the British training of military officers that made the Indian Officers of officers "real mercenaries who were only concerned with their own bread and butter. It was regarded as none of our business to think about what happened to the rest of the country" (p. 7). While a cadet, Malik portrays himself as ignorant about the high politics of Partition and states that he was even unaware of the developments that led to the separation of the British Indian Army (p. 5). It was the communal riots in the provinces of Punjab and Bengal that led him to "realise the magnitude of this tragedy" (p. 9). Malik writes about his first journey to Pakistan, witnessing atrocities and suffering on the way, and writes that he was emotionally affected when he entered Pakistan for the first time (p. 11).

Malik contrasts his observations of the early period of Pakistan with subsequent political and social developments. Sharing a common vision in the beginning, Malik writes, all Pakistanis considered each other as equal and worked together. This vision was lost mostly due to the military. The following passage highlights this aspect, when Malik (1991) describes his arrival in Peshawar in December 1947:

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[43] Malik, Maj. Gen. Tajammul Hussain (1991), *The Story of My Struggle*, Jang Publishers.
[44] Malik's book was translated into Urdu and published with Jang publishers as Malik, Tajamul Ḥusain (1996), *Merī jidd o jahd kī dāstān*, Jang Pablisharz, Lāhaur.

> "There was no fear of the so called law enforcing agencies to arrest anybody they liked and there was no need for a martial law to restore law and order, nor were they prepared to accept such an authority at that time. They had shed away the colonial rule and were now the citizens of a free country which a constitutional government in the province and at the centre. Young and old, men and women all looked beaming with confidence. There was complete freedom for all citizens on the basis of their fundamental rights and no one could be dubbed as 'anti-state' merely for criticising the Military Government as was often done during the period of Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan and Zia-ul-Haq's rule" (p. 13).

Malik interprets the early days of Pakistan as an emotional, but short-lived version of the aim of the founder Muhammad Ali Jinnah. He argues that although Jinnah wanted "to make the country an ideological 'Islamic State' [that] ever since its inception every successive government followed a colonial system inherited from our British masters" (p. 2f.). For Malik, the fostering of the colonial system inherited from the British was especially strong in the military. The newly created army was based on British habits and contempt for religion:

> "To become a good officer, one was expected to drink, dance and even speak the Urdu language with English accent. The sooner one adjusted oneself to complete European way of life, the better one's chances were to be regarded as a good officer. Good Annual Confidential Reports and even courses reports were generally based on the outer personality of the individual concerned and seldom any superior reporting officer tried to find out the real worth of the man. That is why when partition took place, the outlook of most of our senior officers was more British than the British themselves. Any one who talked about religion was considered to be a backward type and sometimes even ridiculed in public [sic!]" (p. 5f.).

In the narrative, Malik (1991) contrasts himself first to the British officers and later to the British generation of Pakistani officers, which he calls "aristocratic and Europeanized" (p. 6). Under the British, to be commissioned in the army was equal to the achievement of a high social status, a deliberate system introduced "to give the Indian Officers a feeling of superiority over their countrymen generally known as 'Natives'" (p. 7).

Malik interprets Partition as an attempt to create an Islamic state that he sees hijacked by the British generation of military officers. It is both a period, where for a short time, Muhammad Ali Jinnah's vision of an Islamic State was realised but also a starting point of a decline, where the real vision of Pakistan was lost. Partition is therefore also seen as a change of masters that betrayed the Muslims of Pakistan.

As elaborated above, Malik portrays himself as an unaware subject of high politics but as someone who understood the real implication of Muhammad Ali Jinnah's vision of an Islamic Pakistan. Even though only a cadet, Malik depicts himself during Partition as a close observer of his superiors that understood the intentions of their actions. As I will show later, Malik's

self-assigned role is more extensively negotiated during the 1971 war, where he depicts himself as a selfless fighter for the Muslim cause.

### 4.4.3 Integration of Partition events

Admiral Sirohey, who was born a decade after Tajammul Malik, experienced Partition as a young student growing up in a village in the Punjab with a Muslim majority. In *Truth Never Retires,* [45] Sirohey's perspective differs considerably from other texts that have been written by officers who witnessed Partition from the perspective of officers of the Indian Army.

Sirohey's narration of Partition centres around his activities and experiences as a schoolboy and campaigner for the Muslim League in the provincial election of 1946 (1996, p. 29), and later on the experiences as a refugee on the way to Pakistan. The text freely changes from reflections to direct speech. The protagonist is a schoolboy who witnesses the events of Partition on the local level as they unfold. Although he participated in the campaign of the Muslim League, Sirohey writes that he was unaware of the danger that grew in the Punjab (p. 31). With the advance of events, he witnesses injured people, particularly women and children, as well as dead bodies (p. 36). Despite the danger in the Punjab, the protagonist is reluctant to leave his school and home village in the beginning. The eventual flight to Pakistan is an episode full of suspense; the protagonist is separated from his family, hides in fields, marches for days and narrowly escapes militant mobs.

Not only does the perspective occupied by Sirohey, but also his interpretation of Partition differ from officers presented above. Partition is not contextualised by high politics or arguments for a certain perception of the state of Pakistan, Sirohey also shuns away from using Partition as a place to negotiate history. In *Truth Never Retires* Partition events are integrated in a narrative of growing up and coming of age. Sirohey stresses the personal impact that Partition had on him. The witnessing of atrocities and the tension he lived through, he writes, had a strong psychological impact on him:

> "I had just entered my teens. The teens are supposed to be most care-free years in one's life. In these years one gradually grows up while thoroughly enjoying life and defying order or principle. After seeing such deaths during a span of two weeks or so, I skipped adolescence [sic!]" (Sirohey, 1996, p. 39).

[45] Sirohey, Admiral Iftikhar Ahmed (1996), *Truth Never Retires*, Jang Publishers.

At one point in the narrative, he depicts himself as a school boy who was arguing for Pakistan but did not know exactly what the consequences were: "I was hardly aware of the significance of 14 August and the boundaries of the new country" (p. 30). It is with Partition events that he witnesses the consequences of the demand of Pakistan on others (women, children etc.) and experiences them himself. He writes that he started to take responsibility and view himself as a protector and guardian of the people who suffered for the creation of Pakistan:

> "When Pakistan came into existence in 1947 I was a young student who knew little about the world beyond academic activities. Despite this we went around the whole of the Punjab campaigning for Muslim League in the 1946 elections. In pursuance of our goal we chanted slogans in favour of Pakistan and the Quaid-i-Azam. [...] Eventually, Pakistan came into being. What we witnessed at the time of Partition revealed the dark side of humanity as we saw man turning into beast. Innocent children, women, the old and the young – all had to pay the price for the creation of Pakistan. This traumatic experience transformed me from a boy into a man. I saw myself as a protector and guardian of these helpless people" (p. 577f.).

In Aboobaker Osman Mitha's *Unlikely Beginnings: a Soldier's Life*[46] the narration of Partition events is embedded in his over-arching story of the quest to find his "naked self" (2003, p. 100). *Unlikely Beginnings* is a recollection of the protagonist's actions, thoughts and reactions to what he experiences from 1920 to the late 1990s. The narrative consists of personal reflections resembling an interior monologue, with occasional reference to the history of Pakistan.

As a prelude to Partition, Aboobaker Mitha refers to his childhood in Bombay and subsequent socialisation and military training. He represents himself separated from both the British as well as the Indian – equal to the representation as a mercenary of Musa and Malik. He writes that he considered himself equal to the British but was rejected and on the same time was distant from his own tradition:

> "The mix of cultures left young boys like us very confused. None of us wanted to go back to the Indian culture in its entirety. The result was that we were never quite clear what being 'Indian' meant. The only thing on which everybody agreed was that the British must go and we must rule ourselves. […] I also realized that though I no longer held the British in any great esteem, the only language I could read, write, and speak was English" (Mitha, 2203, 43f.).

Mitha (2003) stresses the difference between the English and Indian officers and the fraught underlining relationship that the British Officers felt superior and did not like to converse with

[46] Mitha, Maj. Gen. Aboobaker Osman (2003), *Unlikely Beginnings: A Soldier's Life*, Oxford University Press.

their Indian colleagues (p. 54). Most of the British officers regarded "the Indians as an inferior race and behaved accordingly with the Indian officers" (p. 59).

Before Partition, Mitha (2003) portrays himself as being unaware of political developments. He thought it was impossible that the British would leave the subcontinent (p. 39). And he was convinced that Muhammad Ali Jinnah "was using the threat of Pakistan as a means to get what he wanted for the Muslims. I came to believe later that Partition took place because of the obstinacy of Nehru and Gandhi after the conference" (p. 107).

Pre-partition and Partition occupy a central position in Mitha's narrative: First, Partition is the beginning of his successful career in the Pakistani Army[47] and second, Partition serves as a fountainhead of the search for his 'naked self' (p. 100). Witnessing the famine in the Bengal of 1943 he refers to his search for answers in shrines (p. 81) and ashrams (p.88). The quest for answers becomes a theme that accompanies his career in the army: "I had enjoyed army life and wanted to make it my career; on the other hand, I wanted to study further to find the answers to the questions and doubts which my experience in the Bengal Famine and the war had given rise to" (p. 96). Partition left Mitha in a state of shock and bewildered (p. 108). His personal crisis is deepened as he witnesses the atrocities committed in the Punjab (p. 110). Mitha portrays himself during the Partition events as someone on the quest for his inner self who was deeply affected by what he saw and experienced:

> "I was never so depressed again till the display of the same type of savagery in East Pakistan in 1971. The only difference was that I was not surprised the second time, having been through it once already" (p. 111).

It is here that Mitha also argues about the private place of religion:

> "The killings were carried out in the name of religion despite the fact that every religion teaches otherwise. […] If we were real Muslims and really practiced what Islam teaches, there would be real secularism in Pakistan" (p. 110f.).

Mitha depicts Partition as a dark episode of violence in the name of religion for which politicians were to blame. On one occasion he blames the craving for power of man for the inhumanity that is committed (p. 119). On another occasion he blames Nehru:

[47] Mitha is credited with the establishment of the Special Service Group (SSG).

> "I watched Nehru and thought to myself that it was these leaders who were responsible for these terrible happenings. In their eagerness to get power they had allowed the British to hurry the process of leaving India, without taking into consideration the possible repercussions" (p. 111).

Maj. Gen. Wajahat Husain's (2010) autobiographical narrative *1947: Before, During, After*[48] devotes three chapters to the Partition of the sub-continent. In the first chapter "The Empire's Sunset: Pakistan's Apocalyptic Dawn" (pp. 49-52) Wajahat Hussain provides background information on the British relations with the Muslim League and to the Partition Council that created the Punjab Boundary Force to control the communal disturbances in East and West Punjab. Writing about the internal military developments, he refers to the "communal sensitivities" (p. 50) that eventually affected the British Indian Army. Wajahat Husain elaborates on the political developments that led to Partition (ibid.) and criticises the fast pace adopted by the British:

> "Most Pakistanis and many former British officers and civil servants regard the decision to advance the date of the transfer of power from June 1948 to August 1947 as a disastrous error of judgment and an administrative blunder" (p. 52).

In the second and longest chapter "With The Punjab Boundary Force: In the Midst of Massacres" (2010, pp. 53-78) Wajahat Hussain turns to his duties in the Punjab Boundary Force, the various operations at Jullunder, Ludhiana, the Mahlom Village and Kapurthala. While on service and entrusted with the task of bringing an armoured train to Lahore, he witnesses the attacks on Muslim refugees (pp. 55-57). Amidst the brutality he was himself "engrossed" (p. 62) even though the events are sometimes "comical, even ridiculous and bizarre" (p. 66). Wajahat's descriptions of the massacres are graphic, about the massacres in Ludhiana he writes:

> "Patrolling at night we witnessed the horrendous scenes of earlier Muslim massacres in the mohallas: dead bodies, specially small children, women and old people, lying all over the streets, burnt houses, lanes strewn with remnants of looted items, torn pages of the Holy Quran etc. I had difficulty (in the darkness) avoiding trampling under tank tracks the children's bodies" (p. 58).

In the third chapter "Abandoning Old Roots: Move to a New Country" (Husain, 2010, pp. 79-88) he incorporates a narrative from his brother of how family members moved from Calcutta to Pakistan, leaving their ancestral home behind.

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[48] Husain, Maj. Gen. Syed Wajahat (2010), *Memories of a Solider – 1947: Before, During, After*, Ferozsons, Lahore,

On the interpretational level, several already established themes congregate: First, Partition is used as a place to debate about the historiography of Pakistan and its ideology and secondly, Partition is interpreted as the beginning of the subsequent decline of the state. He concludes that debates surrounding the concept of Pakistan are futile and ignore the fact that exists:

> "There has been an unnecessary debate, amongst the weak-minded, on questioning the very genesis of Pakistan; the way it was conceived, propounded, struggled for and finally, achieved. This is surprising after the passage of 62 years. What is important is to appreciate the reality of Pakistan and the need for strengthening it, rather than questioning and debating the very concept" (Husain, 2010, p. 284).

Right after Partition, Wajahat Husain (2010) writes, the leaders and administrators worked together with the patriotic populace to overcome the challenges. This stands in contrast with the situation in the present (p. 285). He locates a decline on the political, ideological, military and administrational level in Pakistan. Wajahat Husain accuses the politico-religious elements "who were nowhere to be seen in the struggle for the country" (ibid.) first asserted themselves in the anti-Ahmadi Movement before reaching their pinnacle in the days of Zia ul-Haq for hijacking the vision of Muhamad Ali Jinnah. They used religion as a "crutch to find solutions to their political difficulties" (ibid.). Husain blames Ayub Khan for the decline in military and administrational level: The entry of the armed forces into politics and the abolishment of a "merit-based system" (p. 287) subsequently led to "sycophancy, unlimited power, authoritarianism, and the acquisition of perks and privileges" (ibid.). He concludes that with the entry of officers into politics religious extremists materialised that nullified the elements of Pakistan as defined by the Quaid: "enlightened, progressive, wisdom, tolerance, etc." (p. 285).

In his narrative Wajahat Husain (2010) depicts himself as a close witness to historical events.[49] His proximity is connected to his role as a professional soldier that had part in the suffering:

> "The events recounted in these pages provide a glimpse of the great tragedy that befell the sub-continent Muslims in the struggle for the achievement of this great country. Through an act of Providence, I found myself in the midst of this great drama and because of my professional duties I saw, observed and felt, all the untold suffering, losses and miseries suffered by those who lost their hearts and homes in an orgy of needless violence and hatred" (p. 77).

[49] In the introduction he frames it as a "narration of the experiences as personally observed by a lucky survivor", Husain, Maj. Gen. Syed Wajahat (2010), *Memories of a Solider – 1947: Before, During, After*, Ferozsons, Lahore, p. 4.

The representation as a suffering subject is a recurring theme in Wajahat Hussain's narrative (p. 67). He depicts himself as commiserating with the Muslims who suffered for the establishment of Pakistan.

With the diversification of the field the narratives of Partition were noticeably altered. After the 1990s, Partition events occupy considerable space in the over-all narratives and the narration shifted to several different levels. While in the 1970s and 1980s the focus was on high politics, in the 1990s officers incorporate their personal experiences of Partition events eventually referring to their emotional response to communal violence. The change in topic is accompanied by a change in perspective of the narrator. This shift does not imply that the reference to high politics is lost after the 1990s, as I have demonstrated, it is rather accompanied by the narration of personal experiences, and features such as assessments and critiques of military and political leaders are still prominent.

The second change concerns the integration of Partition into larger narratives. From the 1990s onwards, officers attempt to integrate Partition experiences into larger life narratives. As demonstrated in the case of Admiral Sirohey for example, Partition experience is an important element in his narrative of coming of age. It is through Partition that he grows up. Furthermore, for Aboolbaker Mitha Partition belongs to his quest to find his naked self.

Not every text incorporates the personal experience and integrates Partition events into a larger narrative. As with the text of Attiqur Rahman in the previous period, there are autobiographical texts that are almost exclusively devoted to military matters of Partition events.

On the interpretational level, like the preceding period Partition is used to argue about historiography and the concept or ideology of Pakistan. Officers writing about Partition in this period are aware of other texts and reference is frequent. Officers like Wajahat Hussain emphasise the suffering caused during Partition and highlight the sacrifices of migrants that are ignored in historical debates.

Another feature of the text concerning the interpretational level is that some officers view Partition as a focal point in the history of Pakistan and the starting point of a subsequent decline and prelude to the events of 1971. Mitha or Malik for example argue that after independence the vision of the state was unfulfilled, interpreting the Partition as a mere change of masters and connect it with the 'tragedy' of 1971. While Malik argues for an Islamic state, Mitha advocates that the Quaid envisioned a 'secular' communal state.

The subject position and the manner in which officers interpreted their role in history also saw some considerable changes. The emphasis on proximity to events is a prominent feature in

many autobiographical narratives. In contrast to the preceding period proximity to communal violence seems to exceed the closeness to political and military leaders. Officers like Sirohey portray themselves as suffering with the migrants. Mitha depicts his role as opposed to the political leaders who were not aware what Partition implied for the Muslim population. At the same time officers present themselves as unaware of high politics. This also has to do with the integration of Partition in a larger life narrative. Because the events become an integral part of growing up or searching for a self, emotional attachment becomes more prominent. Officers write about the change they felt, when Pakistan was achieved or when they arrived in Pakistan. Authors confining themselves to a military professional position, on the other hand, desist from referring to emotional change.

For Sirohey, fighting was not restricted to chanting slogans and trying to influence policies. It meant real fighting, with fists and sticks. And with it came real physical suffering. They contrast their high moral and spirit they had when they were striving for Pakistan with the current state of decline. The suffering in a way authorises them to speak.

### 4.5 Subject positions in regard to 1947

As I have outlined at the beginning of the chapter, there is no systematic study of the role of officers' during Partition. Literature on Partition and the military largely refrains from giving information about officers' interpretation of their role, but hints at the change in the main categories of identification that occurred during Partition and altered officers' subject positions. Pandey even argues that the violence at Partition created entirely new subject positions.

The analysis of officers' views of Partition shows that there is considerable variation at the level of narration and interpretation, as well as in the subject positions officers occupy. The diversity in narratives, interpretations, and subject positions show that Partition events mean different things to different officers – to reduce Partition experience to a purely military professional point of view impedes an understanding of the importance Partition plays in the negotiation of the self-understanding of the Pakistani military officers.

After the 1990s, the narration of Partition takes up more space, officers focus increasingly on the experience and less on high politics and the pre-Partition period, and the change in narration is accompanied by a diversification of interpretations of Partition. Some officers view Partition as a golden age and a prelude to decline, others as a mere change in masters. Even other interpretations suggest that Partition should be viewed as a period of intense suffering and hence a source of patriotism. For high-ranking officers of the first generation trained under the

British, the division of the sub-continent came as a surprise. For the generation of officers that followed, however, the creation of Pakistan is presented as their political and ideological goal throughout their military and sometimes political career. Over the last four decades, writing about Partition becomes a place to criticise the generation of officers that are depicted as being responsible for the 'Tragedy' of 1971.

There is considerable diversity regarding the subject positions occupied in the texts. With time, officers developed or occupied subject positions such as a close observer, debater of national ideology, accuser, or military professional. The differences in the respective subject position of Ayub Khan, who depicts himself as a patient soldier in the Punjab Boundary Force, of Sirohey's active struggle and suffering for the creation of Pakistan, and of Wajahat Hussain's position as a close witness of the massacres in the Punjab, are just a few examples.

Some representations of Partition are shared by most officers; notably the fast pace the British adopted when leaving the sub-continent, the Indian attempt to undo Pakistan at birth, and the army's good performance despite the circumstances in 1947. However, the different representations of the officer's own role, makes it hard to integrate a cohesive collective narrative of Partition. Officers who reconstruct and present their story through 1947 are somehow located between producers of 'objective' narratives centring on the state (narratives of 'high politics') and the producers of multiple narratives as 'history from below'. As a consequence of, or related to, this location a range of representations can be observed. Some officers understand themselves as purely professional soldiers who were surprised at how new distinctions, and eventually violence among communal lines affected even the officer corps. In high-ranking officers' narratives of Partition, the purely military professional self-understanding is voiced, together with the mantra that the army stood above religion and race. Parallel to these narratives, there are narratives of officers with strong communal feelings that advocate interpreting Partition and the birth of Pakistan as the struggle for an independent Muslim homeland. Later narratives of struggling (against the British masters and mischievous Indians), fighting for and suffering as a Muslim through Partition events echo the official military histories produced in the 1960s and late 1970s. Particularly after the 1990s however, the official history as well as the purely military professional representation of 1947 is challenged by officers who produce more balanced or nuanced accounts of Partition, reflecting both on their personal experience and the representations of other officers that exist of the events. Here officers locate themselves in contrast to an official representation as well as distant from a purely military or ideological position. Partition for some officers is thus also a place to

position themselves as critical insiders of the military institution. The self-understanding of the Pakistani military officer is thus not reducible to the military's own ideology.

The subject positions the officers occupy in regard to 1947 draw on distinctions between generations, between senior and junior officers, active and passive positions, between critical and nationalistic voices, between actors/witnesses in high politics and experience, between politically acting and military acting officers, between patriots and opportunists, between Hindus and Muslims, British and Indian, Indian and Pakistani, between Pakistanis by choice and circumstance, between sufferers and mere observers. These distinctions are a feature of the field, and the practice of writing about 1947 is connected with the positioning of the agents on either side of these distinctions. Inside the field, these distinctions have their own economy. In the 1960s and 1970s, the distinction between British and Indian officers, as well as between Hindu/Sikh and Muslim officers for example are more pronounced than in later decades, where the distinction between generation of officers and officers with different ideologies (Islamic vs. secular) becomes more noticeable.

## 5. Representation of the officers' in regard to the Tragedy of 1971

> "We lost the war without losing a battle. Even the enemy was surprised at the speed of our disintegration." – Maj. Gen. Qureshi[1]

> "Some people even publicly cheered. I even heard something like, okay then, at least we return alive […]. Sense of shame? Maybe I am exaggerating, but in these conditions should our behaviour be like this? When facing imprisonment to commit suicide like the Japanese may be an extreme step, but a regular soldier of a brave army cannot afford to lay down his weapon in front of the enemy let alone cheer about it." – Lt. Col. ʿAbdulqādir[2]

> "We were all to blame. The leaders were more to blame because they should have known better. The poor were to blame for not being more careful and selective in the choice of their leaders, particularly when they should have known from so many past experiences that it is always they, the poor, who suffer when things go wrong; so they have no one to blame but themselves." – Maj. Gen. Pataudi[3]

> "I debated the subject in my mind and said to myself: If you want to take something back, take the scars of dismemberment of your country and the deep anguish of your imprisonment. Nothing can be more precious, noting more memorable!" – Brig. Siddiqi[4]

On 16 December 1971 Lt. Gen. A. K. K. Niazi, Commander of Eastern Command, signed the Instrument of Surrender in Dhaka. Less than two weeks before, on 3 December, the Pakistani armed forces formally entered into war with India by attacking airfields on its eastern border in Ambala and Amritsar, as well as Udhampur in Kashmir. Although the formal war between India and Pakistan lasted a little under two weeks, Pakistani military officers were engaged in a civil war in East Pakistan for over a year. The reasons for the civil war and who was responsible for the loss, as with many other aspects of this conflict, are subject to debate.[5] The conflict triggered by the surrender and the breakup of Pakistan has fuelled the production of autobiographical narratives in the last four decades.

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[1] Qureshi, Maj. Gen. Hakeem Arshad (2002), *The 1971 Indo-Pak War – A Soldier's Narrative*, Oxford University Press, p. 129.

[2] Abd al-Qādir, Lt. Col. (2011), *Be-tegẖ Sipāhī – jang 71 aur qaid kī rudād [The bare handed Soldier – The War of 71 and Prison Narrative]*, ʿilm o ʿirfān publishirz, lāhaur, p. 53.

[3] Pataudi, Maj. Gen. S. A. (1978), *Al-Qissas: The Story of Soldiering and Politics in Pakistan*, Wajadalis, Lahore, p. iv.

[4] Siddiqi, Brig. Abdul Rahman (2004), *East Pakistan – The Endgame: An Onlooker's Journal 1969-1971,* Oxford University Press, Karachi, p. 172.

[5] Disputed aspects circle around the commitment of war crimes, genocide, the number of civilian and military casualties and prisoners of war. Figures vary widely and range from 300,000 to over 3 million.

The prelude to one of the shortest wars in history was the internal political confrontation in Pakistan that led to a civil war in East Pakistan. In March 1969 General Yahya Khan took over the post as Chief Martial Law Administrator and President of Pakistan from Field Marshall Ayub Khan who faced fierce opposition. Gen. Yahya promised to hold the first general elections in Pakistan in October 1970 under a new established general plebiscite.

The military establishment worked with Islamic parties in both wings to weaken the two main contesters Zulfikar Ali Bhutto form the Pakistan People Party (PPP) in the West wing, and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman form the Awami League (AL) in the East wing. The military intelligence services estimated that neither of the two parties would win a clear majority and would have to build coalitions to rule Pakistan, in which case the military establishment could figure as kingmaker (Nawaz, 2008, p. 260).

During the summer of 1970 massive rains caused floods in East Pakistan and led Gen. Yahya Khan to postpone the elections to 7 December. A month before the election, on 13 November, the tropical cyclone Bhola and subsequent floods caused destruction and the loss of 300,000 to 500,000 lives in East Pakistan and India. The Pakistani government was criticised for the hesitant rescue efforts. When the elections finally were held on 7 December, to the surprise of the military leadership, it presented a clear political divide: In East Pakistan the Awami League led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman emerged as the clear winner, winning 161 of the 300 seats of the General Assembly. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto with the Pakistan People Party (PPP) finished second winning 81 seats, all of them in West Pakistan.

After the 1970 election results were announced, the military, according to Sisson and Rose (1991), was concerned with "integrity of Pakistan under central government with power" (p. 54) as well as the "military budget at current levels" (p. 54). The military decided to back Bhutto because it feared that Mujibur Rahman would work against the armed forces,[6] while Bhutto, with a major power base in the Punjab, from where most of the military officers were recruited, would not work against the army. The Awami League had already voiced demands to recruit more Bengali officers into the ranks (Sisson and Rose, 1991, p. 66). Bhutto himself was not "ready to sit in the opposition" (Nawaz, 2008, p. 263).

In March 1971 the negotiations between Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Mujibur Rahman and Yahya Khan failed. On 23 March Pakistan's Independence Day was rendered into Resistance Day and Bangladesh flags were raised in most cities. Secondary literature usually sets the start of the

[6] Shuja Nawaz refers to A.R. Siddiqi who traces the decision to Gul Hassan Khan. See Nawaz (2008, p. 262) and, Sisson and Rose (1991, p. 54, 66).

civil war in East Pakistan as 25 March, when the army under Tikka Khan carried out Operation Searchlight. The objectives of Operation Searchlight were to neutralise political power of Awami League, control the radical students, and disarm ethnic Bengalis in the armed forces (Sisson and Rose, 1991, p. 157f.), particularly the units of the East Pakistan Rifles. Several Bengali servicemen deserted and together with the paramilitary Mukti Bahini guerrilla force engaged with the Pakistan Army. Although the historiography of the conflict and especially the agenda of the actors in the conflict are heavily disputed, a common understanding distinguishes two or three parallel conflicts in 1971. While Sisson and Rose (1991) distinguish between a civil war in East Pakistan and an international war between India and Pakistan (p. 1), Pakistani author Shuja Nawaz (2008) identifies three conflicts:

> "Contrary to popular belief, 1971 witnessed not one but three major conflicts in the subcontinent: One was a civil war within Pakistan, with Yahya and his regime using military power to force the East Pakistanis to accept a united Pakistan. Another was a war with India, with Mrs Indira Gandhi's government taking advantage of the turmoil to launch an invasion of East Pakistan in support of Bengali freedom in November 1971, precipitating the third conflict: a Pakistani riposte from West Pakistan into Indian territory that began on 3 December 1971. With that move, Pakistan sought to forestall an Indian decision in East Pakistan and to draw international intervention into the conflict" (p. 282).

The outcome of the conflicts was a disaster for Pakistan and its military and is commonly referred to as the ‚Tragedy'[7] or *almiyah* in Urdu. The offensive into India on the western front was halted, the border re-established, East Pakistan became independent Bangladesh, West Pakistani officers and soldiers stationed in East Pakistan were ordered to surrender and over 90'000[8] became prisoners of war in India. With this defeat, the Pakistani military lost a third of its army, half of its navy and parts of its air force.

The Tragedy of 1971 was a catalyst on several different levels. Foremost, the good image of the military in Pakistan was shattered. It came as a surprise to most Pakistanis that the Pakistani military would lose the war. Army propaganda painted a favourable picture of the battle, highlighting territorial gain of its troops right to the end of the conflict (Siddiq, 1996). Inside the armed forces major shifts occurred after the war: Several high-ranking officers were retired, patterns of recruitment changed, and, as the quotes in the introduction to this chapter

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[7] See for example Masʿūd, Muḥammad (1972), A*lmiyah-yi Mashriqī Pākistān: aik tabṣarah; aṭhārah savāl va javāb kī ṣūrat mẹn ma'ah faujī pas manẓar [The Tragedy of East Pakistan: An observation in 18 Questions and Answers with a military background],* Kitāb Markaz. Isḥāq, Muḥammad (1973), *Mashriqī Pākistaān kā alamiyah*, Lāhaur, Punjāb muzdūr kisān pārṭī. In the following, I will use Tragedy with a capital T as a term for the reference to the political and military developments that are connected to the secession of East Pakistan or the breakup of Pakistan.

[8] The number of prisoners of war is disputed by the military officers as I will show below.

indicate, the army engaged in introspection (Nawaz, 2008; Fair, 2014).[9] As described in chapter two, the emergence of a new elite and the realignment of the social structure during Bhutto's rule affected the military. The period of populist egalitarianism (1972-1977) challenged the military on several levels, particularly the "interference in its internal organization" (Qadeer, 2006, p. 30) as well as the "attempts to create parallel security force" (ibid.). by Bhutto.

The Tragedy of 1971 occupies a central part in the autobiographical narratives of Pakistani military officers, even more so than Partition. Reference to the debacle, also termed the "betrayal of East Pakistan" (Niazi, 1998), "loss of East Pakistan" (Siddiq, 1984), the national "drama" (Siddiqi, 2004), or the "traumatic experience" (Musa, 1984), is accompanied by emotional reactions, accusations, attempts to correct historical misrepresentations, self-criticism, and debates about the ideology of the state. As seen in the quotes given in the introduction to this chapter, the Tragedy of 1971 triggered an introspection as well as a search for culprits. As with the reference to Partition, the Tragedy of 1971 means different things to different officers, and was narrated and interpreted differently in subsequent decades.

In this chapter I work out the different representations of the officers' role during the Tragedy of 1971 and their subject positions. Following the same procedure as in chapter four, I will proceed in three steps. To contextualise the shifts in narration and interpretation, in a first step, I turn to secondary literature and highlight several features of the historiography of the conflict – the 'troubled' nature of the historiography of the Tragedy being the main characteristic. In the second step I describe how the officers represent their role during the Tragedy following the chronological order of publication. To understand the place the 1971 Tragedy occupies inside the self-representation and construction of the officers, I first describe how the officers narrate the event, then address how much space the narration occupies, and finally examine prominent narrative features as well as the modes of narration. In the second step, I turn to the interpretation of the events by the officer, in other words, in what context the events are presented, what other fields and topics are negotiated with the events, before addressing the role the officers ascribe themselves during the events. In the last step I look into interpretations and representation and summarise the changes of the officers' subject position in the last four decades. Here I argue that the controversies surrounding the historiography of the Tragedy are central to differentiation of the Pakistani military 'self'. Because the Tragedy triggered the production of a closely-knit web of texts, the officers are forced to position themselves in regard to the already existing positions. The practice of representing oneself

[9] For the social and cultural consequences and developments in the armed forces after the 1971 see 2.3.2.

becomes an exercise in position taking in regard to other writers. The officers' negotiation of the Tragedy triggered different and competing representations that cannot be integrated into a single cohesive narrative.

### 5.1. The troubled historiography of the Tragedy

"Truth," it has been said, "is the first casualty of war,"[10] and the Tragedy triggered the production of partisan literature championed by either a Bengali, Pakistani or Indian point of view. While partisan narratives are partially nurturing the troubled nature of the historiography of the Tragedy, secondary literature has identified a "paucity of writing on 1971" (Khan, 2010, p. 27) or referred to a "narrative vacuum" (Cilano, 2011, p. 2) as the main culprits. Cara Cilano argues that the classification of the Hamoodur Rehman Report and its Supplement, both with diverging claims to truth, led to a "narrative vacuum" (p. 2) about the Tragedy. The Pakistani military itself did not commission an official version of the wars of 1971.[11] According to Nawaz (2008, pp. 328-330) and Shah (2014) the military only commissioned an "internal study on the 1971 war, it was not circulated widely and was restricted to the purely military aspects of the war on the western front" (Shah, 2014, p. 130).

In contrast to the readily comprehensible literature on the role of officers during Partition, the literature on the officers' role during the conflict of 1971 is almost multitudinous.[12] The civil war in East Pakistan and the international war between India and Pakistan triggered the production of partisan texts, written from either a Bengali, Pakistani or Indian perspective. The conflicting narratives and different perspectives presented in these texts refer directly to the roles of Pakistani military officers during the conflict. In contrast to Partition, secondary literature about the conflict cannot be divided according to thematic foci. The differentiation

[10] Although the attribution of this quote is disputed, it can be ascribed to Philip Snowden in the introduction to Morel, E. D. (1916), *Truth and the War,* London, p. ix.

[11] Some officers refer to Fazal Muqeem Khan (1973), *Pakistan's crisis in leadership*, published with the National Book Foundation in 1973, as a commissioned history of the army's performance during the Tragedy, for example Gen. A.K.K. Niazi (1998, p. 159). While Fazal Muqeem Khan's earlier work about the Pakistan Army published in 1963 was commissioned by the army, *Pakistan's crisis in leadership* was not. Further more Muqeem Khan's *Crisis in leadership* is written in first personal singular. Other works that are Khan, Mohammed Akbar (1972), *The mystery of debacle of Pakistan, 1971, and myth of exploitations since 1947, and secret of the covert war-unmasked*, Islamic Military Science Association. Mohammad Akbar Khan authored several works about tactics, for example *The Islamic pattern-of-war: planning and training in* 1968 his son published his memoirs after his death entitled *Merī ākhirī manzil* in 2006.

[12] The three positions that can be distinguished refer to the primary parties of the conflict and are either written from the Bengali, Pakistani or Indian perspective. The partisan literature written from a Bengali perspective focuses on the atrocities committed by the Pakistan Army and portraits the conflict as the Liberation War of Bangladesh. The literature written from the Indian perspective focuses on the performance of the Indian Army, for example Mankekar (1972), *Pakistan cut to size*, Indian Book Company, New Delhi, or Singh, Jagdev (1988), *Dismemberment of Pakistan: 1971 Indo-Pak War*, Lancer International, New Delhi.

between secondary literature that focuses on military aspects, such as on developments on the battlefield or inner military conflicts, and literature that focuses on political developments is futile. Not only are the political, military, and to some extent the social roles the Pakistani officers played an integral part of the narrative of the events in the secondary literature, the texts the officers produced are used as sources for the historiography of the Tragedy.[13]

Scholars writing about aspects of the Tragedy tend to categorise the already existing historiography according to the thematic focus of the work ('high politics' vs. history from below), or the perspective (partisan literature vs. "dispassionate scholarly work" (Bose, 2011, p. 185). Several studies attempt to counter the historical partisan narratives of the high politics of the conflict and analyse other aspects of the historiography. In the following I will present the three most prominent aspects that help to contextualise the subsequent analysis of the officers' self-representation during the Tragedy. The first aspect concerns the troubled narrative of the Tragedy and is highlighted in studies by Sarmila Bose (2011), Yasmin Saika (2004; 2010) and Carla Cilano (2011). The second aspect is voiced most prominently by Srianth Raghavan (2013) who draws attention to the insularity and determinism of most historiographical works about the conflict. Lastly, Naveeda Khan (2010) argues that the historiography of 1971 turns back to the foundation of Pakistan. In other words, reference to the Tragedy of 1971 becomes an integral part of an overarching 'crisis narrative' (Khan, 2010) of the state.

Hinting at the dominance of the high politics of the conflict in her micro level study of personal narratives of both Bengali and Pakistani writing, Sarmila Bose (2011) notes "most of the literature on 1971 is preoccupied with the conflict between India and Pakistan, with the Cold War as a backdrop, marginalising the people of the land where it was fought" (p. 5). She sees the conflict of 1971 "in need of serious study in many aspects" (ibid.). Beside the fixation on high politics, which Bose wants to counter with history from below from both Pakistani and Bangladeshi sources,[14] she indicates "the material from all parties to the conflict is relentlessly partisan" (ibid.). Particularly in Pakistan, the historiography about 1971 is in a state of denial (Bose, 2011, p. 14). In regard to Pakistani narratives dealing with 1971, Bose (2011) indicates "Pakistani discussions on 1971 are full of bitter recriminations, mostly with regard to losing to India, with deafening silence from the majority of those who had served in East Pakistan" (p. 5). Bose's (2011) assessment stands in contrast with the numerous autobiographical narratives

[13] Military autobiographies and memoirs extensively used in the works of Nawaz, Shauja (2008), *Crossed Swords*, Oxford University Press, and Cloughley, Brian (1999), *A History of the Pakistan Army*, Oxford University Press.

[14] Bose (2011) makes a list of "dispassionate scholarly work" (185), and also looks at memoirs from Pakistanis but ignores the work that has been published in Urdu. Her attempt partly fails because the narratives from below she uses, are themselves highly partisan.

written by military officers particularly in the 1990s, as demonstrated in chapter three. There are several voices that are at the focal point of reference to the conflict in East Pakistan, first and foremost from high-ranking officers.[15]

In her study of Pakistani army soldiers' experiences during 1971, Yasmin Saika (2010; 2004) hints at three aspects in connection with the historiography and narration of events.[16] Similar to Bose (2011) Saika (2010) notes that the general Pakistani public was uninterested in the history of 1971 (p. 185). Furthermore, Saika notes that the memory of 1971 became depoliticised, because "the confusing memory of 1971" is framed as a "story of 'betrayal' within a 'family saga'" (p. 185). According to Saika, the conflict is remembered vividly and treated in great detail inside the armed forces. Referring to her fieldwork in Pakistan, she writes about the willingness of officers to talk about the conflict of 1971:

> "It quickly became clear to me that the reason for the easy access was because no one cared about the history of 1971 in Pakistan. It was a forgotten memory for most people, including scholars and students. In the military academy, however, 1971 is remembered for lessons on strategy, battle plans, operations, the role of officers and unit commanders and such technical matters" (p. 185).

Inside the armed forces, Yasmin Saika (2010) distinguishes two types of literature: "Military and police history [with] focus on the armed conflicts, operations and military activities, strategies, tactics and acts of diplomacy" (p. 184) and a "genre [of] glorifying high-ranking soldiers' personal memories of value and bravado" (ibid.) that created "semi-fictionalised narratives of the war" (ibid.). In addition to these two types of literature, which Yasmin Saika (2010) characterises as "ideological narratological manipulations" (p. 185), there are the stories of foot soldiers at the "margins of these celebratory national narratives" (p. 184). Similar to the undertaking of Bose (2011), Saika wants to correct and confront the narrative of high-ranking officers and the high politics of the conflict with the experience of low-ranking soldiers in Pakistan.

Yasmin Saika (2010) further highlights that the conflict of 1971 is connected to the history of 'otherising' in the subcontinent (p.180), noting that "in 1971 the rhetoric of Hindu as the enemy of Muslim Pakistan and Muslim as the enemy of Hindu India was primed for violence" (p. 181). The distinction between 'them' and 'us' became pronounced and "the abstraction of

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[15] There is almost no scholarly work about the conflict of 1971 published after 1999 that does not attend to Gen. A.A.K. Niazi's *Betrayal of East Pakistan,* or the memoir of Maj. Gen. Hakeem Qureshi, *The Indo-Pak War: A Soldier's Narrative*.

[16] Her interest lies in the way the common foot-soldiers become perpetrators of violence, witness the breakdown of morals and eventually face their human condition.

the human person to fit ethnic and/or religious labels open up the space for a cold, inhuman purpose for one group to exploit another" (p. 183).

As indicated above, in her study of national identities in Pakistan after 1971 Cara Cilano (2011) observes that there is a "narrative vacuum" in the Pakistan Tragedy. The two main reasons for this vacuum were the classification Hamoodur Rehman Commission of Inquiry into the 1971 war and its supplement, which was only partially made public in 2000 (Cilano, 2011, p. 2), and the diverging claims to truth articulated in the report and its supplement.

The Hamoodur Rehman Report was commissioned by the President of Pakistan in December 1971 to inquire into "the circumstances in which the Commander, Eastern command, surrendered and the members of the Armed Forces of Pakistan under his command laid down their arms and a cease-fire was ordered along the borders of West Pakistan and India and along the cease-fire line in the State of Jammu and Kashmir" (Government of Pakistan, 2000)[17] and submitted in July 1972. For the original report 213 witnesses were examined but the report excluded the input of officers stationed in East Pakistan who were still prisoners of war in India. The Supplementary Report recorded additional evidence from 72 witnesses, among others from Gen. A.K.K Niazi and Rear Admiral Sharif. By relying mainly on testimonies, the Supplement and the report, the official narrative upholds several diverging claims to truth (Cilano, 2011, p. 20).

Although the years and decades after 1971 added contextual layers, with the repatriation of Pakistani prisoners of war, the narrative of the war was closed: "In some way, the repatriation marked the closing of one narrative of war" (Cilano, 2011, p.3). Cilano indicates that there exist "nationalist historical narratives of the war" (p. 2) that "make use of the over-familiar Indo-Pak binary, resulting in unsubtle explanations that refuse national self-examination" (ibid.).

Analysing the historiography on the creation of Bangladesh, Srinath Raghavan (2013), observes that "insularity and determinism" (p. 5) are integral parts of the historiography. The narrow-mindedness of much of the literature on the creation of Bangladesh and the breakup of Pakistan stems from the fact that "most of the books are written from the standpoint of one of the subcontinental protagonists and are often inflicted by their nationalism" (p. 5). After Raghavan, Pakistani writers for example describe the conflict as a secession where the Bengalis "betrayed the idea of Pakistan as the home land for the Muslims of South Asia" (ibid.). The Bengalis on the other hand depict the conflict as a story "of the realization of Bengali

[17] The Report was published by Vanguard in 2000, Government of Pakistan (2000), *The Report of the Hamoodur Rehman Commission of Inquiry into the 1971 War,* Vanguard, Lahore.

nationalism" (ibid.). Adding to this, both perspectives reduce the conflict to "primarily a subcontinental affair" (p. 6) neglecting the wider international political context.

The second observation touches on the teleological and determinist positions Raghavan (2013) finds in most secondary literature about the conflict. Arguing with the geographical, linguistic, ethnic or structural differences between East and West Pakistan, many "narratives also tend to assume that the breakup of Pakistan and the emergence of an independent Bangladesh were inevitable" (p. 6) and thereby render the historiography of the creation of Bangladesh into a "chronicle of a birth foretold" (p. 6).

Naveeda Khan (2010) observes a similar reduction and determinism in her examination of the historiography of Pakistan, written after 1971.[18] As Khan (2010) argues "evaluations of the failed state, of nationalism and of sovereignty" (p. 5) are central to the "analysis of the crisis of governance constituting the 1971 war and Bangladesh's subsequent secession from Pakistan" (ibid.). Thereby the analysis frequently focuses on trajectories set in motion at Partition. Khan diagnoses "intellectual soul-searching that 1971 generated in Pakistan did not actually attend to the events of 1971. Rather, it recursively extended to the origins of Pakistan" (p. 5f.).

### 5.2.After the Tragedy – who is to blame?

In contrast to Partition, the Tragedy almost immediately triggered the publication of autobiographical narratives. The internal conflicts of the military were fought out in public, written in first person singular mode. In the 1970s and 80s there were two different generations of officers writing autobiographical narratives incorporating the Tragedy of East Pakistan: retired high-ranking officers belonging to the British generation and officers that were still in active service. Some of these retired officers, for example Maj. Gen. Sher Ali Khan Pataudi,[19] Maj. Gen. Atiqur Rahman[20] or Gen. Musa[21], were part of the martial law administration of Yahya Khan. The second generation of officers were younger and published autobiographical narratives about the breakup of Pakistan in the midst of their military career and/or during the

[18] See for example Khan, Naveeda (2010, pp. 1-28), Khan refers to Philip Oldenburg (1985).

[19] Maj. Gen. Pataudi, retired from the army in 1958. Under Yahya Khan he served as Minister for Information, Broadcasting and National Affairs from 1969-1971. Nawaz Shuja indicates that Sher Ali Khan Pataudi as minister for information and national affairs used his influence on the "turn of political events by directing the officially controlled media and other arms of the government to support Islamic Parties." See Nawaz, Shuja, Crossed Swords, p. 250.

[20] Attiqur Rahman was appointed Governor of West Pakistan in Feb 1979 and after the dissolvement of the one unit, took over as Governor of the Punjab. He retired from the army in 1971.

[21] General Musa Khan Army Chief 1958 until 1966, Governor of West Pakistan 1966-1969 and Governor of Baluchistan 1985-1991.

period as prisoners of war in India. The personal narratives of the officers who were prisoners of war in India, as demonstrated in chapter three, belong to a sub-genre of autobiographical narratives.

In the following, I will first analyse the prisoner of war narratives from Brig. Siddiq Salik and Lt. Col. Afẓal Kayānī that were published in the aftermath of the Tragedy before turning to autobiographical narratives of high-ranking officers of the British generation. As Brig. Siddiq Salik wrote both a prisoner of war narrative and an autobiographical account of his posting in East Pakistan, his texts will be analysed in both sections.

Brig. Siddiq Salik belongs to a generation of officers that entered the armed forces in the 1960s to be counted to the American generation of officers (Cohen, 1998, p. 63f).[22] Before joining the armed services he pursued an academic career, studying and teaching English literature at university (Sālik, 1989). Siddiq Salik authored several books, both in English and Urdu, during his army career at the Inter Service Public Relations (ISPR) secretariat. His literary output ranges from Urdu novels[23] and humorous literature[24] to autobiographical narratives[25] and treaties on military politics.[26] Judging from the numerous reprints of his work, especially his literary output in Urdu, Siddiq Salik has a wide readership in Pakistan. Most of his books became bestsellers and as spokesman for the armed forces Brig. Siddiq became a prominent face of the martial law administration during the rule of Gen. Zia ul-Haq (1977-88). Siddiq Salik authored two books that relate to the Tragedy: first an Urdu autobiographical narrative about his time as a prisoner of war in 1974 entitled *Hamah yārāṉ dozakh*,[27] and three years later, in 1977, a personal account – or rather military and political treaty – of the 1971 war and its background in English under the title *Witness to Surrender.*[28] Both works have been reprinted several times and *Hamah yārāṉ dozakh* was translated from Urdu into English as *The Wounded Pride*[29] – *Witness to Surrender* was translated from English into Urdu as *Meṉ ne Ḍhākah ḍūbte dekhā.*[30]

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[22] For the different generations of officers see 2.4.
[23] Sālik, Ṣiddīq (1984), *Praishar kukar*, Maktabah-yi Sarmad, Rāvalpiṇḍī; Sālik, Ṣiddīq (1985), *Aimarjansī*, Maktabah-yi Sarmad, Rāvalpiṇḍī.
[24] Sālik, Ṣiddīq (1983), *Tā dam-i taḥrīr*, Maktabah-yi Sarmad, Rāvalpiṇḍī
[25] Sālik, Ṣiddīq (1989), *Salyūṭ: 'askarī zindagī ke māh o sāl*, Maktabah-yi Sarmad, Rāvalpiṇḍī. Salik, Siddiq (1977), *Witness to Surrender*, Oxford University Press, Karachi. Sālik, Ṣiddīq (1974), *Hamah yārāṉ dozakh*, Maktabah-yi Sarmad, Rāvalpiṇḍī.
[26] Salik, Siddiq (1997), *State and Politics: a case study of Pakistan,* al-Faisal Nashran, Lahore.
[27] Sālik, Ṣiddīq (1974), *Hamah yārāṉ dozakh*, Maktabah-yi Sarmad, Rāvalpiṇḍī.
[28] Salik, Siddiq (1977), *Witness to Surrender*, Oxford University Press Pakistan, Karachi.
[29] Salik, Siddiq (1984), *The wounded pride: reminiscences of a Pakistani prisoner of war in India, 1971-73*, Wajadalis.
[30] Sālik, Ṣiddīq (1979), *Meṉ ne Ḍhākah ḍūbte dekhā,* qaumi pablisharz, Rāvalpiṇḍī.

In contrast to Siddiq Salik, Lt. Col. Afẓal Kayānī belongs to the group of lower ranking officers writing autobiographical narratives in the armed forces. Kayānī lived through the events as an officer who was posted in East Pakistan right before the declaration of war between India and Pakistan. His account *matāʿ-i qafs* can be categorised as a thematic or partial autobiographical narrative, as the text only covers the period of his posting to East Pakistan and the subsequent imprisonment in India. In this regard, it is similar to the text of Siddiq Salik, to which he refers in the preface and throughout the narrative.[31]

### 5.3.1 The suffering as a prisoner of war

Brig. Siddiq Salik's *Hamah yārāṉ dozakh* — and its English translation *The Wounded Pride* – is one of the first personal narratives of the sub-genre of prisoner of war narratives. Over the last three decades the sub-genre of prisoner of war narratives has become a part of the field of military autobiographical narrative production — one of the most recent works was published in 2011 and will be analysed further below. Several prisoner of war narratives became bestsellers and were reprinted several times.[32]

The sub-genre of prisoner of war narratives approaches the representation of officers from a different perspective. Typical for the sub-genre of prisoner of war narratives, *Hamah yārāṉ dozakh* covers the experiences of Brig. Salik during the final days of his posting in Dhaka and the subsequent imprisonment in India. The focus of the narration is less on the historical events or military operations during that period, and more on Siddiq Salik's experience as a prisoner of war, his observations of fellow officers and their daily routine, as well as the Indian guards. The text refers to the situation of imprisonment and its effects on the soldiers. It portrays humorously the different activities the prisoners undertook to kill time, turns ironically to the 'hospitality of the Indian officers' and how the Pakistani officers outsmart their guards.

In *Hamah yārāṉ dozakh* Brig. Siddiq Salik documents the inner struggle, pondering on the question of who was to blame for the separation of East Pakistan. The narrative follows the narrator's inward journey leading him to God and trying to cope with the humiliation of defeat. The interior monologue, the precise and satirical observations of his fellow officers, and colloquial direct speech distinguish Siddiq Salik's autobiographical narrative from texts written by Pakistani officers writing before him. *Hamah yārāṉ dozakh* is a crafted narrative and in the

[31] Kayānī (1980, p. 64) refers to Salik (1974).
[32] The English translation of *Hamah yārāṉ dozakh* was reprinted six times. As Siddiq Salik writes in the introduction to the English translation, "the publishers attributed it to the tender feeling the people of Pakistan then had for the fresh repatriates" see, Salik (1984, p. ix.).

Urdu original interspersed with Urdu poetry and allusions to Urdu literature. In his text Siddiq Salik's reference to historical truth is secondary to the presentation of his personal observations as prisoner of war in India.

In the first two chapters, Siddiq Salik mainly observes how his fellow officers, both senior and junior, adapted to the situation after being captured. He informs the reader of the destiny of the non-Bengalis who collaborated with the Pakistan Army and of the atrocities conducted at the end of the war by the paramilitary guerrilla force of the Mukti Bahini (Salik, 1984, p. 4-7). Ironically he observes how within a few days "everybody was busy praying, even those who never said prayers before" (p. 23). Later he describes how the physical and psychological state of his fellow imprisoned officers deteriorated during the subsequent relocations to different jails throughout India. Eventually, Siddiq Salik (1984) describes humorously that with the sight of repatriation to Pakistan, the officers' attitude changed:

> "So some farsighted officers began to think of alternative vocations in case they were not accepted back in the Army. They generally chose sheep-breeding, poultry farming and bee-farming. Out of their meagre stipend, they purchased, through the contractor, some literature on these occupations. I could see that some of them studied these booklets with great concentration after breakfast, before lunch, and late at night. […] They also examined the prospects of poultry farming, sources of quality breed chickens and their feed" (p. 123).

Passages like these distinguish Siddiq's text from others. He depicts the officers as a group of men that are not larger than live figures. However, Siddiq Salik's critical observation goes beyond a critique of military and political mismanagement or leadership. By alluding to officers' economic ventures, he characterises officers as flexible, or opportunistic, entrepreneurs that refrained from dealing with the humiliation of defeat.

The inward journey is articulated through two thematic strings that are developed in the subsequent chapters of *Hamah yārāṉ dozakh*: first through Siddiq Salik's rediscovery of religion, and second, through his inner monologue circling around this role and blame during the 1971 war. In the narrative he depicts himself as a suffering subject admitting to his share of guilt in the separation of East Pakistan – although reference to concrete wrongdoings is absent. The rediscovery of religion and the question of self-blame are interconnected.

Salik's inward journey begins with his solitary confinement, where he writes that the only pillar intact in his life was his faith in God (1984, p. 29). Subsequently he starts to recite prayers and concentrates on their meaning:

> "I had said these prayers many a time before, rattling off the Quranic verses like a parrot. But tonight each oft-repeated Quranic verse revealed a new meaning to me. ... After prayers, as I raised my hands to God, it seemed He himself was standing before me. I put up my small, insignificant desires to Him. By this spiritual act, I felt light" (p. 33).

Religion as an important tenant during his time as a prisoner of war is referred to throughout the subsequent paragraphs. Siddiq Salik (1984) writes of the psychological tension the prisoners suffered caused mainly by the uncertainty and the Indian interrogation (p. 109).

> "In these appalling circumstances, the best relief was provided by religion. I turned to it very often. In the stillness of the night, I said long prayers, bowed to Allah in total submission and prayed to Him in utter humility" (p. 117).

Siddiq indicates that the question of blame was a major concern among the other prisoners of war. However, in his observations about the question of who is to blame, he sets himself apart from the others:

> "First of all, I observed that whenever the fall of Dacca was discussed among ourselves, the criticism focussed on our senior commanders. I usually kept out of this mud-slinging. When they started coming to me, every now and then, to drag me into this useless exercise, I put up a hand written poster carrying this motto 'Small men discuss personalities; average men, events; and great men, ideas.' Despite this I was frequently asked this question, 'What is your idea about Gen. Niazi or Gen. Farman,' as if they were discussing ideas and not personalities" (p. 79f.).

Siddiq Salik (1984) portrays himself as constantly pondering on the question of who was to blame for the loss of East Pakistan (p. 96). He refers to his dreams about the forerunners of the Pakistan movement, such as Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, Allama Iqbal and Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who stare at him "as if they were accusing me of dismembering the country of their dreams" (p. 8). In contrast to his fellow officers, he admits his guilt in losing in the war: "Was I, too, a criminal? Perhaps, yes. There is no greater crime than to lose a war, how so much sacred the cause may have been" (p. 100).

Focusing on his time in imprisonment, Salik uses the separation of East Pakistan as the backdrop of an inevitable drama that befell soldiers and officers. This drama triggers a double introspect, an inward journey to God and a close observation of his fellow officers and their reaction to the events. In addition to this self-presentation as a literary person (p. Salik, 1984, p. 130), the reference to his inward journey and the observation of his fellow officers and soldiers with their world concerns set Siddiq Salik apart. Salik (1984) recognising and admitting his faults, and:

> "I debated the subject in my mind and said to myself: If you want to take something back, take the scars of dismemberment of your country and the deep anguish of your imprisonment. Nothing can be more precious, nothing more memorable!" (p. 172).

Lt. Col. Kayānī's text *matāʿ-i qafs* (Comforts of the cage) published in 1980, [33] is a composite of his personal narrative of his posting in East Pakistan, his subsequent imprisonment in India, and letters and newspaper articles written during the imprisonment. The book comprises six chapters and a foreword. In the first chapter *barq-o bād* (Thunder) Kayānī writes about the duties and responsibilities involved in his posting to East Pakistan. He refers to episodes he lived through with his fellow officers, pursuing a first person plural narrative for the most part. Kayānī presents himself as anticipating the social and political climate in East Pakistan and the deterring situation. He notices the absence of Bengali soldiers at deployment and writes that the soldiers travelled to East Pakistan in civilian clothes to go unnoticed by the Indians (Kayānī, 1980, p. 10f.). Kayānī also touches upon what he labels as the international propaganda that affected the soldiers and argues in third person singular mode that they fought a good fight without a backup.[34]

In the second chapter, *pā bih zanjīr* (Surrender) he covers the events that led to the surrender. Narrating in short episodes, Kayānī (1980) depicts the Indians as *lālcī* (greedy) (p. 30) and portrays himself as a humble officer who does not accept the privileged treatment the Indians provided at surrender for the ranks. He wants to stay with his soldiers and subedars. The third chapter *qaidī kīmp nambar 58 (*Prisoner Camp Number 58) (p. 39) is a collection of episodes concerning the negotiations with the International Red Cross and the Indian Guards, the different escape attempts, and the environment of the camp. The episodes underline the constant struggle with the Indians for basic provisions under the Geneva Convention. Kayānī distinguishes between two generations of Indian officers: those who joined the armed forces before the partition and who are more tolerant (*mutḥamal mazāj aur saljhā*) (p. 44), and those who joined after Partition who are greedy and selfish. For Kayānī this distinction also applies for Pakistani officers: For officers recruited under the British Raj, activities such as cleaning, cooking, or washing are new experiences (ibid.). Kayānī writes that the imprisonment brings the different generations of Pakistani officers together and everybody was forced to adapt (p. 44).

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[33] Kayānī, Afẓal Lt. Col. (1980), *Matāʿ-i qafas*, Yūsuf Pablisharz, Rāvalpiṇḍī.
[34] Kayānī (1980) blames the Mukti Bahini for most of the looting and bloodshed (p. 17f), lamenting that he international press believed the "Hindu propaganda" (p. 19).

Furthermore, Kayānī (1980) writes about escape attempts by other officers and his own failed attempt (p. 52). As Bareilly camp was located in a part of India with a considerable Muslim population living under a Hindu majority, he refers to the plight of the Indian Muslims. He regards the Indian Muslims as being oppressed by the Hindu majority (p. 62).

In the fourth chapter *qaid ke shab-o rūz* (Daily life of imprisonment) Kayānī sets out to describe the physical and psychological state of prisoners. He refers to the loneliness experienced in prison and with the effect this had on experiences of being alone after imprisonment (p. 64). Imprisonment was hard (*kaṭhan*) and the prisoners had to exercise and turned to different activities in order to kill time. Kayānī refers to literary talented officers and soldiers, who wrote poetry in Urdu and Pashto. He lists and comments on books he read, mainly religious literature like the *tafsir* of Maulana Ashraf 'Ali Thanwi and Ahmad Khan (p. 67). For Kayānī imprisonment has the benefit of having enough time to devote to the reading of the Quran and other religious texts and to studying and practicing religion. He refers to the Indian government's attempts to install and propagate secularism in them (p. 68) with help of university professors and secular Muslims.

In chapter five *andāz-i fikr* (Reflections) Kayānī reproduces letters and articles referring to Islam and calling on the patriotism of the Pakistani. He describes how the enemies of Islam and the Quran managed to break the bound between the Muslims of East and West Pakistan (Kayānī, 1980, p. 108f.).

For Kayānī (1980) "the story of the imprisonment of the Pakistani soldiers is a historical event in the political history of Pakistan" (p. 5), which he sets out to describe to the Pakistani public. Kayānī uses the Tragedy as a place to uncover reasons for the breakup of Pakistan. He advocates that the right reaction to the Tragedy is the belief in God (*iyad-i k̲h̲odā*) and patriotism (*watan kī muḥabbat*) (p. 6). For him, the faith of the prisoners of war is an important part of the history of the nation and a source for patriotism. According to Kayānī, Pakistani soldiers are not to blame for the Tragedy. They fell prey to the circumstances (*ḥālāt*) and politics (p. 42), and "Pakistan became the victim of its own plot" (p. 22) which the international community accepted. He argues that the soldiers were trained to fight a conventional war rather than a rebellion, and the political conflict demanded a political solution (p. 25). Kayānī is convinced that if the Pakistani military had only fought Indians and if it had had air support, the outcome of the war would have been different (p. 26).

In the darkest chapter (*tārīktarīn bāb*) of the history of the Pakistan Army (Kayānī, 1980, p. 28), he portrays himself as a patriotic Muslim who painfully remembers the Tragedy of the separation of East Pakistan (p. 14). Expressing his patriotic feelings in admonitory speech, he

tries to deal with the humiliating surrender brought upon the soldiers. In his narrative Kayānī occupies the position of a close observer who is in constant opposition to the Indian guards. In contrast to Siddiq Salik's narrative, however, Kayānī does not refer to his inner struggle.

### 5.3.1. Witnessing a political failure

In contrast to officers such as Afẓal Kayānī and Siddiq Salik, many officers from the British generation wrote autobiographical narratives that did not attend exclusively to the Tragedy or incorporated events in their overall narrative. Rather, they referred to it in the argumentative sections of their texts. In these sections, the reference and the context in which this reference is made shows considerable diversity. Here, I will discuss common practices of referring to and interpreting the Tragedy with the use of four different texts. The first example is a thematic narrative by Lt. Gen. Faiz Ali Chishti, who mainly writes of his military career after 1971. The second example is the text from General Sher Ali Khan Pataudi, who refers to the Tragedy mainly in the introduction and conclusion of his autobiographical narrative of his military career in the 1940s and 1950s. The third and fourth example are texts by Gen. Musa Khan and Siddiq Salik. In both texts the officers occupy the position of an observer reflecting on the 'Tragedy'.

Lt. Gen. Faiz Ali Chishti's memoir *Betrayals of another kind – Islam, Democracy and The Army In Pakistan*[35] published in 1989 refers briefly to the internal dynamics of the army after the 1971 war, refraining from giving context or narrating the historical events of the secession of East Pakistan. First, Chishti (1989) indicates that some officers were accused of "wrong beliefs" (p. 122) about the 1971 war, charged with a coup attempt against Prime Minister Bhutto, and sentenced between three and 14 years in prison. The wrong beliefs according to Chishti were, that there existed a pact between Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Yahya Khan and Tikka Khan that barred any investigation into the responsibility for the breakup of Pakistan.[36] Opposing the verdict on the basis of the officers' good performance during the war of 1971, Chishti persuaded General Zia to lift the verdict. Second, Chishti hints at the atmosphere inside the armed forces after the 1971 war. He writes that criticism was silenced, especially from officers who served in East Pakistan. Referring to his critique of Tikka Khan, he writes: "Gen. Tikka Khan refuted my criticism by saying that I had been nowhere near East Pakistan […] He was right, I was not in East Pakistan. I was in GHQ, working for the integrity of Pakistan, while

[35] Chishti, Lt. Gen. Faiz Ali (1989), *Betrayals of Another Kind – Islam, Democracy and The Army In Pakistan*, Asia Publishing House, London.

[36] The wrong beliefs circled around the responsibility for the dismemberment of Pakistan and the personal agenda of Bhutto. See Chishti, (1989, p. 121).

he was in East Pakistan doing the opposite" (Chishti, 1989, p. 2). He indicates that it would have been a privilege to serve in East Pakistan which he was denied:

> "The explanation lay in the fact that postings to East Pakistan were reserved for the privileged ones. It ensured financial benefits and I was not one of the privileged class. The favoured ones had to be related to someone who mattered, either civil or military" (p. 4).

The scarce information in Chishti's autobiographical narrative does not allow a general statement about his self-representation during the Tragedy and his interpretation of the events. While Chishti does not elaborate on his role during the conflict, he positions himself with his reference to different opinions inside the officer corps.

Sher Ali Khan Pataudi, a retired general and the former superior of Yahya Khan was appointed Minister of Information and National Affairs during the separation of East Pakistan,[37] published his memoirs *al-qissas: The Story of Soldiering and Politics* in 1978.[38] Equivalent to Chishti's autobiographical narrative, the dismemberment of Pakistan is not incorporated into the life story of Sher Ali Khan Pataudi. He refrains from giving a historical chronology of the events or explaining the national or international political backdrop. The references in *al-qissas* are restricted to the bounds and differences between the West Pakistanis and the Bengalis and are limited to discussions on what he terms the 'ideology of Pakistan' and the role of the Pakistan Army.

The starting point of Pataudi's (1978) book is the question of who is to blame for the dismemberment of Pakistan:

> "I have been haunted by all this since 1971 when in the last days of December of that year I sat late at night on my prayer mat, crying to my Creator, after hearing the B.B.C. [sic!] announce the surrender of the Pakistan Army in Dacca, and asking Him the same question – Why? What have we done to deserve this? The few pages started today tell the brief story of our faults. If we can learn from them then we may be able to salvage what is left to us of our home and save it from dismemberment. This is still called Pakistan, but it used to be formerly just West Pakistan" (p. v.).

For Pataudi (1978) the responsibility for the dismemberment does not rest directly on Gen. Yahya Khan and the military leadership. He argues that the underlying problem were several rifts that separated the two wings. For Pataudi, the personal "one man rule" (p. 412) over long periods of the history of Pakistan hindered the democratic process and the participation of the

[37] Sher Ali Khan Pataudi also supported the Islamic parties in East Pakistan during the 1970 election. For more on Pataudi's role see Nawaz, Shuja (2008, p. 205, 258f.).
[38] Pataudi, Maj. Gen. Sher Ali (1978), *Al-Qissas: The Story of Soldiering and Politics in Pakistan*, Wajadalis.

federal units of Pakistan. This circumstance hampered the "strengthening of the sincere feeling of brotherhood that had created Pakistan" (p. 265). Pataudi indicates that the economic, linguistic and cultural differences between the two wings were exploited and the rallying cry "Pakistan for Islam" (p. 362) of the Pakistan Movement was forgotten and the "racial national identity took precedence over the larger Muslim society's identity" (ibid.). He further argues that a true 'Islamic Society' would have saved the integrity of Pakistan:

> "If the true Islamic Society had been practised at every level, if the principles of individual dignity, fundamental rights, maximum equality of social economic structure, but in keeping with the individual inherent right in Islam, had been practised and a sense of full participation and not just only participation, had been worked for and achieved, would the Home (Pakistan) have split even then? I doubt it" (1978, p. 362).

According to Pataudi (1978), blame rests with external powers, mainly with India who decided to cut Pakistan to size from 1964 onwards (p. 328). Pataudi lifts the blame from the army and refrains from calling the conflict a war, because according to him, the army was never in a position to conduct a war in East Pakistan:

> "The blame for all this fell squarely on the shoulders of the poor Army whose only fault was that it obeyed all and any orders given to it in keeping with the traditions that it had inherited – implicit obeying of orders, in keeping with the highest standards of discipline. As a result of the bungling by a few Seniors on the top it suffered humiliation at the hands of the Indian Army in December 1971 – which some call defeat but I don't. Because as far as I am concerned, there was no war. The Pakistan Army was ordered to go to the aid of the civil power in suppressing the secessionist element in the sovereign territory of Pakistan. This secessionist element was being aided by India from across the border. The Army's main task was to seal the border and stop infiltration from the Indian side. Pakistan Army has never been in a position to conduct war in the Eastern part of Pakistan" (p. 383).

In short, *al-qissas* does not refer extensively to the author's role during the conflict. Instead, it is preoccupied with assessing the causes and consequences of the Tragedy. The position Pataudi occupies in his narrative in regard to the Tragedy can be characterised as the position of a debater of national ideology.

General Mohammad Musa (1984)[39] refers to the conflict of 1971 in a section of his chapter titled "retired life reflections" (pp. 219-230). The narration of the partition of East and West Pakistan only takes up little space in his memoir. They are framed as an afterthought of his

[39] Musa, Gen. Muhammad (1984), *Jawan to General – Recollections of a Pakistani Soldier*, Oxford University Press.

reflections on events after his retirement. Although Musa indicates that he considers the events as significant, they are not woven in his overall narration about his life in the armed forces. There is hardly any reference to this "traumatic experience" (p. 225) in other parts of his text, despite the fact that Musa was posted Division Commander in East Pakistan in 1952 and witnessed the language riots of 1952 (p. 104f.).

Gen. Musa focuses on the high politics of the three domestic actors; the army, the Awami League and the Pakistan People Party (PPP), as well as on India and the UN as the two main international forces. Musa refrains from explaining why the Bengalis turned against the military in East Pakistan but hints at Indian's agenda to train and reinforce the guerrilla group of the Mukti Bahini, as well as the non-Muslim population.[40] In addition to the political developments he touches on the military developments. In the section of the narration Gen. Musa turns to the distinction between soldiers and politicians, and he argues that the proximity of soldiers with politics was an important factor in the Tragedy (p. 226).

In *Jawan to General*, Musa uses the reference to the 1971 events as an opportunity to accuse the military leadership, in particular Gen. Yahya Khan and Gen. Abdul Hamid. He examines what he sees as negative developments in the armed forces. For Musa (1984), although the two units of East and West Pakistan inherited differences, it was the "inefficiency and lack of realism among the top echelon of the administration exacerbated by tension and deep distrust between the provinces [that] led to the loss of one of the two wings of the country, inhabited by the majority of our population" (p. 220). In contrast to the "ruling clique" (ibid.) that misjudged the situation and hung on to power "at the cost of our national honour and solidarity" (p. 221), the regular soldiers were not to blame. Musa wonders why the infantry divisions posted in East Pakistan were ordered to surrender and explains that they were not fighting and "not given a fair chance of proving its professional competence and superb fighting qualities" (p. 220).

Musa (1984) interprets the loss of East Pakistan less in the light of a military defeat, but rather as a political failure of the leaders who did not understand that "a political problem calls for a political solution" (p. 220). Musa uses the Tragedy as a place to pillory the favouritism and bad management of conflict by "nebulous, ad hoc groups and cliques of [the] so-called elite [which] chatted over vital issues relaxed in the evenings with beverages and relaxants of sorts,

[40] The metaphor used is "India was fishing in the troubled waters of East Pakistan" (Musa, 1984, p. 222). A point he makes earlier, when posted as Division Commander: "Even minor local grievances were misrepresented and deftly exploited by parochialists, politicians who did not see eye to eye with the party in power, and by the subversive, non-Muslim population. In a way, the seeds of the six-point formula, in framing which a civil service officer from West Pakistan also reportedly played some part, appeared to have already been sowed" (p. 109).

and what emerged were regarded as decisions!" (p. 222). Gen. Musa contrasts the leaders with fighting soldiers whom he sees as heroes and "Ghazis of Islam" (p. 223) who fought the rebels and Indians while keeping the fasts. This stands in sharp contrast to Musa's (1984) description of the military leaders stationed at the headquarters:

> "These Ghazis of Islam fought like hungry and wounded tigers. Almost every fighting man was worthy of a Nishan-e-Haider. It goes to the credit of the brave, simple, frugal, undemanding Pakistani fighting men and their equally brave junior leadership that, in spite of adverse conditions, unfavorable relative strengths, and unfavorable troops to terrain ratio, no infantry battalion locality could be over-run by India." (p. 223f.).

In the narration, Musa occupies the role of a distant observer and comments on the developments in retrospect. He refers to himself as a "citizen, whose opinion about the political developments and other events, in particular the fighting in East Pakistan, is largely based on newspaper reports and other unofficial sources" (1984, p. 220). With this statement, he emphasises that he has neither political nor any other motives (ibid.).

*Witness to Surrender* is Siddiq Salik's second text dealing with the conflict of 1971. Published in English in 1977 and translated in Urdu and reprinted several times,[41] Siddiq's book is framed as a military and political treaty of the separation of Pakistan. Hinting at the unavailability of an "official version" (Salik, 1997, preface) of the events, Siddiq Salik indicates that he decided to record his "experience of the change" (ibid.) in East Pakistan.

Although narrated as a first person singular account, *Witness to Surrender* is a thematic narrative of the war, divided in chapters describing the background and the chronological development of the conflict. The narrative starts with the events that followed Operation Searchlight on March 25, 1971, and presents the war between India and Pakistan in chronological order.[42] To illustrate his account and support his arguments, Siddiq Salik refers to the existing literature about the conflict as well as newspaper articles.[43] Interspersed in the narrative are episodes of his interactions with key figures of the conflict, for example with General A.K.K. Niazi of the Eastern Command. Siddiq Salik (1977) presents his narrative from the viewpoint of an observer, who narrates how participants in the conflict acted and reacted. Although he repeatedly states that he does not want to give his final verdict on who is to blame

[41] *Witness to Surrender* was published in Karachi and Dhaka by Oxford University Press and in India by Lancer.
[42] Salik (1977) divides his narrative in three Parts: the political background (pp. 1-70), the intervention and civil war in East Pakistan (pp. 71-120), and the war with India (pp. 121-213).
[43] For the Indian preparation of the war in the East for example, he refers to articles and studies of Indian writers, here (Salik 1977, pp. 97-106).

and leaves it "to history to distinguish devils from dervishes" (preface), two themes run through *Witness to Surrender*: first, the direct and indirect critique of the passiveness of the martial law administration and second, the assessment and eventual reckoning with General Niazi. Siddiq Salik also points to differences in attitudes and interpretations of the events inside the officer corps and to the existence of conflicting narratives.

In the first part of the book, Siddiq Salik (1977) describes the atmosphere in East Pakistan before the general election, which was dominated by a "complete mental schism" (p. 8) between East and West Pakistan. To illustrate the difference in cultures and particularly the secular influence in East Pakistan, Siddiq Salik narrates episodes of his interactions with different exponents of the martial law administration, as well as Bengali journalists, politicians and civil servants. He contrasts his insight with the mostly senior officers' ignorance of the martial law administration:

> "The general and I, perhaps, represented two categories of officers. The juniors, with their limited comprehension, made mountains out of molehills while the seniors, gifted with depth and vision, turned mountains into molehills. Whether, in fact, it was a mountain or a molehill was not clearly known. Everything was masked by the heavy crust of army discipline. The Awami League and its sympathizers had the whole election year to erode this crust" (p. 13).

Siddiq Salik (1977) accuses the martial law administration, and especially President Gen. Yahya Khan of passively watching the "political ebb and flow" (p. 19) and eventually letting the army fall into the "trap" (p. 46) set up by the Awami League to take over the security situation in Dacca. He incorporates different versions and episodes from officers who were close to Yahya about his inability to address the situation. Yahya is portrayed as being misguided by his close allies and shielded off from the realities in East Pakistan. Although Operation Searchlight produced initial success – some of the territory was only under control by mid-April –, Siddiq Salik (1977) indicates that the underlying issues remained unresolved. He argues that the conflict was not to be resolved by the armed forces: "It was essentially a job for statesmen, but rarely do they grow in the arid land of martial law" (p. 96).

As indicated above, in some passages, Siddiq Salik (1977) leaves the position of an observer and changes the narrative mode to accusation. Satirically he notes how the martial law administrators assured themselves of control of the security situation without understanding the underlying problem:

> "Leaving aside the major task of bridging the mental and emotional gulf, the material problem itself was too gigantic for the pygmies who attempted to solve it. They lacked comprehension of the magnitude

> of the problem. They were like a mouse who, while riding an elephant's back, may consider itself master of the area it occupies but hardly claim to have grasped the elephant as a whole" (p. 96).

After Operation Searchlight, Siddiq Salik (1977) accuses, "President Yahya Khan [who] went on a long mental holiday after ordering the army crack-down on 25 March" (p. 107), and refers to anonymous sources that say, Yahya had personal disputes with women during the time.

In the second part of the book, Siddiq Salik mainly sticks to the narration of the military operations during the civil war and the following war with India. The war is narrated mostly in third person, focusing on the duties, responsibilities, and actions of the different units – only occasionally interspersed with reference to Siddiq Salik meetings with Niazi and other officers. The narration culminates in a confrontation of Salik with Niazi. Although Salik (1977) criticises other officers who "abandoned the fortresses without firing a shot and left the ammunition dump" (p. 142) he primarily focuses on Niazi and his "foibles and failings" (p. 92). According to Salik, Niazi was constantly making dirty jokes, set the wrong priorities during the war and eventually failed to defend Dacca. Niazi is portrayed as acting tough at the beginning of the conflict. "He criticized the 'doves' in the Army for their past laxity, and poured his wrath on the Bengalis, particularly Hindus and the intellectuals — the two classes which, in his opinion, nurtured Bengali nationalism" (p. 92) Siddiq Salik remarks. During the conflict however, Niazi "gradually lapsed into disillusionment" (p. 193) and eventually "broke into tears. He hid his face in his hand and started sobbing like a child" (p. 194).

Shortly after the surrender in a dramatised sequence, Siddiq Salik confronts Niazi to discuss the war. Salik (1977) writes that Niazi did answer frankly and bitterly and "refused to accept the responsibility for the dismemberment of Pakistan" (p. 212f.), blaming General Yahya Khan. He ends with the confrontation between Niazi and himself about the cost of war and the meaning for the Pakistan Army:

> "With what little you had in Dacca you could have prolonged the war for a few days more', I suggested. 'What for?' he replied. 'That would have resulted in further death and destruction. Dacca's drains would have choked. Yet the end would have been the same. I will take 90,000 prisoners of war to West Pakistan rather than face 90,000 widows and half a million orphans there. The sacrifice was not worth it.' 'The end would have been the same. But the history of the Pakistan Army would have been different. It would have written an inspiring chapter in the annals of military operations.' General Niazi did not reply" (p. 213).

But the blame for the dismemberment of Pakistan was not exclusively on Niazi and the military administration in West Pakistan, according to Siddiq Salik (1977). He also refers to a long plan of India which had the "chance of the century" (p. 113) to direct a blow at Pakistan.

India is made responsible for training and assisting the rebels on the other side of the border (p. 98f.). For Salik, India's main goal was not to assist the Bengali people. Rather, India acted selfishly, and eventually plundered Bangladesh:

> "The Indians had no time to protect these innocent lives. They were busy removing the plunder of their victory to India. Large convoys of trains and trucks moved military hardware, foodstuff, industrial produce and household goods, inducing refrigerators, carpet and television sets. The blood of Bangladesh was sucked so thoroughly that only a skeleton remains to greet the dawn of 'independence'. One year later, this realization dawned on the Bengalis as well" (p. 212).

Commissioned to work as a public relations officer during the conflict, Siddiq Salik portrays himself as being mobile and having access to all the actors in the conflict. He meets with Bengalis, as well as journalists from the international and local press. Siddiq ascribes himself the role of a close unpartisan observer during the conflict.[44] At the same time, he uses this position to assess different events and accuse personalities – particularly the military high command. The Tragedy is used by Siddiq Salik to contrast himself with an older generation inside the army. He depicts himself as actively speaking up against the high command, but eventually being ignored.

Before analysing the self-representation of the officers' role during the Tragedy in the 1990s, I summarise several observations concerning the narration, interpretation and self-ascription for the officers writing in the 1970s and 1980s. The first observation concerns the sub-genre of prisoner of war narratives and their authors, who position themselves in contrast to an older generation of officers. The second observation is that there is a diversity of interpretations in the autobiographical narratives that relate to the reasons for the Tragedy and the search for a culprit.

First is should be noted that officers writing about the Tragedy of 1971 directly turned to thematic autobiographical narratives, focusing on their experience as prisoners of war. These experiences are directed at a young readership. They are written in simple Urdu, and only later were they translated into English. These texts focus on personal experiences that stand in contrast to the historical and military treatments published right after the war by Indian, Bangladeshi and Pakistani writers. The prisoner of war narratives are not primarily concerned with making historical truth claims by referring to an already existing historiography – although they write authoritatively about the Tragedy. But they relate to each other and to the sub-genre

[44] He admits for example, that some of the Pakistani troops raped Bengalis and carried out atrocities. See (Salik, 1977, p. 104).

of humorous military autobiographical narratives, particularly to the works of satirist Col. Muhammad Khan. The main constituents of these texts are sequences of anecdotes and observations of fellow officers, and episodes where the protagonist outsmarts the Indian guards. The texts feature colloquial direct speech, Urdu poetry, and emotional reference to Pakistan. In the case of Siddiq Salik's prisoner of war narrative *The Wounded Pride*, the narrative is crafted as an inward journey.

With their prisoners of war narratives Siddiq Salik and Afzal Kayānī, both posted in East Pakistan and subsequently prisoners of war in India, distance themselves from on older and senior generation of officers. They describe their counterparts in the army as detached from reality, unable in military matters, quirky, and idiosyncratic. For both authors, their access and proximity to the historical players put them in a position to write authoritatively about the events and assess other officers. They represent themselves as self-reflexive and religious, which is connected to this self-positioning. Although piety becomes an integral part of the self-reference not only in prisoner of war narratives – Sher Ali Khan Pataudi literally elaborates on the ideology of Pakistan while on his prayer mat – but piety is used to distinguish oneself from others. As in the example of Siddiq Salik his devotedness is presented in contrast to the worldly concerns of the other officers. Kayānī in his narrative advances the importance of the plight of the prisoners of war in India as a source of patriotism and argues for engaging with the past.

Officers writing during the 1970s and 1980s find themselves in a dense net of partisan literature about the conflict. High-ranking officers refer to these texts; Gen. Musa for example indicates that reference to the events is used for political motives. During the 1970s and 1980s, one can distinguish two generations of officers narrating or rather referring to the dismemberment of Pakistan. The first group belongs to the British generation of officers that occupied a prominent role in the government administration. These officers only refer to the Tragedy in their autobiographical narrative. But they refrain from giving information about their role or attempting to craft a historical narrative. The second group of writing officers belongs to a younger generation who held lower positions during their posting in East Pakistan. Besides writing prisoner of war narratives, they wrote thematic narratives about the conflict, focusing on the period of their posting to East Pakistan.

The English autobiographical narratives of the first group show considerably more diversity in their reference and narration of the Tragedy. In most texts, the authors do not incorporate the events into their life or career narratives, and refrain from developing a historical narrative of the dismemberment of Pakistan. These references take up little space in the text. In the case of Gen. Musa for example, the conflict of 1971 is incorporated in a short afterthought that centres

on the political and military administrational players. In Pataudi's text, the Tragedy is used as a place to lament the loss of the integrity of Pakistan and argues about a national Islamic ideology. Lt. Gen. Chishti only refers briefly to the Tragedy when he sketches the inner military consequences of the conflict.

The second group, of which Siddiq Salik's *Witness to Surrender* is presented as an example, strives for a cohesive historical narrative of the events that takes up more space. Siddiq Salik's autobiographical narration is a chronological string of observation of events and episodes, interspersed with argumentative and judgmental passages that make reference to the existing literature. His first-hand observation is a political and military treatment that assesses the actors of the conflict, mainly aimed at a military-interested readership. He sets out to accuse the military leadership, particularly Gen. Niazi, because of their role in the conflict.

In all the texts examined, the dismemberment of Pakistan is presented as a dark chapter in the history of the Pakistan Army. All the authors also agree that neither the ordinary soldiers nor the Pakistan Army as an institution are not to blame. For Pataudi for example, the botchery of a few senior officers and India are responsible for the humiliating defeat of the army that was not given a fair chance to fight. The civil war caused by the alienation of the Bengalis with the West Pakistanis is explained by the general distance from a true Islamic society. Musa distinguishes between the soldiers in the field and those at the GHQ and accuses the latter of being too close to politics. The dismemberment is interpreted as a political failure rather than a military loss. In his political and military treaty, Siddiq Salik hints at the failure of the civilian and military administration, with Yahya Khan, Tikka Khan and Niazi leading the way. Many officers in the administration as well as in the field were unable to change the course of history. In addition, India and the international community ultimately had a share in the outcome of the conflict.

The self-ascribed roles during the conflict as well as the subject position are connected to the position the authors had during the conflict. It differs between officers who were posted in East Pakistan and those who were witnesses to the events. The latter refer only briefly to the role they occupied during the conflict and do not connect it with the historical events of dismemberment. Musa portrays himself as a civilian without any political motives when he discusses the events. Pataudi highlights his inner struggle to find reasons for the dismemberment of Pakistan and for coming to terms with the crisis. He occupies the role of a debater of national ideology.

### 5.4. The Tragedy in the 1990s – Personal vendettas and rehabilitation

In the 1990s the representation of the role of officers during the Tragedy was governed by personal vendettas and rehabilitation of the writing officers. However, it would be wrong to reduce the processes inside the field during this period to these practices alone. As demonstrated in chapter three, new ways of publication in the 1990s enabled new agents with different military and social dispositions to access the field. With the participation of these agents, the representations diversified. In addition to the shifts inside the field, the political transition from the martial law administrator and later President General Zia ul-Haq (1977-88) to a democratically elected government also played a prominent role. The abrupt change in political and military leadership, and the release of several officers who were imprisoned under the rule of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Gen. Zia ul-Haq, opened up a space for dissident voices.[45]

In chapter three I described the conflict between the two high-ranking officers Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan Khan and Maj. Gen. Aboobaker Osman Mitha that was played out in the field of military autobiographical narrative production in the 1990s. The Tragedy, the role of the generals, as well as subsequent representation in form of an autobiographical narrative was the core of the conflict. In the following, I analyse four different representations of the officers' role in the Tragedy writing in the 1990s that mainly produced accuser-type of narratives. The first text was written by Maj. Rahat Latif, however is not an accuser-type of narrative but takes up the position of a close observer. Rahat Latif's text is incorporated into the analysis as an example of the diversity in the field from the 1990s onwards. The second narrative I will analyse is Admiral Sirohey's *Truth never Retires* published in 1995, followed by Maj. Gen. Tajammul Malik *The Story of my Struggle* published in 1996. At the end of this subchapter I turn to General A.K.K. Niazi's *Betrayal of East Pakistan*, published in 1998.

Rabat Latif's autobiographical narrative *...Plus Bhutto's Episode* published in 1991[46] centres on the trial, imprisonment and eventual execution of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Latif (1993) discusses the dismemberment of Pakistan only briefly (pp. 78-97). The text is a chronological assembly of short episodes focusing on his career. During the period of the conflict, Latif was posted first in East Pakistan, and after his promotion to lieutenant colonel, he was transferred to West Pakistan to command the regiment of Dastooris on the Border with India.

The conflict is incorporated into Latif's narration of career advancement. In connection to this posting in East Pakistan in the late 1960s, Latif (1993) presents the reader with a short

[45] Gen. Niazi (1998) indicates that his "book could not have been published earlier because the circumstances were not conducive to its publication" (p. xxiii.), and that he was imprisoned under Bhutto and Zia.
[46] Latif, Maj. Rahat (1993), *...Plus Bhutto's Episode – An Autobiography*, Jang Publishers, Karachi.

"Profile" (p. 78) of East Pakistan, referring to the climate and "42 million fruitful people" (ibid), the agricultural products of Pakistan, and disparity between East and West, citing articles from newspapers (p. 80). Although noting that the common link between the two wings was religion, Latif writes that "One could sense the simmering feelings of East Pakistanis, which assumed that the West Pakistanis were systematically following the same policy of selfishness and injustice as the Hindus had in undivided India, which led to the demand for Pakistan" (p. 80). Later in the text he also refers to the historical oppression of the Bengalis by the British since the defeat of the last independent Nawab, Siraj-ud-Duala at Plassey (p. 88). With reference to the Gulf War, he argues "Islam was not able to unite all Muslim countries into one state on the basis of Islam alone" (p. 81). Eventually during the conflict, the Muslims of the Bengal that voted for Pakistan at Partition opposed Pakistan (p. 88).

Through numerous episodes Latif elaborates on his proximity to historical personalities. In the subchapter "A few moments with Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman," he recounts his time with the leader of the Awami League during the time of the Agartala conspiracy case.[47] Referring to the political demands by the Mujib Rehman, Latif (1993) writes:

> "During this boat ride we had ample time to cultivate a mutual familiarity while talking about his Six Points. I told him that his Six Points would in fact lead to the dismemberment of Pakistan by encouraging dissident tribal and linguistic groups in West Pakistan. He [Sheikh Mujib Rehman] answered logically, emphasizing that his Six Points were meant to achieve autonomy for the Bengalis who, he thought, had so far been denied their share of benefits[,] which the country was amassing as a result of jute export. He said emphatically that the Six Points were not meant to disconnect East Pakistan from West Pakistan and declare it an independent state. He spoke in English and was very clear in conveying his point of view. He contended that he had been falsely charged in the Agartala conspiracy case, primarily to stop him from pursuing his political manifesto. He also wanted to refute the impression being spread by West Pakistan that Bengalis were incapable of managing their own affairs. I being a West Pakistani myself did not agree with him because Bengali's management capability was never a point of discussion amongst the government officials" (p. 85).

After setting the stage with some short background information and the meeting with Mujib Rehman, Latif introduces the military takeover by Yahya Khan that affected his posting. His superior was appointed deputy martial law administrator and Latif's workload "increased

[47] In January 1968 the government of Pakistan announced that local politicians and the leader of the Awami League, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman met with Bengali officers and Indian intelligence agents in the Indian border town of Agartala. The government claimed that the politicians and officers were planning a coup. The Trail lasted over six month and "helped to foster Mujib's image as a Bengali martyr in East Pakistan" (Ahmad, 2013, p. 167). During the trail one of the accused was shot, allegedly because he tried to escape. His funeral turned into large protests. See (Nawaz, 2008, pp. 240-1; Ahmad, 2013, p. 167).

manifold" (p. 87). The narration follows his career advance. He is promoted to lieutenant colonel and takes over the command of the regiment of the Dastooris, before returning to the general election of 1970. The narration of high politics is very brief and puts the blame for the war entirely on Yahya Khan and India. After the 1970 election Latif writes:

> "Then started the political struggle. Gen. Yahya Khan failed to invite the leader of the majority party to form the Government. Thus started a civil war in East Pakistan and Bangladesh becoming an independent state started to appear a reality. For this struggle Awami League was supported by India's militarily. The Indian troops violated the international border and invaded East Pakistan with their military might. That triggered war between the two countries" (p. 92f.).

The actual war and the secession of East Pakistan is narrated in equally short episodes. He narrates how his unit was involved in transport of weapons by train to the border, giving details of a fatal accident of two members of his unit during a night manoeuvre (p. 94). After the soldiers had regained their fighting spirit and his troops were ready to confront India, Latif writes that president Yahya Khan announced that he had agreed on a ceasefire (p. 96). Latif labels the surrender and the ceasefire "a terrible experience for all the soldiers. […] On the morning of 16th December the troops were sad and in mourning. Every eye was filled with tears. Every heart was bleeding" (ibid.).

During the Tragedy of 1971 Latif portrays himself as a close observer of personalities that shaped the "history of Pakistan", a subject position that he upholds in the rest of his autobiographical narrative. He refers to himself as a professional soldier that is preoccupied with his duties and tries to be exemplary.

### 5.4.1. Personal Quests to uncover the betrayal

Admiral Sirohey (1995)[48] refers to the dismemberment of Pakistan in the two chapters *1965 War and After* and *1971 War* (pp. 185-267). The narration adheres to military developments, his duties and responsibilities, and occasionally turns to national and international politics. In the text Sirohey complains about the neglect of the navy at the cost of the army (p. 176f.) and assesses different commanders.

At the beginning of the conflict, Sirohey was selected to undergo a Staff Course in the United Kingdom from January 1971. He returned to Pakistan only in December 1971, taking over the command of an immobile ship in the harbour of Karachi (Sirohey, 1995, p. 188). He

[48] Sirohey, Admiral Ifthikhar Ahmed (1995), *Truth never retires*, Jang Publishers, Lahore.

recapitulates the difficulties of the navy at the beginning of the conflict. After Sirohey, 40 percent of the navy personnel were discharged due to the fact that they were East Pakistanis. A further problem was that the Pakistan navy could not match the Indian navy in equipment and personnel. Lamenting on the neglect of the navy he writes: "The Pakistan Navy had been denied the required instrument of waging war against the enemy. […] The Quaid [Muhammad Ali Jinnah] was the only one who understood the need of the maritime defence" (p. 196). Sirohey recounts how he oversaw the repair and manning of the ship PNS Alamgir in Karachi when India attacked and destroyed two vessels of the Pakistani fleet (p. 192). While the narration of the war is relatively short, Sirohey devotes more space to the developments inside the navy right after the war. Sirohey is tasked with the preparation of an analysis of the conduct of the navy during the 1971 war (p. 200). Some of his negative findings are reproduced inside the text, referring to the concealment of deeds by some officers. Sirohey indicates that at the end of the war the "fibre of discipline had broken down" (p. 198). He dwells on the negative change in the navy that "struck at the roots of discipline":

> "The pre-71 social fabrics had broken. The respect for elders and seniors was no longer to be taken for granted. It had to be earned by knowledge, action and handwork. The officers ceased checking the mistakes of their juniors for fear of being disgraced" (p. 206).

He contrasts himself with other officers who feared mutiny and stays on the PNS Alamgir: "Even if I wanted to leave the ship to enquire of my family I could not do so as my pride would have prevented me" (ibid.).

Sirohey (1995) sees the origin of the conflict between East and West Pakistan in the war of 1965 and refers to political failures, international conspiracies, propaganda and moral decay that led to the dismemberment of Pakistan. On the political front he accuses Ayub Khan of violating the constitution by handing over to General Yahya Khan instead of to the Speaker of the National Assembly, who at that time was an ethnic Bengali (p. 184). For Sirohey, the breakup of Pakistan was the fulfilment of the political aims of Mujib Rehman who "manipulated the masses" (p. 184), combined with Bhutto's "lust for power" (ibid.). According to the Admiral, General Yahya played an important part because he backed Bhutto, but eventually was ousted as president by an engineered uprising by Bhutto (p. 197). Alluding to a wider decay in national politics he writes: "The consequences of the two wars were therefore in consonance with the commitment of the people conditioned by [the] insincerity of the political leaders, hungry only for power with total disregard for the nation" (p. 192).

In addition to the international propaganda orchestrated by India, Sirohey (1995) also averts to an international conspiracy against Pakistan as an Islamic country (185f.). Bangladesh was thus created by the Indians with the support of the USSR and the undeclared support of the West (p. 196f.). The Islamic world, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, was unable to intervene or even provide material support, and could not change the course (p. 197). After Sirohey, the motivation behind the conspiracy was to deny Pakistan's economic emancipation:

> "The enemies of Pakistan could not tolerate this economic emancipation of an Islamic country. It had to be kept a client dependent state. A grand conspiracy was hatched to break up the country into two, burden it economically through long civil strife, culmination in a war, demoralize its armed forces and then hoist a system of Government to ensure stagnation. The talks was [sic!] completed across the board nationalization, setting in inefficiency, corruption and political favouritism. We have been on the down side since, in every respect" (p. 199f.).

The lack of religiosity or moral decay prior to 1971 is the last context mentioned by Sirohey. For example, he laments that 99 per cent of the Pakistani population was unaware of the teachings of the Quran (p. 169). He describes the pre-war situation in Karachi as follows:

> "The preceding few years had seen immorality, deviated and key clubs as a norm. The women in certain circles started going public half naked. In some cases husbands encouraged the spouses to gain favours. The tragedy had to come as Karachi was taking over from Beirut, where civil strife [had] started probably due to the same reasons, as being adopted by Karachiites. It is a digression but a food for thought [sic!]" (p. 205).

In the narrative Sirohey depicts himself as a professional and devote officer who is preoccupied with the improvement of the navy during the conflict. He frequently clashes with others due to his outspokenness: "Almighty has endowed me with the courage to say whatever needed to be said directly to the person concerned" (Sirohey, 1995, p. 209). Referring to God and the Quran throughout the text, he also accentuates his religiosity.

In Pakistan, Maj. Gen. Tajammul Malik is known for his role in the battle at the Indian/Pakistan border area around the town of Hilli and his coup attempt against Zia ul-Haq.[49] He published his autobiographical narrative *The Story of my Struggle* in 1991.[50] The conflict in East Pakistan includes the narration of his battles, personal episodes and arguments about the

[49] The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) became aware of a plot of Tajammul Malik to assassinate General Zia ul-Haq in 1980. Malik was released after the death of Zia ul-Haq. After Nawaz (2008) Tajammul Malik planned to install an "extreme Islamic government" (p. 387).

[50] Malik, Maj. Gen. Tajammul Hussain (1991), *The Story of My Struggle*, Jang Publishers, Lahore. The Urdu translation was published with Jang Publishers in 1996 with the title *Merī jidd-o jahd kī dāstān*.

military performance of the Pakistan army. In the last chapters Tajammul Malik writes about his reintegration into the army and his rationale, and the consequences of his coup attempt against Gen. Zia ul-Haq in 1980.[51] Tajammul Malik frequently introduces digressions into the main chronological narrative where he presents himself as a professional soldier and a devoted Muslim.

At the beginning of the conflict, Tajammul Malik (1991) finds himself posted to West Pakistan to command a brigade after being promoted to Brigadier. In October 1971 he is transferred to GHQ where he requests from the Chief of Staff to be posted to a fighting unit. Hinting at the dislike among the officer corps to be sent do East Pakistan, he depicts his decision to go to the eastern wing as a deliberate choice: "Without the slightest hesitation, I accepted the offer and said that I was prepared to go there because that was also part of Pakistan" (p. 89). He arrives in Dacca on 16 November 1971 and takes over the command units along to border to India, first around Dargah (pp. 107-112) and later around Bogra (p. 125f.). The narration follows the fighting. It gives exact information of time and place, troop strength, and strategy. Tajammul Malik visits troops on the frontline, frequently changes location, gives prep-talks and argues about tactical decisions.

At the announcement of surrender, Malik (1991) depicts himself as being in the midst of battle and ready to fight until death. He turns to the troops and announces "that we would not surrender and that we would continue to fight till we hear direct from the President through Radio Pakistan to cease fire. In any case there is a big difference between 'ceasefire' and surrender" (p. 133). With some volunteers Malik tries to flee surrender and is helped by the local population that he treated correctly in the past. Eventually he is captured by the Mukti Bahini, which "appeared to be ex-soldiers maybe of Bengal Regiment" (p.140), according to Malik. Following the battle narrative, Malik assesses the performance of the Pakistan officers. In particular, he focuses on the commanding officers, relying on both Indian[52] and Pakistani sources.

Malik's text is in large parts a reckoning with, and assessment of, the military performance of the senior commanders of the Pakistan army. In contrast to officers writing before him, Malik (1991) makes the senior leadership of the army jointly responsible for the loss of East Pakistan,

[51] Malik (1991) writes about the coup attempt in chapters 35 and 36 (pp. 213-224) Malik argues for an Islamic democracy and draws on the works of Muhammad Iqbal and Maulana Maududi and Hamad Ali. See Malik, (1991, pp. 215-218).

[52] Malik refers to Maj. Gen Lachman Singh's *Indian Sword Strikes in East Pakistan* about the Battle of Hilli, or to Siddiq Salik's *Witness to Surrender.* Here (Malik, 1991, pp. 165-182, 101).

and not the politicians (p. 9) nor General Niazi alone.[53] Niazi is to blame for not taking the opportunity to repeat "the performance of great Muslim commanders of the past. If he had decided to stand and fight he could have added a glorious chapter in the history of Islam, which would have served as an example for generations to come" (p. 159f.). But Malik is sure that surrender was a 'syndicate solution', which was not objected by any general in Dacca (p. 157). Malik is convinced that the plan of defence of East Pakistan was "sound and practicable" (p. 149). He sees the reason of the loss of territory and eventually East Pakistan not in the military strength of the Indian army, but in the weakness of the Pakistani commanders: "It was mainly due to the reason that our units/formations abandoned their positions without giving the enemy a proper fight" (p. 151). Summing up, he writes:

> "In conclusion I would say that what happened in East Pakistan was a great national tragedy. In my personal opinion the blame for such a humiliating defeat goes mostly to those battalion, brigade and division Commanders who failed to carry out their assigned mission. The team of Generals sitting in Dacca who had finally given their consent to surrender, despite the fact that about 26,000 armed men with plenty of ammunition and rations which could last for some months, were readily available to carry out the defensive battle, had committed unforgivable crime and should have all been tried for high treason" (p. 159).

Malik does not spare the commanding officers positioned on the West front, who lamented at the end of the war that they would have captured Delhi if they were allowed to move forward. According to Malik (1991), they had an accord with the enemy not to fight properly. The senior commanders "both in East and West Pakistan did not like the smell of the gun powder and they wanted to go back to their comfortable life as early as possible" (p. 184). Malik depicts the superiors of the armed forces as continuing their "dinner and drinking parties" (p. 88) while fifteen to twenty soldiers were killed every day in October 1971 (ibid.). He accuses the officers as being passive mercenaries, who were aware of the situation in East Pakistan:

> "I must say most of our senior officers had [a] very slavish mentality. They knew the things were going wrong and often kept cribbing about it – yet they took no steps to dislodge Yahya Khan who in any case was a usurper and had no legal right to be where he was. Their attitude was that of a mercenary soldier. They were only concerned with their own bread and butter. It never picked their conscience that hundreds of their own countrymen were being massacred by these butchers only because they wanted to stay in power at all costs" (ibid.).

[53] Malik (1991) at one point writes, "Niazi was not a coward, but was made a coward by the cowards around him" (p. 159).

In his text Malik also turns to the cover-up of the performance of the commanders after the war, and laments that the Hamoodur Rehman Commission Report was not made public (p. 158). He tries to correct the military narrative that is fostered in Pakistan, contrasting it with analysis of Indian authors. "I do not like to cast any aspersion on any individual[,] but these are some of those unpleasant facts which are no more secret" (p. 152). Referring to Siddiq Salik, he argues that Niazi was not to blame for everything:

> "Siddique [sic!] Salik, in his book Witness to Surrender has made an effort to describe the events as best as he could and he has gone into fairly great details but even his narrative of the battle cannot be regarded as authentic because it is generally based on 'hearsay' and his own opinion as a Public Relations Officer, who himself had no experience of war. I feel, being still in service, he had shown some mental reservations and in some cases, it appears, he even tried to cover up those who were still in power when he wrote the book" (p. 101).

In the text Malik portrays himself as an active fighting soldier who takes responsibility for his actions and as a devote Muslim, standing in conflict with his surrounding officers. The text is replete with Arabic terms in capital letters and reference to "Quranic Injunctions" (Malik, 1991, 120). His piety stands in contrast with the drinking senior officers who disliked him for being rigid about his prayers (p. 90). Frequently, he presents his choices as being motivated by his piety. At social events in the army mess for example, he has to choose between "bowing before ALLAH or bowing before man" (p. 91). In the battlefield he takes possession of his actions and sets a personal example for his subordinates, in contrast to other commanders who try to avoid conflict and discomfort.

### 5.4.2. Accused of surrendering

General Niazi's autobiographical narrative *Betrayal of East Pakistan* published in 1998[54] is framed on the dust jacket as the long-awaited personal account of the 1971 war by one of the main protagonists. Niazi was the commander of the Eastern Command and features prominently in the post-war partisan literature relating to 1971.[55] *Betrayal of East Pakistan* is a personal thematic narrative of the events and the subsequent developments. Niazi first spent time as a prisoner of war in India and on his return joined the Jama'at-e Ulama-e Pakistan (JUP) political

[54] Niazi, Lt. Gen. A. A. K. (1998), *The Betrayal of East Pakistan*, Oxford University Press.
[55] Interestingly not in the literature produced by the Indian side, but inside the vast literature produced by Pakistani Officers.

party. He was imprisoned under the government of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and remained in prison under martial law ruler Gen. Zia ul-Haq.

The introduction sets out the argumentative mode of the narration. Niazi (1998) states that he writes against "innumerable writers" (p. xxviii.) who present the conflict as being "far removed from the factual happenings, based on hearsay, conjectures, and unsubstantiated records" (ibid.). Niazi refutes the accounts written about the breakup of Pakistan by senior officers for two reasons: First, they disconnect the two wars in the East and the West, and second, they neglect the strategic, political, diplomatic and economic context of the conflict (p. xxx.). For example, Niazi refutes publications by Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqeem Khan and Brig. Siddiq Salik.[56] In his judgement, the first deliberately presents distorted facts commissioned by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and General Tikka Khan (p. xxviii.). He rejects Brigadier Siddiq Salik's text arguing that he was a "reporter by profession, and had neither basic training in military matters nor any experience in warfare, and had no understanding of military operations. Military matters of that magnitude were entirely beyond his comprehension" (p. xxviii.).

The text is clearly aimed at readership familiar with the details of the 1971 conflict and well versed in military terms. The narration of the war is almost illegible for readers with no military knowledge. It is full of military abbreviations, references to persons and their positions, and the geography of East Pakistan. In argumentative passages the text refers to further works of Pakistani, Indian, and international authors.[57] It includes military and personal correspondence, maps and photographs, and newspaper articles.

In general, the text follows the chronological order of the political and military events that led to the 1971 war and the subsequent surrender, with occasional introductions and assessments of the political and military context and its actors. In the last three chapters Niazi (1998) turns to the developments after the war and his subsequent venture into politics, focusing on a conspiracy and its actors who were to blame for the breakup of Pakistan. The first chapter

[56] As indicated in the introduction to this chapter, Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqeem Khan's *Crisis in Leadership* is considered by some officers as an official narrative from the military command. Niazi also refers to Siddiq Salik's *Witness to Surrender,* in which he is personally accused of surrendering. Niazi further criticises Siddiq Salik because of his proximity to the military leadership. Siddiq Salik was the commanding officer of the Inter Service Public Relations (ISPR) and a prominent face of the Martial Law Administration under Zia ul-Haq.

[57] Niazi among others refers to Maj. Gen. Fazal Muqeem Khan, *Crisis in Leadership* (1973); Maj. Gen. Shaukat Riza, *The Pakistan Army 1966-71* (1990); Sisson and Rose, W*ar and Secession: Pakistan, India and the Creation of Bangladesh* (1991); Maj. Gen Lachman Singh, *Indian Sword Strikes in East Pakistan* (1979); Maj. Gen. Tajammul Malik, *The Story of my Struggle* (1991), Maj. Gen. D. K. Palit, *The Lightning Campaign* (1972)*;* Raina, Asoka, *Inside RAW: The Story of Indians secret service* (1981; Maj. Gen. Ali Khan Pataudi's *Al-Qissas* (1978) and Syed Alamdar Raza's *Dacca Debacle* (1993).

somehow stands apart, as Niazi does not refer to the events that led to the conflict. In this chapter, he presents his own and his family's military credentials.

Presenting the background to the conflict in chronological order following and commenting on the political and military developments, Niazi (1998) assesses the Martial Law Administrators in East Pakistan, Yaqub Khan and Tikka Khan and their individual aspirations.[58] He refers to the cultural differences between East and West Pakistan (p. 33),[59] and argues that they stem mainly from the Hindu influence on the "subservient Muslim population" (p. 33). In chapter four Niazi turns to the first person singular mode, writing about the military shifts in command, appointments, and the retirements he witnessed (p. 49f.), before describing in bleak terms the situation he found in East Pakistan. According to Niazi, there were military and political obstacles to the operations in East Pakistan. As the main obstacles, he identifies the malfunctioning of the administration, the hostility of the local population towards the soldiers who were "unwanted foreigners in our own country" (p. 51), the lack of intelligence and border control (p. 51f.). Despite these obstacles, Niazi works out a plan for the fight against the "rebels" (p. 58). But in the end his superior Gen. Hamid, fearing that the violation of the international border might trigger a reaction from India, cancels his plans. In subsequent chapters, Niazi assesses the military strength of the conflicting parties, the Mukti Bahini, Razekars, police and army. Niazi's task was to evict the guerrillas and to hold on to the territory, he writes, but he had not been given any "clear-cut written operational instructions from GHQ, assigning me a mission, allocating me resources for the attainment of the mission, and providing logistic support" (p. 80). Instead, he writes that "we remained short of not only heavy weapons, but were not provided with even ordnance stores like vests, shirts, trousers, and boots. The soldiers had to fight bare-footed and bare-chested" (p. 81). With reference to secondary sources, Gen. Niazi presents himself and his troops as performing well despite the obstacles (pp. 99-102). He

[58] According to Niazi (1998), Yaqub Khan failed on many levels: He refused to provide help to the troops during the relief operations following the cyclone in East Pakistan, he was soft towards the Awami League and their bullying tactics towards other political parties in the election, enabling them to win, and resigned very quickly after taking over as Governor of East Pakistan. (p. 41.) After Niazi (1998), Yaqub also failed to control the insurrection at an early stage, when it was a "rag-tag mob, lacking the skills of trained soldiers" (ibid.). Niazi portrays Yaqub as being a weak opportunist, who subsequently followed a successful career, first under Bhutto, later under Zia and then under Nawaz Sharif. He accuses Yaqub of double standards: "When thousands perished in the floods, their cries went unheard. He was unmoved when Biharis, West Pakistanis, and army officers serving in the East Pakistan Rifles were ruthlessly murdered. His conscience slumbered when officers' wives were dishonoured. He failed to lift even a proverbial finger when Tikka used three divisions in Baluchistan to crush the so-called insurgency, although in principle he should have resigned his ambassadorship in protest." (p. 43). For the assessment of Yaqub Khan see Niazi (1998, pp. 33-47).

[59] Niazi (1998) writes: "The language was different. Customs and traditions failed to merge. The diet was different. The dress was not the same. The culture of East Pakistan clashed with the culture of West Pakistan. Each believed in its own values, traditions, customs, and social set-up" (p. 33).

writes that he accomplished the pushback of the Bengali rebels with far fewer troops at his disposal than deemed as necessary (p. 102):

> "No other army in the history of warfare has faced such heavy odds as Pakistan Eastern Garrison faced in East Pakistan. To win a battle one needs a three to one ratio and that too not overall but only at the point where tactical success is being sought. The Indians, in spite of an overwhelming superiority in every conceivable aspect, could not beat the small, tired, but gallant Pakistan Eastern Garrison on the battlefield, which is not only unbelievable but militarily criminal" (p. 112).

For Niazi (1998), the actual battle starts with the Indian invasion (p. 117). He presents himself as a clever commander who surprised the Indians first in April 1971 when he evicted the rebels from the East Pakistani territory – a task the Indian commanders deemed impossible. The second episode features a wrong map presented to the Indians which depicted his troops along the border, giving the impression that the troops in East Pakistan were able to defend the territory (p. 122). He accuses the Pakistani high command and the politicians of deliberately working against him:

> "My High Command wanted me to be defeated in the first encounter with the Indian army. I was told not to lose any chunk of territory, for which sealing off the borders was essential and which meant that dispersal of troops along the borders was essential. As a result, I would become easy meat for the Indians" (ibid.).

Niazi accuses Gen. Yahya Khan of abandoning the operational plan that the defence of East Pakistan lies in the West. Furthermore, the Pakistani delegation at the UN failed to gather international support, while the military high command gave wrong reports about the situation in East Pakistan (p. 132).[60] He alleges that the high command was not "interested in the affairs of East Pakistan or the integrity of Pakistan. Like Nero, they played while Dhaka burned" (p. 123). Turning to the battles in the different sectors (p. 137), Niazi corrects battle narratives of other officers, for example of Maj. Gen. Muqeem. He considers Muqeem "a hired writer who had sold his pen and conscience" (p. 159). In short, he paints a picture of a competent army in the East that was able to withstand the Indian aggression and performed well under the circumstances. Finally, Niazi argues that it was a conspiracy that eventually led to the surrender:

[60] Niazi (1998) refers to a common theme found in many narratives: The military leadership deliberately painted a favourable picture of the military battles against India and the insurgency. Adding to this theme, Niazi also refers to the wrong information about the situation in West Pakistan: "I also fail to understand why GHQ fed us a false report that India had initiated a war in the west. In actual fact we had attacked India in the west" (p. 132).

> "It was through a conspiracy that Pakistan, its glorious army and brave Eastern Command commanders and troops were let down. We were ordered to surrender, and thus humiliated. We were not defeated. We were let down and cheated" (p. 165).

In the chapter succeeding the surrender, Niazi (1998) focuses on the conspiracy and the subsequent developments in Pakistan. Although he writes that he does not intend "to disentangle the web of intrigues and conspiracies concerning the separation of East Pakistan that have been such a feature of the chequered history of Pakistan" (p. 220) they take up much space inside the narrative.

Foremost, Niazi (1998) interprets the Tragedy of 1971 as a "débâcle, pre-planned and pre-arranged by President Yahya and Mr Bhutto" (p. xxvi.), of which several military and political leaders took advantage. He alleges that the destiny of Pakistan "was in the hands of opportunists who were engaged in a fierce struggle to attain or retain power" (p. 166) and they "preferred to sacrifice the national honour to their vested interests" (p. 272). He refers to the M. M. Ahmed plan, an agreement between Bhutto and General Yahya which "aimed at abandoning East Pakistan without a successor government, which meant: by losing the war" (p. xxv.). Niazi argues that he himself and his troops "could have also escaped the humiliation of surrender if they had allowed us to keep fighting" (p. xxvi.).

Niazi (1998) also turns to the official investigation of the Hamood-ur-Rehman Commission that was set up to examine the defeat in East Pakistan. However, instead of holding the military and political leadership accountable for losing the war, for Niazi the Hamood-ur-Rehman Commission (HRC) was restricted and wrongfully framed. It already blamed the Eastern Command in its mission "to inquire into the circumstances in which the Commander Eastern Command surrendered and the members of the Armed Forces under his command laid down their arms and ceasefire was ordered along the borders of West Pakistan and India and along the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir" (p. 253); and "People testified under duress or for self-motivated gain" (p. 255).

In several passages of his narrative, Niazi (1998) depicts himself as a "fighting soldier" (p. xxiv, 195), who takes responsibility for his actions but was eventually betrayed. His self-ascribed role is best illustrated in the passage about his deliberately chosen decision to surrender:

> "The destiny I could not evade was not of my choosing or making. Ordered to lay down arms by the President to save West Pakistan, my mind swung between the two options – risk West Pakistan being further overrun, or jeopardize my reputation, my career, my future, and the high tradition of the Pakistan Army by submitting to the orders. I had accepted a task beset with hazards and difficulties, when East

> Pakistan was in disarray and disorder. Two senior generals had refused to accept the responsibility on various pretexts, one had resigned when raging torrents of insurgency became obvious, and another had bungled the situation. I was twelfth in seniority when I was selected for the third senior post in the Army. Deciding to agree to the second option, I had swallowed my pride and made the supreme sacrifice of forfeiting reputation and honour, and the honour of my gallant troops, in the national interest" (p. 235).

To summarise the representation of officers' self-representation in the 1990s with regard to their role in the Tragedy of 1971, I will highlight the following five aspects: first, the intertextuality and increased space the Tragedy occupies in the autobiographical texts, second, the integration of the Tragedy in an overarching narrative, third, the diversification in interpretations of the Tragedy, fourth, the individual officer's occupation of a subject position in contrast to fellow officers, and finally, a tendency to develop military arguments that hint to a military-interested readership.

First, in contrast to the autobiographical texts published in the preceding two decades, the Tragedy of 1971 becomes an important point of reference in order to debate established positions and texts. The works analysed in this subchapter are full of references to other autobiographical texts by Pakistani military officers, their Indian counterparts, as well as by international scholars. The authors rely on intertextuality to back up their claims and contrast existing interpretations. The intertextual reference and the arguments put forward need more space, particularly when they circle around military performance or historiography. As a result of officers addressing the subsequent developments in the armed forces and their role, they expand the reference to the Tragedy.

Second, the narratives become more cohesive and the events of 1971 become integrated in an overarching narrative of the authors' personal professional development. The texts address the consequences of the Tragedy for the officers and are integrated in the encompassing narrative of their career, as demonstrated in the case of Admiral Sirohey, Gen. Niazi and Maj. Gen. Malik.

Third, interpretations of the Tragedy of 1971 diversified in the 1990s. While Sirohey points to an international conspiracy to deny Pakistan's economic emancipation, Malik and Niazi refer to a domestic conspiracy by politicians and senior generals that led to the breakup of Pakistan. Malik and Niazi both argue that the civil war as well as the international war with India in East Pakistan could have been won, thus picking up the interpretation put forward in earlier narratives. However, in contrast to earlier narratives, Niazi and Malik blame commanding officers, particularly in West Pakistan. Both authors depict the military goals and a success on the battlefield as practicable. According to Niazi and Malik, the Pakistan army could have

defended the territory in East Pakistan and fought India. They argue that the defeat was pre-planned. They both direct their critique at the high command and write that the commanding officers in the west wing shied away from fighting and arranging themselves with their Indian counterparts. They both refer to an analysis of the performance of the high command initiated after the conflict, arguing that the consequences were not welcomed inside the army.

Fourth, all authors depict themselves as professional officers who were preoccupied with their duties and responsibilities and took responsibility for their actions. The authors contrast themselves with officers in the high command who were not aware of the realities on the ground, and not involved in the fighting. In contrast to the high command, the officers are active and aware of the situations and their plans are depicted as achievable. Piety is still an integral part of the self-reference in the 1990s. Occasionally it is used to contrast it with the older high-ranking generation inside the armed forces. Malik and Sirohey both indicate that their religious beliefs motivated some of their actions. The writing officers increasingly contrast themselves with their fellow officers. For example, they accuse their fellow officers of being unaware of the ground realities, of aborting missions, of failing to defend territory, or simply of cowardice. Occasionally, they portray themselves as having to face the consequences of their fellow officers' actions. Furthermore, the authors present themselves as being betrayed and forced to accept the humiliation of surrender. They had to face the consequences of the wrong decisions or even the mischievous plans of the high command.

Finally, there is a noticeable shift on the argumentative level. Because the accusations and rehabilitations are directed increasingly towards fellow officers and their performance rather than to politicians, arguments circle increasingly on military matters, such as tactics, troop strength, use of equipment and leadership. Parallel to the shift from recounting the high politics of the Tragedy or the personal suffering as a consequence of it by prisoners of war, to arguing predominantly on a military and tactical level, the narration is more aimed at a military-interested readership. The narrative is full of military terms and reference to military personalities, almost incomprehensible for a general readership not familiar with the developments of the conflict.

### 5.5. The Tragedy after 2000 – Self-blame and historical trajectories

In the new millennia, the narratives evolved further: There are prisoner of war narratives, such as Lt. Col. ʿAbdulqādir's *be-tigh sipāhī* (2011) or Ikram Seghal's *Escape from Oblivion* (2012), thematic autobiographical narratives focusing on the Tragedy such as Arshad Qureshi

*The 1971 Indo-Pak War* (2002) and autobiographical narratives in which the Tragedy is part of an overall military professional life narrative.

In the following part, I will analyse four typical autobiographical narratives. My argument focuses on two developments in the representation of the officers' role during the Tragedy in the new millennia. First, I will discuss the Urdu prisoner of war narrative by Lt. Col. ʿAbdulqādir and highlight the changes and continuities in the representations of officers writing prisoner of war narratives. Second, I look at two recently emerging types of self-representations. The first can be identified as a representation of a self-scrutinising officer who takes responsibilities for his actions, represented in Hakeem Arshad Qureshi's text. The second type is characterised by the authors' emphasis on continuity between the 1965 and 1971 war, and an integration of the Tragedy into an overarching life narrative. I will discuss this aspect with respect to Anwar Shamim's and Sajad Haider's autobiography.

Lt. Col. ʿAbdulqādir who was serving with the Special Service Group (SSG) commanded the paramilitary Razakars during the last days of the Pakistani military presence in Dhaka. His autobiographical narrative *be-tigh sipāhī: jang 71 aur qaid-i hind kī rūdād*[61] briefly recalls the battles he fought in December 1971. In its main part, the text focuses on his experience as a prisoner of war in India. In the introduction, Lt. Col. ʿAbdulqādir (2011) writes that most of the text was written in 1974 after his return from India. Apart from the last two chapters, the narrative circles around his posting to East Pakistan and imprisonment in India in chronological order. The last chapters do not advance the plot but hint at the consequences of the Tragedy and Lt. Col. ʿAbdulqādir's turn to religion. *Be-tigh sipāhī* is framed by General Hamid Gul as a simple narrative that shows how regular officers and soldiers, despite their errors and shortcomings, retained their love for the homeland (*waṭan kī muḥabbat)* and kept fighting (ʿAbdulqādir, 2011, p. 16).

In the first chapters Lt. Col. ʿAbdulqādir (2011) refers to his posting to Chittagong and elaborates on the background of the conflict. He writes about the domination of the East Pakistani economy by the western wing (p. 20). A further topic is East Pakistan's education system, which he sees dominated by Hindus (ibid.). ʿAbdulqādir points to the fact that the majority of the commanders and troops posted in East Pakistan were from West Pakistan (p. 21). He sees the political developments that started under Ayub Khan as the main reason for the dominance of the Awami League and their demands under their six-point programme (p. 24).

[61] ʿAbd al-Qādir, Lt. Col. (2011), *Be-tegẖ Sipāhī – jang 71 aur qaid kī rudād*, ʿilm o ʿirfān publishirz, lāhaur.

The narration sets in as Lt. Col. ʿAbdulqādir (2011) receives his posting order to Dhaka on 29 November 1971 (p. 24), four days before the declaration of war between India and Pakistan. Arriving in Dhaka, he writes about the air battle over Dhaka, and, resorting to battle narrative, he describes the defence of Bhairab bazar and later Brahmanbaria east of Dhaka (pp. 29, 31). He depicts himself and his troops as performing well under the circumstances, but eventually being ordered to surrender. Surrender for Lt. Col. ʿAbdulqādir is both a humiliation (*kẖafīf*) (p. 68) and a shame (*nadamat*) (p. 53) and it has led to severe consequences for the Razakars and their families, who were subsequently murdered by the Mukti Bahini (p. 57f.).

ʿAbdulqādir (2011) writes that he was surprised by the announcement of surrender, but even more by the reaction of some officers and soldier who seemed satisfied with the outcome:

> "I arrived at the DHQ [District Head Quarters] and saw a JOC [Junior Officer Commanding]. He called me over and said that our leaders have surrendered. I was speechless. He also informed me that I was awarded Sitar-e Jurat (SJ). The feelings were so intense, that he could not hold back the tears. He just was able to say: "Sir at this time we can still fight here, we do not want to surrender." On the way back I saw many officers and soldiers. There were a variety of expressions but when I saw this I was surprised that on some faces there was a wave of satisfaction" (p. 52).

For ʿAbdulqādir (2011) the officers and soldiers should at least feel ashamed:

> "Some people even publicly cheered. I even heard something like, okay then, at least we return alive […]. Sense of shame? Maybe I am exaggerating, but in these conditions should our behavior be like this? When facing imprisonment to commit suicide like the Japanese may be an extreme step, but a regular soldier of a brave army cannot afford to lay down his weapon in front of the enemy let alone cheer about it" (p. 53).

After the surrender in Dhaka, he is transferred to the Bareilly camp in India. In contrast to some of his fellow officers who are afraid of the consequences, he tries to escape but is eventually captured (p. 65). Lt. Col. ʿAbdulqādir describes his fellow officers and the daily routine in the camp, noting that many officers started to pray regularly. He depicts the Indian guards as generally mischievous (p. 70f.) – the prisoners are forced to fill out forms and are subject to interrogations.

The chapters where Lt. Col. ʿAbdulqādir (2011) describes his time as a prisoner of war are a collection of episodes about his escape attempts, and subsequent punishment as well as characterisations of his fellow inmates. As he is transferred from the Bareilly to the Meerut camp in Uttar Pradesh, he tries to escape again. The attempt fails as several fellow officers refused to help him (p. 82f.). After the attempt he is treated badly and put into solitary

confinement. Through the intervention of the ICRC the Indians treat him better (p. 91). After solitary confinement, he writes that he started to pray regularly and studied the Quran and Maulana Azad's Tafsir with his fellow officers (p. 110).

He depicts himself in opposition to many fellow officers who are against escape attempts (p. 151), because they fear the consequences. Especially after the announcement of the Simla agreement, which indicated at the release of the prisoners of war, most officers did not want to participate in any escape attempt (p. 146). Ultimately, he seeks permission from General Head Quarters in a secret letter, but is disappointed, as GHQ does not grant prisoners permission to flee (p. 152).

After Lt. Col. ʿAbdulqādir (2011) returns to Pakistan he is reintegrated in the army. In the last two chapters he observes and comments on the political developments after his return. He writes about his crisis of faith, questioning his daily routine in the armed forces (p. 164f.). Finally, he turns to religion and joins the Naqshbandiyah order (p. 168) of Ameer Muhammad Akram Awan. He indicates that he wanted to join the Afghan Jihad (p. 169) and was in contact with Maj. Gen. Tajammul Malik about an Islamic coup attempt against Zia ul-Haq (p. 170). Although he does not support the coup, he is imprisoned with Tajammul Malik for one year.

Lt. Col. ʿAbdulqādir (2011) presents his interpretation of the Tragedy of 1971 in the last few chapters. For Lt. Col. ʿAbdulqādir, the Tragedy becomes a place to discuss the ideology and politics of the state of Pakistan as well as a place to criticise the developments inside the Pakistan army. The reasons why Pakistan was broken, writes Lt. Col. ʿAbdulqādir, was because the ideology of Pakistan was ignored. He establishes a difference between western secular democracy, which advocates separate identities and Islam, which integrates them: "From my understanding, God gave us this pure earth (pāk zamīn) that the world becomes clear that Islam is the only source of humanity and peace (*islām-hī insānyat kī bhalā'ī aur aman kā wāḥid ẕarīʿah he*)" (p. 155). For ʿAbdulqādir the separate identities fostered by western secular democracy are at the core for the breakup of Pakistan (p. 157). Part of the blame lies also with the political parties who exploited the lower classes through a system established under the British rule (p 158f). For ʿAbdulqādir no political party has fully integrated the ideology of Pakistan – only the period of Islamisation during the reign of Gen. Zia ul-Haq has advanced the ideology of Pakistan (pp. 160f.). ʿAbdulqādir concludes "there is no other way than Islam for us."[62]

[62] *Islām keʿilāwa hamāre pās koʾī dūsre rāstah he hī nahīṉ* (p. 163).

In several paragraphs, Lt. Col. ʿAbdulqādir (2011) criticises developments inside the army and alleges that despite the bad performance in the two wars, nothing has changed in the selection process (p. 73). At the same time he laments a lack of self-scrutiny and debate: "Things don't change in the army because critical voices are crushed" (ibid.). Referring to the situation in the 1970s, ʿAbdulqādir writes that officers were "selected because of their sociability and their fluency in English" (p. 74). He sees the cause for the wrong developments in the British tradition, which created a separation between offices and soldiers: "Maybe after 44 years the gulf between the officers and soldiers is not smaller because of the British who established it for their special interests" (p. 63). Similar to his discussion of the political problems in Pakistan, he advocates that Islam is the solution for the problems inside the army: "In addition to professional development, we should render our army more national and Islamic (*qaumī aur islāmī soc*)" (p. 74).

ʿAbdulqādir's prisoner of war narrative mirrors earlier texts such as those from Siddiq Salik or Kayānī, in that it is a crafted narrative incorporating colloquial direct speech. The text is written in simple Urdu and directed at a young Pakistani readership. In contrast to Siddiq or Kayānī's narrative, however, Lt. Col. ʿAbdulqādir also implies a more military-interested readership, as the reference to the battles he had fought take up much space of the text.

In the narrative Lt. Col. ʿAbdulqādir depicts himself as a fearless officer, suffering for his beliefs and actions. As a prisoner of war, he constantly tries to escape, an action he equates with the reestablishment of honour of the Pakistan army. He sees himself as being let down repeatedly by his fellow officers who fear the consequences, and later by the Pakistan army. An integral part of his self-representation is connected to his religious piety and Islamic beliefs. He depicts himself as a devoted Muslim, concerned with the faith of the Muslims of India and the Islamic State of Pakistan.

### 5.5.1. Military failure and self-blame

> "There were those who had taken it upon themselves to rewrite history, either because the truth was to bitter to swallow, or because memory had gone selectively foggy, permitting honor to be distilled out of an inglorious episode in our national life. Others had decided to cuddle up to the authorities, in order to elect better treatment. Then there was the group of young toughs who tried to browbeat everyone into submission. I suppose each group had, in its own way, redefined its short-term 'achievable' aim, necessary for survival." (Qureshi, 2002, p. 223).

Hakeem Arshad Qureshi (2002),[63] writing at the beginning of the new millennium, finds himself confronted with three distinguishable positions by fellow officers relating to the Tragedy of 1971 that he wants to confront. First, he positions his text against officers writing selective histories to rehabilitate themselves. Second, he rejects histories by officers who positioned themselves with the ruling elite to elect better treatment. Finally, he criticises the younger generation that tries to intimidate and suppress dissident voices. Maj. Gen. Qureshi's autobiographical narrative *The 1971 Indo-Pak War – A Soldier's Narrative* is framed as an account of a commanding officer in East Pakistan, who "experienced the hazards involved in the concentration of unlimited powers in the hands of a Martial Law 'demi-god' to the humiliation of becoming a prisoner of war, shorn of all dignity" (p. dust-jacket).

Qureshi joined the armed forces in 1954. He was stationed in East Pakistan before the general elections in 1970. Qureshi's autobiographical narrative focuses on his experience during the conflict, his subsequent imprisonment and successful reintegration into the armed forces. Adhering to a chronological order of the historical events Qureshi presents a crafted narrative of the Tragedy, referring to preceding and subsequent occurrences. The text relates to several personal accounts about the bifurcation of Pakistan written by other officers as well as Indian and international authors.[64] He argues for a critical and selfless re-examination of Pakistan's breakup:

> "Even after twenty-six years, the debate on the factors leading to the breakup of Pakistan continues unabated. Spurious, self-serving arguments, backed up by half-truths, are advanced to confuse the basic issues. Refusing to face reality, we tend to obliterate irritants by reinterpreting history in such a manner that the conclusions suit our attitudes and opinions. The honourable way is to rewrite history with our blood" (Qureshi, 2002, p. xi.)

In the first chapters he turns to his posting in East Pakistan. He contrasts the situation in 1970 with the 1950s when the local Bengali population was not hostile to arriving commanders from West Pakistan. However, two decades later "the Bengalis had realized that "Independence" (Qureshi, 2002, p. 6) had hardly changed anything for the majority" (ibid.). He depicts the military leadership as unaware of the social and military developments in East Pakistan, where "provincialism, parochialism, and ethnicity had permeated society" (p. 7f.).

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[63] Qureshi, Maj. Gen. Hakeem Arshad (2002), *The 1971 Indo-Pak War – A Soldier's Narrative*, Oxford University Press.

[64] Qureshi refers to Fazal Muqeem Khan's *Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership* and Raina, Asoka (1981), *Inside RAW: The Story of Indians secret service,* Vikas Publishing House, New Delhi, Singh, Jagdev (1988), *Dismemberment of Pakistan: 1971 Indo-Pak War*, Lancer International, New Delhi.

Furthermore, the lack of intelligence failed to anticipate the victory by the Awami League (p. 8, 63).

Qureshi (2002) interprets the alienation of the local Bengali population towards the West Pakistanis as a long-term goal of Hindu India. Despite the violent conflicts between the Muslims and the Hindus in Bengal in 1905 and 1911, "a common platform of language, heritage, and culture with the Hindu minority" (p. 13) was generated after the creation of Pakistan:

> "The initiated measures for the creation of such a platform: 'conversion' through conviction, 'friendly persuasion', or coercion of the young leadership amongst student bodies and the working classes, using a 'lethal' combination of wine, women, and money, was started straightaway" (ibid.).

After Qureshi (2002), Indian propaganda and the failure to counter this propaganda poisoned the minds of the Bengalis (p. 29). The national language Urdu, "the greatest bond between the two wings" (ibid.) was eliminated from East Pakistan and "Bengali Muslims were set up for a cultural onslaught by Bengali writers, mostly Hindus" (ibid.). He traces the Indian infiltration also to the 1965 war, in which East Pakistan was left defenceless:

> "Over the years, India had infiltrated potent sections of our society-students, the civil and military bureaucracy, political organizations, and the print media. By exploiting the sense of insecurity and deprivation felt by many East Pakistanis, especially after the 1965 war, they had been able to capture the imagination of a segment of our people who mattered" (p. 122).

Turning to the election, Qureshi (2002) writes that the "Bengali chauvinists" (p. 10) forced the local population to vote for the Awami League:

> "The course of history might have been changed if worthwhile action against chauvinistic, bellicose, and rebellious sections of the Awami League and the Indian agents had been promptly initiated across the board" (p. 18f.).

For Qureshi (2002), East Pakistan became ungovernable after the election because the army failed to act,[65] or was "lulled into inactivity" (p. 22). He upholds that the army should have acted, because politicians were unable to find a solution: "Political problems must be resolved

[65] Qureshi (2002) writes: "We did not react to their high-handedness because, unfortunately, we were more worried about the 'form' than the substance of our conduct. We refused to look beyond our noses, isolated ourselves from the realities of the situation, and allowed a spurious seal of legality and respectability to be put on the election 'victory'" (p. 12).

by political means – but not necessarily by politicians, who have so often been found wanting in this respect" (p. 15f.).

After giving background information he changes to narrate the battles fought in sectors close to the Indian border. Resorting to battle narrative mode, he writes how he and his troops disarmed the East Pakistan Rifles. His troops captured Lalmonirhat Airfields and eventually re-established the international border when taking control over Phulbari, Nilphamari, Hilli, Birol, Kishorignaj and Barogram.[66] The narrative is ripe with military truisms that hint at a military-interested readership:[67]

> "Unit command is a very testing charge even during peacetime; in East Pakistan it had become doubly so. All human beings have their own perception of life and aspirations, and in order to influence his command and to harness their thoughts, a commanding officer has to be firm under pressure, dependable in a crisis, and compassionate in his dealings. What makes him so are his convictions, his self-confidence born out of knowledge and experience, and his adherence to moral values. Dependability is the outcome of harmony in word and deed. For all these qualities to mesh into a whole, understanding of human nature is necessary" (Qureshi, 2002, p. 86).

Quershi (2002) assesses the military strategy and performance, criticising the objective to defend the entire territory of East Pakistan. In his opinion the tactics did not correspond to the realities on the ground:

> "In fact, we appear to have disintegrated as a cohesive fighting force somewhere between the borders and our envisaged first, or in some cases second line of defense. Hence a quick defeat in detail. We lost the war without losing a battle. Even the enemy was surprised at the speed of our disintegration" (p. 129).

In passages of battle narrative Qureshi (2002) depicts himself as a devoted professional soldier who acts fearlessly and cleverly and attacks the Indian by surprise (p. 149f). In contrast

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[66] The special reference is very elaborate. Among others he refers to battles in Dinajpur (p. 38f.), Palasbari (p. 42f.). Later he turns to the disarming of the East Pakistan Rifles (p. 45f) and his capture of Lalmonirhat airfield (p. 55f.), recapture of Dinajpur (p. 61) and eventually the reestablishment of the international border with the capture of Phulbari, Nilphamari (p. 71f.), Hilli (p. 72), Kishoriganj (p. 75f.) and Barogram (p. 83).

[67] The use of military truisms and the identification categories associated with its utterance will be further elaborated in the next chapter. A few examples given by Qureshi (2002) are "In battle, wrong reporting can spell disaster" (p. 95); "Those who can withstand the heat are the ones who succeed" (p. 90); "A subordinate's faith in his commander is a potent catalyst for enviable professional conduct" (p. 87); "The young are always optimistic. Self-confident and bold, they are not seriously concerned about the consequences of a risky undertaking" (p. 57); "In order to respond to a live situation intelligently, the ability to think coherently while in danger is essential" (p. 56); "The sight of dead and injured comrades is never pleasant. It arouses either desperation or fear in the beholder" (p. 37); "The situation in the field is never as bad as claimed by a deserter, nor as rosy as claimed by a successful 'gladiator'" (p. 113); "War is a cruel business in more ways than one. While it can stimulate ordinary humans to perform heroic deeds, it can demolish many professional demigods in the twinkling of an eye" (p. 141).

to other commanders he maintains the fighting spirit of his troops: "Thankfully, the despondency that has gripped the leaders and the led elsewhere has not percolated into our area" (p. 169). At the time of the order to surrender, he depicts himself as absorbed in fighting. Switching to the present tense, Qureshi (2002) writes that the order of surrender was unexpected and devastating.[68] He further elaborates on surrender, which he sees as unacceptable:

> "In fact, surrender is not a choice available to any ablebodied soldier, anywhere in the world. To suggest laying down their arms to a body of troops amounts to treason under the Army Act. Orders to surrender can be disobeyed with impunity. In Islam, even withdrawal, unless tactically advantageous, is not acceptable, far less so laying down arms or running way [sic!] from the battlefield to save one's skin" (p. 176).

For Qureshi (2002) the surrender of the Pakistani forces has wider implications and affects the Indian Muslims and the Muslim *ummah*, adding "we had preferred self above self-respect and national honor, negating our professed faith in the permanence of the Hereafter" (p. 192).

After the surrender, Qureshi (2002) turns to his experience as a prisoner of war in India, focusing on the Indian hostility and indoctrination attempt, as well as on developments among the prisoners of war (p. 213). He indicates that many officers turned to religion. He depicts himself as neither a "playboy" (p. 211) nor a "practicing Muslim" (ibid.) and says "[my] ego, twisted logic, or a misplaced sense of honor, stopped me from joining the 'converts' at first," (ibid.) eventually he participates in the regular prayers.

Qureshi (2002) briefly turns to the Indian indoctrination attempt. He argues that they failed because the Pakistanis were fighting a defensive battle against India and not a battle in a foreign land, as for example the US fought in Vietnam. Besides the nature of the battle, the circumstances of surrender affected the conviction of the Pakistanis: "most of us, however, had surrendered on orders while still 'in being' as a fighting force. To attempt the collective 're-education' of such a body of troops was futile" (p. 214). Qureshi also writes about the core of the 'Pakistani identity', which the Indian propaganda also failed to understand:

> "[…] deep impact of the Two Nation theory on the Pakistan Army's psyche. […] We had a well-defined identity as Pakistani POWs. Our collective behavior was motivated by a sense of belonging to a

[68] Qureshi writes that he could not "comprehend this new development. It is morally wrong and tactically unnecessary. The abruptness of the proposed cessation of hostilities makes me wonder if the message is even authentic." (174f.) For him the "The order to surrender was a bolt from the blue," (175) and "It was a mind shattering order" (176).

whole, our home across the border, and professional pride and group cohesion added spine to our determination" (ibid.).

As indicated in the introduction to this subchapter, Qureshi (2002) engages with the literature written after 1971. For Qureshi, officers writing autobiographical narratives of the Tragedy of 1971 were not representative of the majority of officers. In contrast to the writing officers, who "waste[d] time on recalling the past gory of the Ummah" (p. 223), the majority of officers "reviewed the major events of the past few years, with a view to understanding the causes of Pakistan's break-up" (ibid.).

Qureshi (2002) eventually turns to developments inside the Pakistan army after the conflict and writes about the reintegration of the prisoners of war. The military leadership doubted the loyalty of the returnees and posted them to different units (p. 261). Qureshi writes that the general feeling towards the returnees was hostile:

> "The general feeling in the Army at that time was that the returnees were a spent force, untrustworthy, and we had to work hard to expose the fallacy of such jaundiced views. We had war experience which was matchless, an invaluable asset" (p. 262).

The last few chapters are interspersed with back flashes to his military training before being posted to East Pakistan, and reflections of the evolvement of the armed forces and its training. It is here that Qureshi (2002) writes about the context of the conflict and assesses developments. For example, he calls into question the international defence treaties, which were unable to save united Pakistan:

> "A Mutual Defence Treaty against Communist aggression and a few million dollars' worth of military equipment, discarded by the US at the end of the Korean War. The treaty failed to elect US help in the 1965 War or in 1971, when India – after concluding a 25-year defence pact with the USSR – invaded East Pakistan" (p. 248).

For Qureshi (2002), the Tragedy of 1971 is the most important historical event in the history of Pakistan and place for reflection and introspect (p. 143). Throughout the text, he accuses alternatively India, the Bengali Hindus and politicians, as well as military leaders for the Tragedy. Qureshi writes that it is a "tradition in Pakistan to blame individuals or institutions but this tradition evades the truth" (p. 258). At the same time, he advocates that all Pakistanis should share the blame for the breakup of Pakistan:

> "We must accept the fact that, as a people, we had also contributed to the bifurcation of our own country. It was not a Niazi, or a Yahya, even a Mujib, or a Bhutto, or their key assistants, who alone were

the case of our break-up, but a corrupt system and a flawed social order that our own apathy had allowed to remain in place for years" (p. 288).

He accuses a general duplicity prevalent in Pakistan:

> "We lament the martyrs of Karbala, but we fail to follow their spirit of sacrifice for a principle. We fervently commemorate Hazrat Hussain's martyrdom every year, but do not register the irreparable damage the aftermath of the tragedy has done and is doing to the Muslim cause. We are prepared to die, safeguarding Prophet Muhammad's (PBUH) honor, but do not wish to emulate the qualities of head and heart which made him a Guide. We created a country to avoid exploitation by the Hindu majority, but instead of developing a just society, we had institutionalized the exploitation of the have-nots. This duplicity we have developed into an art form" (p. 94).

He also hints at several negative social and moral developments in Pakistan:

> "Unfortunately, a majority of the Pakistanis who mattered did not adhere to Islamic values of character and conduct, public as well as private. National unity in the name of religion was, therefore, foredoomed. Equally unfortunately, the society that had developed over he years was practically devoid of any unifying values. Corruption, smuggling, nepotism, parochialism, lack of justice, inadequacy of education, scarcity of civic sense, dearth of institutions, dictatorship and the dictatorial attitudes of democratically elected representatives, and no public participation in national affairs do not promote patriotism. Such a society could not foster a sense of nationhood, or infuse pride in the individual. Rather, it released forces of dissertation and lead [sic!] to the formation of selfish groups with narrow aims" (p. 26f.)

In his text, Qureshi (2002) portrays himself as an active participant in the events, a close witness and a fearless soldier and Muslim. He takes responsibility for his actions and does not shy away from self-scrutiny. His own identity and the role of the soldiers in East Pakistan in general are linked by the use of the first person plural (we) in describing the situation and dealings. In several passages of the battle narrative, he portrays himself as brave and reckless (p 80). Qureshi also contrasts himself with other unit commanders in acknowledging his faults (p. 199).

### 5.5.2. Another betrayal

In his autobiographical narrative *Cutting Edge PAF: Reminiscences,*[69] Air Chief Marshal Muhammad Anwar Shamim (2010) devotes relatively little space to the events around the 1971

[69] Shamim, Air Chief Marshal M. Anwar (2010), *Cutting Edge PAF – Reminiscences*, Vanguard Books, Karachi.

war (pp. 179-193). Although he depicts it as an important time of his career in the Pakistan Air Force, there is little information about his actions during the conflict. He describes the political and military background of the conflict, referring to the international alliances and the development of both the Indian and the Pakistan Air Force after the 1965 war (p. 170f). Focusing on the military strength of both forces, he assesses the situation in the different sectors of the conflict.

During the conflict Anwar Shamim (2010) is posted to West Pakistan (p. 193), and because he is not a witness to the situation in East Pakistan, he restricts himself to conveying military background information, such as the planes used by the Pakistan and Indian Air Force. He highlights the heroic battles of Air Squadron No. 14 stationed in East Pakistan who "wrote their own history of fighting with spirit and audacity against [an] enemy 10 times their size?" (p. 183).

As a protagonist or narrator Anwar Shamim (2010) is almost absent in the text, except for two passages where he refers to his post as Sector Air Defence Commander who "witnessed the professionalism of our pilots and commanders" (p. 190) and his assessment of surrender (p. 192). He sticks to the third person singular mode when giving background information. Similar to other parts in his autobiographical text, the Tragedy features as an important moment in his own career, after which he is promoted to Chief of the Air Force. In the aftermath of the war, the reference to himself gains prominence, particularly in his chapter *In Senior Positions,* (pp. 194-217) where he writes about the advancement in career and his quest to educate the personnel under his command about the background to the conflict.

Like many officers writing in the 2000s, Anwar Shamim (2010) puts forward the view that the conflict between the eastern and western wings of Pakistan was mainly caused by social inequality. However, he also indicates that the military abandonment of the East Wing during the 1965 war also played a role in the alienation of Bengalis (p. 172). After the conflict, the political demands of the leader of the Awami League were "not handled politically to the satisfaction of the leaders and the people of Eastern Wing" (ibid.). Eventually Yahya Khan failed to resolve the political conflict between the Awami League and the Pakistan People's Party who were "antithetical" to the government.

> "Instead of choosing route of political solution [sic!], General Yahya Khan, with backing of the largest political party from the West Wing, decided to go for a military solution – that perhaps was the biggest blunder General Yahya Khan made to restore normality in the East Wing" (p. 174).

Anwar Shamim (2010) sees the decision of the Pakistani government for a military intervention in East Pakistan as giving India a reason to intervene:

> "In fact, the Government of Pakistan itself presented the rationale for Indian intervention when armed forces took action against its own people that resulted in a human tragedy on a massive scale and large numbers of people took refuge in India. That was also the turning point when most of the countries lost sympathy with Pakistan just because it used force to avoid secession" (p. 174).

After Shamim, on the one hand the different security pacts (SEATO and CENTO) helped Pakistan to gain access to modern military equipment. On the other hand, however, they had the effect that Russia would help India "to cut Pakistan in half" (p. 185). Apart from blaming India, Anwar Shamim also accuses the Pakistani military leadership for their failures. The implicit defence strategy that an attack on East Pakistan would trigger a reaction on the Indo-Pakistan border in the West "was though chivalrous but not credible in our case" (p. 184). For Shamim the plan was based on the "inaccurate assumption" (ibid.) that the Pakistani forces were able to turn the momentum in the West, where in fact their troop level was insufficient.

Despite the shortcomings in terms of military equipment and the tactical failures, Shamim (2010) insists that the Pakistani forces put up a heroic fight: "Our army units everywhere fought with unsurpassed bravery and their valor will be remembered in history with honor and pride" (p. 186). The war of 1971 is thus portrayed as a tragedy, but there were many heroic episodes both in the armed forces as well as in the air force. In short, Shamim argues "it was fascinating to me how a handicapped David fought with overwhelmingly powerful Goliath" (p. 193).

Anwar Shamim (2010) blames the loss of East Pakistan on both India and the international alliances, as well as the strategic failure of the Pakistani military and governmental leaders:

> "For India the Eastern Pakistan was an easy target and a prelude to [the] bigger prize that was West Pakistan. Undoubtedly she needed total backing of big international players for that venture. I have however penned my views on the outcome of the war and the confusion in thinking at governmental and army command levels" (p. 193).

However, there is also a level of self-blame:

> "The question is who can be blamed for this debacle? The simple answer is no one but us. But have we learnt the lesson? It does not appear that we have. However, the redeeming factor is that in the history of nations, there have been selfless men who rose to the occasion and took control of the situation. The names of Mao Zedong of China, General Charles De Gaulle of France, Winston Churchill of England, Marshall Stalin of Russia and Mustafa Kemal Ataturk of Turkey are the shining examples of a few stalwarts in the pages of recent history" (p. 192f.)

Although he depicts himself as a witness to the performance of his pilots and commanders in a short passage, there is almost no reference to Anwar Shamim's own role in the conflict. The subject position occupied by the author is one of a professional officer who assesses military strategies and strengths.

Sajad Haider's autobiographical narrative *Flight of the falcon: Demolishing myths of Indo-Pak wars 1965 & 1971*[70] devotes three chapters to the Tragedy of 1971.[71] In other sections of the narration, Sajad Haider also refers to the war of 1971, and relates it to the war of 1965. *Flight of the Falcon* is a crafted narrative, ripe with military abbreviations, and reference to inner military developments. Besides narrating his actions, duties and responsibilities, Sajad Haider argues about the historical (mis)representation of the conflict and the performance of the air force with reference to historical works as well as personal narratives of Indian and Pakistani officers.[72]

The narration follows a chronological order. In the chapter *The Gathering Storm* Haider (2010) gives background information on the developments inside the air force and compares the build-up of the Indian and Pakistan Air Force (PAF) after the 1965 war (p. 222f.). After returning from a Staff course in the UK (p. 217), Haider is promoted to Officer Commanding (OC) of Flying Wing at Sargodha in West Pakistan, a post he holds throughout the war (p. 224). He depicts his posting as the "pinnacle of fighter flying, which was the dream of every fighter pilot worth his salt" (p. 225). He indicates "fate had conspired to place me at Sargodha on this momentous occasion. I intended to give the job every ounce of my energy and experience" (p. 230).

In the subsequent chapter *War of 1971 – Another Betrayal*, he turns to the performance of the air force in East Pakistan. Despite criticising some of the commanding officers for their "mediocre" (Haider, 2010, p. 235) performance who later were awarded medals, Haider generally hails the performance of the PAF as heroic:

> "As stated earlier, this was to be a desperate battle for survival and any attrition that the sole Squadron in East Pakistan was expected to inflict upon the preponderant adversary would be a miracle of resolve and grit. That is precisely what happened and it is an epic of air warfare" (p. 233).

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[70] Haider, S. Sajad (2010), *Flight of the Falcon*, Vanguard Books, Lahore.

[71] The titles used for the chapter read *The Gathering Storm* (p. 216f.), *War of 1971 – Another Betrayal* (p. 230f.) and *Shameful Capitulation and the Aftermath* (p. 270f.).

[72] Haider refers to the official history of the air force *The Story of the Pakistan Air Force: a saga of courage and honour*, written by the Shaheen Foundation in 1988. In other parts he refers to articles of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and Pran Chopra's *Indian Air Chief: My Days with the IAF*.

According to Haider's (2010) experience, most of the officers and pilots would have kept fighting, if they were not ordered to surrender (p. 239). Furthermore, India failed to achieve its military goals because of the bravery of the Pakistani soldiers:

> "My humble suggestion to the Pakistani nation is that they failed owing to the resolute courage and determination of the men who had proudly worn the uniforms of the Pakistan army, and the air force. This nation owes much gratitude to the spirit of the armed forces" (p. 241).

Haider (2010) then turns to his duties and responsibilities as Officer Commanding in West Pakistan, narrating episodes of individual bravery of pilots under his command (p. 256f.). He credits himself with having flown two missions every day during the war (p. 257), and depicts himself as a fearless fighter pilot. For example, he writes that when he was not at the airbase, he still tried to participate in the war with his son:

> "On the nights that I was at home and a bomber raid was announced by the eerie sound of sirens, I would take my 8 year old son, Adnan with my helmet on his head and I would take a sub-machine gun from my guard and help him hold that and point it at the sky, because he insisted that he was going to shoot down a bomber. My wife at the time would sit nervously in the corner of the large bunker instead of her parents' lovely home in Brussels" (p. 262).

During the war, there are two episodes describing Haider's personal involvement. This takes up much space in the narrative. The first episode circles around an air battle where he misses his target. But in the heat of the battle, he claims to have shot down an enemy airplane. After returning to the airbase, he takes responsibility for his misinformation: "It was just bad judgment on my part. I have not lived that down even today, and feel bad about having claimed one destroyed" (Haider, 2010, p. 266). In the second episode his mission is cancelled "owing to a foolish error of a senior officer" (ibid.) just before the attack. Haider returns without having fought the enemy. "It proved to be a catalyst for unrest amongst the patriotic cadres of the PAF" (ibid.).

In the chapter *Shameful Capitulation and the Aftermath* Sajad Haider turns to the consequences and developments inside the military after the surrender; particularly inside the air force. He narrates personal episodes where he has confrontations with the air chief, for example because of an incident during the preparation for the Pakistan Day, where he is made the scapegoat (Haider, 2010, p. 281). He refers to the PAF leadership which—with the aid of the military intelligence agencies—started "the worst witch-hunt in PAF's history" (p. 284). Overall, Haider notes a transformation "in the attitude of the PAF leadership and their campaign to target pilots considered renegades became vicious, with me in the eye of the storm" (p. 283).

In this chapter he hints at the near coup attempts inside the military, and Bhutto's tactic to degrade the image of the military in public by using it to quell riots (p. 274).

As the subtitle of Sajad Haider's book suggests, the Tragedy of 1971 is used as a place to argue about the historiography of the conflict – demolishing myths – and as a place to accuse several leaders. Haider (2010) locates the misrepresentation of the performance during the conflict on both the Indian as well as the Pakistani side.[73] Criticising the Pakistani officers' historiography – particularly the "chair-borne senior army staff officers" (p. 259) who "propagated that the PAF had failed to provide the expected support" (ibid.) – he writes:

> "Some of the losers from the army and navy have also criticised the performance of the PAF to veil their own dismal performance. The shadow between myth and reality has widened because like many contrived stories, this disillusionment has become invasive. People need to read history of the 1971 war, written by authors from both sides to remove the erroneous and false impressions created by vested interests, especially the political cabal of this beleaguered nation" (p. 231).

Haider (2010) indicates that myths become part of the official histories of the air force. He writes about the performance of the commander who took over his position in the East who was awarded *Sitara-e-Jurat* despite the knowledge of "every pilot from No 14 Squadron. The official history even rewards him with the shooting down of one of the Gnats during this air combat. This is incorrect and his claim should have been rejected" (p. 236).

He criticises Pakistan's defence doctrine as "a powerfully worded plan, played on [a] sand model" (Haider, 2010, p. 234), highlighting that the army high command planned on capturing large areas in the Punjab, but deployed too much force in Kashmir (p. 248). In East Pakistan Haider puts the blame for the surrender on Niazi who – despite a military advantage – "failed to use his soldiers properly" (p. 234f.) and "suffered moral and professional paralysis" (p. 270). Overall, Haider writes that the army was passive and waited in vain for the allies (p. 262).

Besides the tactical deficits of the military and some commanders, Haider (2010) also accuses the leadership of lacking a "clear political agenda or national goals" (p. 227). He indicates that roots of the conflict date back to Ayub Khan and a Punjabi establishment:

> "[…] the imbroglio was the making of the politicians, the Punjabi establishment and their nexus with the dictators, Ayub and Yahya and their civilian and political hawks. The military solution, a no-win

[73] Haider refutes the representation of Prem Chopra and his claims that they were able to shoot down Pakistani Mirage airplanes. See Haider (2010, p. 263).

> strategy, was employed when the Bengali populace had been mentally and emotionally de-linked with Pakistan; it was only a matter of physical decapitation which was left" (p. 239f).

Throughout the text, Haider (2010) refers to the "Punjabi cabal"[74] and argues that the blame rests not only on Yahya Khan, but on the Punjabi cabal, who after the war had no interest in revealing the truth:

> "That he [Yahya Khan] lost East Pakistan was true but the events during the decade leading up to 1971 were full of contradictions and the finger points squarely at that decade and the Punjabi cabal. Yahya Khan's military incompetence and political naivety delivered the coup de grace to Pakistan's integrity, solidarity and the dignity of the armed forces. Still, no one really wants to know the whole truth about Yahya, except to make him a punching bag for the break-up of Pakistan" (p. 417).

In his autobiographical narrative *The Flight of the Falcon* Sajad Haider (2010) depicts himself as a fighter pilot prepared to take responsibility for his actions. He indicates that he was repeatedly made a scapegoat but refutes all accusations as groundless. In contrast to his superiors, he portraits himself as being aware of the ground realities (p. 246). In the narrative he rehabilitates the performance of regular officers and pilots, and with them himself. In the narrative he frequently takes up the position as an accuser of the military high command (p. 271).

The position occupied can be best described as that of a military historian. For Haider (2010), rewriting history and counter misrepresentations is a form of performance of his duty. "Writing my autobiography was to be a way of fulfilling my small responsibility towards my country" (p. xxvi.).

The four exemplary autobiographical narratives discussed in this chapter show that the representations of the officers' role during the Tragedy integrate and expand on already existing positions. In the new millennia, officers published prisoner of war narratives, accuser narratives as well as texts that integrate the Tragedy of 1971 in the narration of their overarching professional career. Here, I will summarise the officers' self-representation in the 2000s in regard to their self-ascribed role in the Tragedy and highlight four aspects: first, the increased reference to the consequences of the Tragedy and subsequent developments inside the military;

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[74] Haider (2010) particularly criticises broad generalisations about the performance of the military during the conflict to defame the military. After Haider the slander of the military was used by politicians, he writes: "They wanted to capitalize on the debacle to shift the onus and find a scapegoat in the armed forces without distinction between the brave and the cowardly. The denigration goes on unabated without any one having the courage to clear up the haze and accord dignity and honour to those who deserved it. Exactly like the veil placed over the 1965 War, the 1971 War has been kept under wraps to protect the culprits and the holy cows, both civil and military" (p. 270).

second, the integration of the Tragedy into the life narrative; third, the diversification in interpretations of the Tragedy; and finally, the spectrum of self-representations of the officers inside the texts.

As developed over the course of this chapter, the space and position the Tragedy occupies in the overall narrative depends on the main focus of the text. In prisoner of war narratives and thematic narratives, the Tragedy features more prominently than in texts focusing on the individual career of the officers. In his prisoner of war narrative, ʿAbdulqādir for example, devotes much space to his time of imprisonment and his personal destiny after returning to Pakistan. The narration of the conflict itself, i.e. the reference to the context of the civil war and war with India, is relatively short. Hakeem Qureshi's thematic text about the Tragedy integrates reference to the political and historical context, precise battle narratives and subsequent assessments of key leaders and policy and ideology. For Shamim and Haider, the Tragedy is an integral part of their military careers; the narration of the events is a supplement to the advancement in their careers.

A noticeable feature of all four texts analysed is the reference to the consequences for the protagonists of the Tragedy. In addition to personal repercussions, the officers devote considerable space to the description of subsequent developments inside the military. For all officers, subsequent developments are important to the plot – For ʿAbdulqādir the personal consequences trigger his turning to religion and later his entry into politics, and for Haider the confrontation with senior air force leaders affects his career. With this reference to personal consequences of the conflict, the Tragedy is integrated in the overall life narrative of the officers. Hakeem Qureshi's monograph is an example of an integrated story of the conflict and the role of the protagonist. Similarly Haider connects his role during the conflict to subsequent developments in the military that affected him. In both texts, the narrators reflect on their role during the conflict, and even admit failure.

As demonstrated, in the 2000s the most prominent framework of the Tragedy addressed are military failure and betrayal. Both Qureshi and ʿAbdulqādir equate the defeat of the Pakistan army with a defeat for the Muslim Ummah against an international and domestic conspiracy. Haider, Qureshi, and ʿAbdulqādir refer to attempts from other officers to distort history in order to shed personal responsibility.

The self-representations put forward in the texts examined show considerable variation. Similar to subject positions taken up by officers writing prisoner of war narratives, ʿAbdulqādir depicts himself in conflict with and in contrast to other officers in the army that either adhere to the British tradition or who are not as committed to fighting. To re-establish the honour of

the Pakistan army by trying to escape he accepts to suffer. Arshad Qureshi's text exemplifies a representation of a self-scrutinizing officer who takes responsibilities for his actions, and the second by the emphasis of the authors on continuity between the 1965 and 1971 war and an integration of the Tragedy into an overarching life narrative. Sajad Haider portrays himself as a fighter pilot prepared to take responsibility for his actions who was inappropriately made the victim of a plot. The self-positioning works in contrast to his superiors. Finally, the subject position occupied by Anwar Shamim in the narration is one of a professional officer who assesses military strategy and strength.

### 5.6. Subject positions in regard to 1971

The analysis of officers' self-representation of their role during the Tragedy presented above contrasts to the secondary literature's distinction of only two broad categories of officers' texts about 1971. While there are texts focusing on military history, tactics and acts of diplomacy, and narratives of personal value and bravado, officers' autobiographical narratives show considerably more diversity in regard to how the Tragedy is narrated, how it is interpreted, and which role the officers ascribe themselves during the events of 1971. Similar to Partition, the Tragedy means different things for different officers, and the self-representation during the Tragedy ranges from a step in the military career to a place for accusing senior officers and rehabilitating their own role, or recapitulating and correcting the historiography of the events. Secondary literature observes that the narrative of the Tragedy is "troubled" or argues that because of the absence of an official narrative there is a "narrative vacuum". This observation refers mainly to Pakistani historiography and fiction, and secondary literature highlights that inside the armed forces the Tragedy is studied only in regard to military aspects. However, as the analysis shows, the officers refer to the Tragedy from different perspectives and fill the narrative vacuum with personal narratives. Particularly the genre of prisoner of war narratives and texts accusing senior officers and politicians are an impetus for the production of literature about the Tragedy and the military's role, both integrate aspects that go beyond military strategy. Moreover, as argued in chapter three, the publication of texts about the officers role during historical events such as the Tragedy can be understood as a field in which the construction and representation of the Pakistani military self is negotiated.

In the following I will first summarise the main findings regarding how the officers narrate their role during the Tragedy, how they interpret it, and which subject position the officers occupy. To conclude, I relate these findings to the field of military autobiographical narratives.

In the last four decades, officers narrated the Tragedy in different ways. I have shown that the consequence of the 1971 war gave rise to a distinct subcategory of military autobiographical narratives: the prisoner of war narratives. These narratives focus on the inner struggle and suffering of the protagonist, mostly referring to themes such as pride, honour, shame, and humiliation. Parallel, there are also thematic narratives that centre around military historiography, or career narratives that incorporate the Tragedy into an overarching life narrative. Over the last four decades two noticeable developments regarding the narration can be observed: first a general integration of the Tragedy into a cohesive narrative and second, an increase in reference to military historiography and arguments regarding military aspects of the Tragedy.

The first narratives published after 1971 did not attend to the events of the civil and international war of 1971 directly and referred to the Tragedy as an afterthought to their military career. Furthermore, early texts refrain from incorporating the Tragedy into a wider narrative – in Siddiq Salik's prisoner of war narrative for example, the Tragedy is only used as the starting point of the protagonist's story of imprisonment. In Musa's story about his military career, the reference to the Tragedy is restricted to the consequences of the breakup of Pakistan. During the 1990s and 2000s the texts incorporate the (sometimes failed) reintegration of the protagonist into the army and subsequent developments inside the military, eventually integrating episodes of the Tragedy into an overarching life narrative. In these later narratives, reference to the Tragedy composes the protagonists' career path before, during and after the Tragedy, as well as argumentative passages about historiography, ideology, and assessments of military tactics and performance.

The second development pertains to language and the context in which the Tragedy is negotiated. From the 1990s, officers increasingly elaborate on military developments in East Pakistan, giving detailed battle narratives and assessing fellow officers and superiors. The texts abound in military acronyms, tactics and reference to territory, directed to a military-interested readership. While there is still reference to broader aspects of the Tragedy, for example failed nationalism or the political developments, officers increasingly assess the military strategy and performance during the Tragedy. Texts from the 2000s generally incorporate elaborate passages about the military historiography of the Tragedy, as demonstrated with Qureshi's autobiographical narrative.

Similar to Partition, over the last four decades, each new publication added a new layer to representations of the Tragedy. In the following, I will distil four frequently addressed contexts of the Tragedy, pertaining to military defeat, blame, failed nationalism and historiography.

Despite the outcome of the Tragedy, the officers share the common representation that they were not defeated in a military sense during 1971. Instead, they argue that they were ordered to surrender. In narratives from the 1970s and 1980s, officers write that the Tragedy ended in a political and not a military defeat. In the 1990s, officers stressed that defending East Pakistan would have been practical and successful if the military high command would not have abandoned the military strategy. Over the four decades, the officers represent the Tragedy as an ordered surrender by senior officers who were not aware of the realities on the ground. A part of this representation includes the protagonists' opposition to orders issued by their superiors and their continued struggle, as well as heroic episodes in all branches of the armed forces. Officers that focus on their military achievements during the battle, such as Tajammul Malik for example, depict themselves as fighting soldiers who were eventually betrayed.

The officers' representations differ considerably regarding the causes of the Tragedy and the performance and ambitions of key protagonists – it is the differences in representations of the Tragedy, the debates about the role of officers and politicians, and the historiography that encourage the production of texts. Some officers focus on the events that led to the internal and eventual international conflict, blaming the political ambitions of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, General Yahya Khan or Mujib Rehman. Others restrict their accusations to military leaders, blaming the high command, the British generation or the military's general entrance into domestic politics since the rule of Gen. Ayub Khan. A representation also put forward is the alienation of the Bengalis towards West Pakistan through the Hindu population aided by India that eventually broke the common bound of religion between the two wings of Pakistan. The least common denominator is the depiction of the common soldiers (and with them the officers themselves) as the victims of a domestic and international plot.

Furthermore, the Tragedy is a place to discuss what officers term the failed national integration and the ideology of Pakistan. During the last four decades some officers argue that the disregard for Islam in Pakistan led to the conflict between East and West Pakistan. In the 2000s, the effect of the Tragedy on the Muslim *ummah*, particularly the Muslims in India are highlighted. Officers writing in the last two decades also portray the Tragedy as yet "another" or reoccurring blunder of the military high command. They draw parallels between the poor performance of senior officers in the war of 1965 and during the Tragedy, indicating that a particular shortcoming was the concentration of troops in West Pakistan, which in 1965 left East Pakistan defenceless. The officers argue that the ignorance of the military high command towards East Pakistan's defence and the underrepresentation of Bengalis in the commissioned ranks led to the alienation of the Bengalis.

Over time the representation of the Tragedy is accompanied by elaborate arguments about the military historiography of the conflict. Since the 1990s writings about the Tragedy has been integrated in the texts. Some officers argue that the high command deliberately distorted the representation of the Tragedy, for example by concealing the performance of the army on the western front.

Three aspects about the subject positions the officers occupy in regard to the Tragedy are noticeable. First and parallel to the developments highlighted in regard to the subject position taken by officers during Partition, from the 1990s officers produced more balanced or nuanced accounts that reflect both on their personal experiences and the representation of other officers of the Tragedy. With the expansion of the reference to officers' personal involvement during the Tragedy from the 1990s onwards, they increasingly take up the position of a close observer of the conduct of their fellow officers and the realities on the ground. The proximity and involvement enable the officers to evaluate both the military performance of their fellow officers as well as the existing historiography of the Tragedy. Thus, in the last two decades, the officers portray themselves as self-scrutinising subjects and critical insiders. Contrary to the subject positions occupied during Partition, however, with the increased reference to the historiography and arguments, the self-positioning of the narrator grows at the cost of the positioning of the protagonist. While still presenting themselves as military officers, arguments and accusations dominate the representation of the protagonists as acting military officers. The self-representation is thus increasingly concerned with the officers' interpretation of the Tragedy.

Second, in the 1970s and 1980s, reference to the place of religion in the state of Pakistan and the officers' personal religiosity is found inside the texts. The officer's personal piety is highlighted throughout the texts and sometimes used to contrast themselves to a secular generation of officers. Two positions can be distinguished: officers that do not refer to their role during the Tragedy but use the conflict of 1971 as place to argue about Pakistan's ideology, and officers who actually fought in East Pakistan. General Musa and Maj. Gen. Sher Ali Khan Pataudi take this first position. Although being commissioned and trained under the British, they contrast themselves and their Islamic and patriotic self-understanding with their fellow officers of the British generation. The second position, taken by Maj. Gen. Tajammul Malik and ʿAbdulqādir, stands in contrast to both their secular and religious fellow officers – they present themselves as asserters of the Islamic state of Pakistan and provide their rationale for a coup against the "illegal and un-Islamic military dictatorship" of General Zia ul-Haq.

The third noticeable aspect pertains to the prisoner of war narratives. The emergence of the prisoner of war narratives genre itself and the subject positions occupied by the officers writing it, point to a break with the traditional form of self-representations put forward in military autobiographical narratives. The subject positions the officers occupy in the prisoner of war narratives are those of close observer and accuser. Inherent in this subject position is a contrast to other officers. In the case of Siddiq Salik the contrast is voiced through his admission of guilt and introspect, while the other officers are portrayed as being concerned only with their worldly aspirations. ʿAbdulqādir and Kayānī both hope to be exemplary by resisting the enemy's and sometimes superior's orders. They present themselves as bearing the consequences of their actions (for example when being caught while trying to escape) and contrast themselves against a British or older generation of officers, who avoid discomfort. In prisoner of war narratives officers depict themselves generally as alienated victims of wrong decisions made by the high-ranking British generation of officers. The posting in East Pakistan and the subsequent ordeal of imprisonment entitles them to criticise the subsequent military developments and accuse the high command.

# 6 Categorical and relational identification

> "I love Pakistan, for what I am today is due to Allah's blessing given to me through Pakistan." – Col. Shafaat[1]

> "We are all Muslims first and then Pakistani's – racial identities are anti-Islam and anti-Pakistan. We voluntarily gave these identities (much older than Islam) for the sake of Muslim Nation hood – which produced Pakistan." – Maj. Gen. Pataudi[2]

> "I am a career soldier. I joined the British Indian Army back in 1946, straight form college, as a gentleman cadet. [...] I shall narrate the story of how I took up a military career, and how I became a General, at a later stage in this book. Right now, suffice it to say that I am a straightforward, god-fearing and honest soldier, loyal to my country and to my conscience and that I have always served the government of the day to the best of my ability without any consideration of short-term gains for myself or my dear ones." – Lt. Gen. Chishti[3]

Identification with and the negotiation of professional, religious, national, ethnical and linguistic categories are part of the construction and representation of the Pakistani military 'self'. In the representation of their role during Partition and Tragedy, officers can be assigned to different generations of officers, negotiate the relation between religion and nationality and position themselves in regard to known others: for example to fellow officers, politicians, civilians, Hindus or Bengalis.

In writing their autobiographical narratives, officers ascribe themselves categories through self-reference, most prominently the categories Soldier, Pakistani and Muslim. As the quotes above indicate, the officers differ with regard to the relationships between, as well as the attributes of, these categories. Col. Shafaat Ali styles himself as a patriotic Pakistani, while Maj. Gen. Sher Ali Khan Pataudi strongly advocates identifying with the category Muslim, Lt. Gen. Chishti, although indicating his loyalty to Pakistan, identifies foremost with his profession.

In this chapter I analyse the practices of relational and categorical self-identification as an integral part of the representation and construction of the Pakistani military 'self', by focusing

[1] Shafaat, Col. Syed Ali (2007), *The Soldier – Memoirs of Colonel (Retd) Syed Shafaat Ali*, Royal Book Company, Karachi, p. 309.

[2] Pataudi, Maj. Gen. S. A. (1978), *Al-Qissas: The Story of Soldiering and Politics in Pakistan*, Wajadalis, p. 420.

[3] Chishti, Lt. Gen. Faiz Ali (1989), *Betrayals of Another Kind - Islam, Democracy and the Army in Pakistan*, Asia Publishing House, London, p. 1.

on the three main categories negotiated inside the texts: Soldier, Pakistani and Muslim. These categories are central to the self-understanding of the officers and at the same time form the core of discussions about the ideological outlook of the Pakistani military and the Islamic republic of Pakistan.

Brubaker and Cooper (2000) distinguish two modes of identification: relational and categorical. The relational mode of identification positions officers in a "web of friendships or kinship" (p. 15), while the categorical mode places officers in a group, which shares a common category. Identification and categorization are active practices, performed by an identifier (ibid.), in this case the narrator. They can ascribe the category to others or to themselves.

In the analysis of the relational and categorical self-identification I draw on the description of subject positions of the officers from the last two chapters as well as the reference to categories and attributes throughout the coded text corpus. The categories I analyse are "categories of everyday social experience, developed and deployed by ordinary social actors" (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000, p. 4) in our case by the writing officers through the practice of autobiographical narrative writing. They are what Brubaker and Cooper in reference to Bourdieu call "category of practice" (ibid.) and as such, they have to be separated from the "categories used by social analysts" (ibid.).

Used for social analysis, these categories can be defined as corresponding to profession, nationality and adherence to religion, as categories of practice they are constantly negotiated. In the case of Pakistan, the relation between religion, nationality, and the ideology of the state are unstable and disputed. Thus, the definition of 'Pakistani' is "deeply contested" as Farzana Shaikh (2009) writes:

> "Nowhere has the lack of consensus over the meaning of Pakistan and its ambiguous relation to Islam surfaced more sharply than in doubts over the definition of 'the Pakistani' - a definition that is still deeply contested" (p. 46).

Farzana Shaikh (2009) sees the main conflict in the definition of 'the Pakistani' in the early history of Pakistan, where conflicting notions between 'sons of the soil' and 'migrants from India' coexist (p. 46). In the 1980s the Islamisation of Pakistan and its orientation to the Arabian Peninsula provided "fresh interest in equating 'the Pakistani' with 'the Muslim'" (p. 47), and eventually the "preference for a certain type of Sunni sectarian Islam as a defining feature of the 'universal Pakistani" (p. 47). The Pakistani is connected to the conflicting definitions of the state of Pakistan, which include among others, the notion of a "Muslim homeland" (Shaikh, 2009, pp. 1, 3, 81), a "guarantor of Islam" (p.1), a "Muslim nation" (pp. 3, 81), or a "migrant

state […] for those who leave their native homes to re-settle in a new land they wished to govern as a nation-state" (p.47). Over the history of Pakistan these definitions had their own economy. During the Tragedy for example "ethnic definition of the Pakistani [stood] in opposition to others that favoured an identity more closely tied to Islam" (p. 46).

Oskar Verkaaik's (2004) and Shaikh (2009) also describe a shift of the category 'Pakistani' after the Tragedy under the reign of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. They argue that until 1971 Pakistanis had two claims of identity connected with religion: "to the *umma* or the universal Islamic community" (Shaikh 2009, p. 55) and to "the *millat* or local religious community" (ibid.). As Shaikh puts it "while the *umma* explained Pakistan's eastern border with India, the *millat* did so for the western borders with other Muslim countries" (p. 55). With the shift from a religious nationalism, as derived from the two-nation theory, to Bhutto's ethnic nationalism *qaum* that focus on regional identities, a third dimension to the category Pakistani was added (Shaikh, 2009, p. 55; Verkaaik, 2004, p. 20f).

For the Pakistani military, Fair (2014) has highlighted the embracing of the two-nation theory by the military institution and the instrumentalisation of Islam (pp. 66-102), arguing that the military used "the ideology of Pakistan to unify the polity, to motivate the Pakistani people to support unending praetorianism and belligerence, and to bolster the troop morale" (p. 67). Thereby the military negotiated the relation of religion and nationality and "espoused Islam as its corporate identity" (p. 66). How this negotiation affected the military officers is difficult to assess, especially if the military institution acts as an identifier of such categories.

> "Military elites may well have a complex understanding of the multiple purposes Islam serves, but it is far from clear how ordinary officers, much less the enlisted ranks, interpret these incessant references to Islamism, jihad, and perpetual enmity with India, especially when they coexist with some six decades of explicit mobilization of Islamist militants under the banner of Islam" (Fair, 2014, p. 102).

In the next three subchapters I will address the most commonly found identification practices for each category and argue that the identification and negotiation of categories in autobiographical narratives are fundamentally situational. As such they are part of the overarching narrative and of the positioning of the agents inside the field. Thereby the attribution of the categories varies greatly; in contrast to the categorical identification the relational negotiation is more stable. Finally, several competing understandings of a category can be voiced simultaneously inside the field.

### 6.1 I am Soldier

The self-declaration of the author as a member of the Pakistani officer corps has been the criterion for selecting the autobiographical narratives for this study.[4] In a way, the selection of texts anticipates an author's self-reference or a form of self-identification with the categories Officer and Pakistani. I will argue here that the reference to the category Soldier exceeds mere self-reference and is articulated through different identification practices and encompasses different competing attributes. The relational identification of Soldier – in contrast to politician and different generations inside the military – stabilizes the category.

In the first section I will address the identification practices employed for the category Soldier. The identification practices are direct self-reference, presentation of a soldierly genealogy, disowning of or distancing to other categories. In the second section, I show how the agents attribute and negotiate the category Soldier.

Pakistani military officers usually voice self-reference to the category Soldier at the very beginning of their autobiographical narrative or in the paratext. "I am a career soldier" (p.1) as the quote from Lt. Gen. Faiz Ali Chishti (1989) from the beginning of this chapter reads, are literally the first words of his memoir.[5] Col. Syed Shafaat Ali simply calls his memoir *The Soldier*[6] Other examples of the reference to Soldier in the military autobiographical narratives' paratext are Brig. Qasim's work titled *Life Story of an ex-Soldier,*[7] Maj. Gen. Syed Wajahat Husain's work *Memories of a Solider*[8] and the use of the title *Be-tegẖ Sipāhī – jang 71 aur qaid kī rudād* which translates to *The bare handed Soldier – The War of 71 and Prison Narrative* for Lt. Col ʿAbdulqādir's prisoner of war narrative.[9] In the 1980s there appeared two titles that featured the rank of the authors. Maj. Gen Syed Shahid Hamid published his *Autobiography of a General*[10] and Gen. Mohammad Musa *Jawan to General.* [11] The indication of the military affiliation is also a feature of the texts of members of the air force or navy – Admiral

[4] As I elaborated in the first chapter, most officers indicate their rank with their name. The remaining officers were selected according to Para textual elements framing the author as a Pakistani officer.

[5] Chishti, Lt. Gen. Faiz Ali (1989), *Betrayals of Another Kind - Islam, Democracy and the Army in Pakistan*, Asia Publishing House, London.

[6] Shafaat, Col. Syed Ali (2007), *The Soldier – Memoirs of Colonel (Retd) Syed Shafaat Ali*, Royal Book Company, Karachi.

[7] Qasim, Brig. Syed Shah Abul (2003), *Life-story of an ex-Soldier*, Publicity Panel, Karachi.

[8] Husain, Maj. Gen. Syed Wajahat (2010), *Memories of a Solider – 1947: Before, During, After*, Ferozsons, Lahore.

[9] Abd al-Qādir, Lt. Col. (2011), *Be-tegẖ Sipāhī – jang 71 aur qaid kī rudād [The bare handed Soldier – The War of 71 and Prison Narrative]*, ʿilm o ʿirfān publishirz, lāhaur.

[10] Shahid Hamid, Maj. Gen. Syed. (1988), *Autobiography of a General*, Ferozsons, Lahore.

[11] Musa, Gen. M. (1984), *Jawan to General*, Oxford University Press.

Muhammad Shariff publishes the *Admiral's Diary*,[12] Wing Commander Lanky Ahmad choose *A lucky Pilot* as the title.[13] If the title does not indicate the author's connection to the military, there are frequent references to the profession in the subtitle of texts. For example Maj. Gen Abookaker Osman Mitha's *Unlikely Beginnings* is subtitled with *A Soldier's Life* and Maj. Gen. Hakeem Arshad's *The 1971 Indo-Pak War* carries the subtitle *A Soldier's Narrative.*[14]

Unlike the category Muslim or for that matter Pakistani, the category Soldier is not inherited by descent, but acquired through socialization in the military institutions. Besides self-reference, it is common practice to elaborate on the military aspects of the authors genealogy. Officers refer to the profession of their fathers who had mostly held posts in the British military and civilian administrations.[15] Attiqur Rahman (1989) referring to his family background for example writes:

> "It will be noticed that the Army looms large in my background so I can seldom keep aloof form military matters and associations. I was born on 24 June 1918, during the First World War, and to this day I would much rather read anecdotes of that war than any other matter" (p. 3)

Through this manner of referencing, officers portray the military profession as a family tradition, as Col. Shafaat Ali (2007) remarks ironically, "parading was in my veins and bones" (p. 42). The reference to the category Soldier through a military genealogy may serve different purposes in the over-arching narrative, as for example in the case of Gen. Niazi (1998)[16], who with his narrative tries to rehabilitate his reputation in the late 1990s. Gen. Niazi (1998) tracing his background to the Afghan Tribes invading the subcontinent writes at the beginning of his narrative

> "I was born into a Niazi family. (...) Niazis have been serving as soldiers for centuries. The Army is their profession. Their graves are scattered all over the Indian subcontinent. The Niazis have produces some very famous generals" (p. 2).

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[12] Shariff, Admiral Muhammad (2010), *Admirals Diary: battling through stormy sea life for decades*, Army Press, Islamabad.

[13] Ahmad, Wing Commander Lankey (2001), A Lucky Pilot – Memoirs of retired Wing Commander Lanky Ahamd, Ferozsons, Lahore.

[14] Mitha, Maj. Gen. Aboobaker Osman (2003), *Unlikely Beginnings: A Soldier's Life*, Oxford University Press; Qureshi, Maj. Gen. Hakeem Arshad (2002), *The 1971 Indo-Pak War – A Soldier's Narrative*, Oxford University Press.

[15] Ahamd Aftab, Maj. (2004), *General! I accuse you – From Attock Fort*, Jumhoori Publications, Ahmad writes that his father and grandfather were in the army.

[16] Niazi, Lt. Gen. A. A. K. (1998), *The Betrayal of East Pakistan*, Oxford University Press.

The practice of referring to a military genealogy, and to genealogy in general however, is challenged particularly by officers who were not commissioned into the British Indian Army and joined the military after Partition and from officers who published their autobiographical narrative in the last decade. Admiral Shariff, writing about his background in his *Admiral's Diary* published in 2010, tries to present himself as a self-made man throughout his narrative and criticises the presentation of a genealogy:

> "I make no bones about saying at the outset that I was born and bred in a remote backward village in the province of Punjab in what was then undivided India and is now Pakistan. Some vain people like to conceal their humble origins and ostentatiously parade their grandiose but fictious [sic!] genealogy to boost themselves in the eyes of the gullible public" (p.1).

In connection with his selection as an officer, Brig. Sadiq Salik (1989)[17] writing in the 1990s for example ridicules the importance placed on a military genealogy and presents it as presumably a British tradition of selection. In *Salyūṭ* he writes that before his selection, he was fortunate to find someone in his family with a link to the army, even though – his village was known for two professions: farmers and warriors. Col. Shaafat Ali (2007) ridicules the genealogy of his ancestor Syed Najaf Ali, a commander of the Mughal army who lost a historical battle against the invading Iranian King Nadir Shah (p. 5), when he elaborates on his choice of a military career:

> "After chivalrous and historic role played by my great-great-grand- father Syed Najaf Ali, in 1739 against invader Iranian King Nadir Shah, I was the first one in the family who was destined to adopt soldiering as a profession, others performed well as engineers" (p. 55).

In most narratives the importance of the category Soldier is highlighted by the exclusion of other categories. Maj. Sher Ali Khan Pataudi (1978)[18], who refers to himself "a fortunate soldier" (p. vii.), excludes other categories, such as that of historian or writer, although placing Muslim above other categories. He writes in the introduction: "It must be His will that I sit and write; for I am not an historian or even a writer. I am a soldier. A fortunate soldier, to whom my God, through His benevolence, gave a rich and wide experience in life" (p. vii.). Mirzā Ḥassan K̲h̲ān also writes in the first chapter, [19] "I am not a writer, scientist or reporter [...] I am basically a Soldier [sipāhī] who is in love with Kashmir and the Army" (n.d., p.8). The strategy

[17] Sālik, Brig. Ṣiddīq (1989), *Salyūṭ: 'askarī zindagī ke māh o sāl*, Maktabah-yi Sarmad, Rāvalpiṇḍī
[18] Pataudi, Maj. Gen. S. A. (1978), *Al-Qissas: The Story of Soldiering and Politics in Pakistan*, Wajadalis,
[19] K̲h̲ān, Col. Mirzā Ḥassan (n.d.), *Shamshīr se zanjīr tak*, Maktab Pablisharz, Islāmābād.

of identifying with a category through the presentation of a genealogy is closely connected to the negotiation of the attributes of the category Soldier and will be analysed further below.

The most commonly found practice of identifying with the category Soldier is through the assessment of, and in relation to, fellow officers. The reference to the category Soldier is casually integrated into the text. Maj. Gen. Rahat Latif (1993)[20] for example characterizes his colleagues in mid-sentence: "I, along with my operator and drive Lance Naik (a Private First Class) Bahadur, a very brave, loyal and confident soldier full of esprit-de-corps, set out for the 19th Lancers in my Jeep" (p. 67). This indirect reference describes the qualities of the fellow officers and the autobiographical narratives become a form of tribute paid to comrades in service. At the same time, it is also used to negotiate the attributes of the category as following example of Wajahat Husain's (2010)[21] characterization of a junior officer indicates:

> "Janak was a solid professional soldier; very responsible, conscientious and an experiences junior officer, totally untainted from any parochial or communal prejudices, (as was expected of the whole Squadron)" (p. 67).

Debates over the assessment are integral parts of army life and as such frequently referred to in their narrative. They attribute and define the qualities of a good soldier and officer. As the example of Brig. Z.A. Khan's (1998)[22] dispute over a negative report he received from General Niazi demonstrates. The words used by Niazi to assess Brig. Z.A. Khan (1998) are the opposite of how most officers would portray themselves in their own the narrative:

> "About a week later I received Lieutenant General Niazi's report on me as the 'superior reporting officer'. He said "He was mostly employed by 14 Division for operations against rebels. GOC 14 Division found this officer to be *dragging his feet*, *by-passing his orders, displaying despondency, negative in his attitude and an arm-chair soldier.* I fully agree with the assessment of GOC 14 Division. His battalion has been doing a good job under enthusiastic and dedicated company commanders but he *himself has been slow in his actions. He is argumentative and more of a theoretical soldier. He lacks personality* and I do not think he can inspire confidence in his subordinates [my emphases]" (p. 318f.).

Narrators acknowledging the achievements of their comrades honour them, as in "He was an obedient soldier par excellence - a national hero. I salute him!" (Ali 2007, p. 303). By categorizing a fellow officer as a soldier, the narrator puts him in his own category, making him

[20] Latif, Maj. Gen. Rahat (1993), *...Plus Bhutto's Episode – An Autobiography*, Jang Publishers, Karachi.
[21] Husain, Maj. Gen. Syed Wajahat (2010), *Memories of a Solider – 1947: Before, During, After*, Ferozsons, Lahore.
[22] Khan, Brig. Z. A. (1998), *The Way It Was – Inside the Pakistan Army*, Natraj Publishers, Dehra Dun.

an associate. Likewise, attaching the attribute un-soldierly to an officer emphasises distance between the identified and the identifier. Soldierly attributes found in most texts are professional, simple, trained, plain, gallant, keen, loyal, proud, diehard, practical, dedicated, fighting, brush, conscientious and straight-forward.

With the practice of attributing the category Soldier through assessment, the negotiation evolves around a professional value system. Other than the profession of a soldier, the relation to politics and discussions about generations inside the military are common places to negotiate the category Soldier.

The negotiation of the category Soldier is frequently connected to a discussion on a military value-system and the utterance of military truisms. As Latif (1993) for example emphasises, "The measure of a good soldier is whether he has done his duty and done it well" (p. ii.). The performance of duty values high in the hierarchy, but there are three other attributes commonly connected with the category Soldier, namely obedience, loyalty and bravery. After Niazi (1998) for example, "The duty of a soldier is to obey orders, not to ask questions or offer excuses" (p. 48) and as Rahat Latif (1993) specifies "there is no option for a soldier when it comes to orders" (p. 187). After a decision is taken, for the Soldier "vigorous execution of orders is the name of the game" (Qureshi, 2002, p. 52), as Soldiers are "trained to obey" (Pataudi, 1978, p. 380). In the case of Niazi and Latif, the attribution of obedience mirrors the agents' overarching narrative and self-positioning: in the case of Niazi as a Soldier that was ordered to surrender and in the case of Latif as the officer who was in charge of Bhutto's imprisonment.

As we have seen in chapters four and five, for most of the officers, soldiering is not only a profession. They present the profession as a vocation rather than a career. Particularly in prisoner of war narratives, the fulfilment of duty is connected to a higher calling, most prominently the defence of the Muslim Nation – as for example voiced by Kayānī (1980).[23] However, few officers challenge this notion. Maj. Gen. Aboobaker Mitha (2003)[24] for example writes about benefits of the soldiering as a profession, highlighting that it "gives one entry to the most exclusive social circles. It is a profession in which you are a junior but never a subordinate. Your rights and privileges are clearly laid down and protected by military law" (p. 101). He calls to attention that service in the military derives meaning from the entrusted responsibilities towards his men – but is reluctant to attribute the meaning to the nation or religion:

[23] Kayānī, Afẓal Lt. Col. (1980), *Matā'-i qafas*, Yūsuf Pablisharz, Rāvalpiṇḍī.
[24] Mitha, Maj. Gen. Aboobaker Osman (2003), *Unlikely Beginnings: A Soldier's Life*, Oxford University Press.

> "In the army, one had always felt that one was working for something much bigger than oneself - one's duty. This means that training, looking after, and commanding one's men in peace and war come before one's family and oneself. As a civilian, I found life empty of meaning and any work that I did, dull and uninteresting, as the sole purpose of such work was merely to earn a livelihood" (Mitha, 2003, p. 384).

The debate about whether soldiering is an (mere) occupation or a vocation is also connected to the debate of negative developments in the armed forces, such as the military's entrance into politics and the economy. Officers distinguish between members of the forces who opportunistically chose the profession of soldier for its benefits or who connect it to a higher calling. Brig. Z.A. Khan (1998) for example distinguishes between a job and a fulfilment of trust:

> "When Pakistan was less than two years old we joined the army, some of us because we had decided to be professional soldiers while for the most, after failing to get admission in the few engineering and medical colleges, it was one of the very few job openings at that time. After being commissioned we were prepared to serve the country at the cost of lives, for some a commission as an officer in the army was a job like any other profession, for others it was a trust given by the country to defend it and look after the men placed under command, not to waste their lives but if, where and when necessary to let them die, some did a job and some fulfilled the trust" (p. 384).

The negotiation of the category Soldier in relation to Politician is frequent. On the one hand there are military autobiographical narratives that uphold the "apolitical military ethos" the Pakistani military apparently inherited at Partition.[25] Gen. Mohammad Musa (1984)[26] for example elaborates that "Politics is a game which a soldier by virtue of his temperament, training, character, and aptitude, cannot play as well as a sound politician" (p. 226) and that "Soldiers in uniform must keep away from it" (ibid.). Admiral Sharif (2010) writing almost three decades later laments the military officers entrance into politics, when discussing the Tragedy:

> "While learning the art of politics in this newly acquired role they gradually abandoned their primary function of the art of soldiering. Not content with mere politics, they also started amassing wealth and

[25] As demonstrated in chapter four, secondary literature indicates that before and during World War Two, there were nationalistic officers joining the ranks (Cohen 1998). Thus, even the apolitical ethos towards a separate state for the Muslims or towards independence from India is called into question. As Shah (2014) demonstrates, the Partition itself and several key events and developments after Partition led to the politisation of the armed forces, notably the Rawalpindi conspiracy case and the Kashmir dispute.

[26] Musa, Gen. M. (1984), *Jawan to General*, Oxford University Press.

usurping status for themselves and their following generation by mutual support and corrupt practices one after another" (p. 97).

On the other hand there are officers who argue that Soldiers are part of the Pakistani society and as such have an obligation to act. Several officers who chose a political career after their service uphold this position. In the late 1970s, Maj. Gen. Sher Ali Khan Pataudi (1978) for example writes, "soldiers are part of the society which form the community - the Country" (p. 146). As the quote from Pataudi indicates he sees a clear hierarchy of categories "the soldier is first a citizen - part of Society [sic!] - and then a soldier" (p. 227). And as a citizen of Pakistan they "should not allowing themselves to be used by politicians, without the proper approval of their superiors" (p. 117). Aftab (2004)[27] in his accuser narrative even calls into question any approval by a superior:

> "Soldiers, sailors and airmen, have their obligations towards the security and the solidarity of their country. Their conduct and behaviour has to be in conformity with the constitution of the republic below and beyond which they either shirk or trespass. They cannot afford to be silent spectators while the authority of the state is eroded and usurped by someone claiming to be their superior" (p. 296).

As I demonstrated in chapter four, the outlook of the officer has also been debated through reference to generational changes inside the armed forces, particularly through the representation of Partition events. With the representation of Partition a distinction between a British generation and a new Pakistani generation is introduced, and the former is criticized for their colonial mind-set and performance during the Tragedy. Brig. Ṣiddīq Sālik (1989)[28] represents this generation as Pakistani and Islamic, where display of Islamic orthopraxis plays a prominent part:

> "In the army there came a pleasant change and it was in fact a change of heart and mind ... for example for most of the officer's, being an officer is a profession [pesh], after the working time, they wear shalwar and kurta [...] When I entered the army there was no officer who would wear shalwar kurta even in his own village or when meeting guests in his own house. At that time, only a few were praying and they were doing it hidden so that the sign of modern society was not ridiculed... […] Besides praying and fasting, [officers] manner of living [būd-o bāsh] also changed, now his outlook is Pakistani and Islamic. [...] now he fulfils his duty in his natural manner [aṣlī rūp meṇ] as a true Pakistani [sacce pākistānī] and a real Muslim [pakke musalmān]. I don't say, that today the army is made out of angels. Now there may

[27] Ahamd Aftab, Maj. (2004), *General! I accuse you – From Attock Fort*, Jumhoori Publications, p. 296.
[28] Sālik, Brig. Ṣiddīq (1989), *Salyūṭ: 'askarī zindagī ke māh o sāl*, Maktabah-yi Sarmad, Rāvalpiṇḍī, p. 214.

be black sheep (in what place aren't there any) but now the over all colour of flock of sheep is not black but white" (pp. 213-4).

Several autobiographical narratives from the 2000s however, distance themselves from this new generation and call the preoccupation of the officers with religious activities in question. Maj. Gen. Wajahat Hussain (2010) for example writes about the period of Zia ul-Haq:

> "As expected, the inevitable fall-out of the long Martial Law and Zia's damaging Islamization policies was changing the Army's focus from hard-core professionalism towards religious activities; especially when an average army officer and soldier was already a God-fearing Muslim" (p. 278).

Brig. Qasim (2003)[29] laments the developments inside the army:

> "My generation of officer corps who had their training and part of the service under a strict military code of the British Era have become outdated as a result of various socio-economic and political changes that have taken place during the last 56 years in Pakistan. When none of my sons could join the army to follow my profession, I was disappointed. In the context of the current standards and the changed scenario, I do not feel sorry any more" (p. 163).

As I have demonstrated, most of the identification practices in regard to the category Soldier are situational. The presentation of a soldierly genealogy for example is employed to ascribe the agents into a cherished tradition but at the same time it is utilised to ridicule the convention of a set of officers. Similarly, soldierly attributes function to establish distance or proximity.

### 6.2 I am a Pakistani

The "defenders of Pakistan" (Latif, 1993, p. 13) identify themselves with the state of Pakistan even if the definition of 'Pakistani' itself is being contested. The practices of identification as well as the attribution and negotiation of the category Pakistani are employed through self-reference, presentation of a genealogies, the reference to alienation under the British rule, and the testimony of struggling and suffering for creation of Pakistan. The category Pakistani is further negotiated through expressing a difference to Hindu India and a fixation with the founder of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah who is depicted as a role model.

Identification through direct self-reference to the category Pakistani is frequent in the texts. At the very beginning of his autobiography Ayub Khan (1967), for example, writes: "I have viewed problems as a Pakistani, a Muslim, and an Asian. Pakistan is my passion, my life" (p.

[29] Qasim, Brig. Syed Shah Abul (2003), *Life-story of an ex-Soldier*, Publicity Panel, Karachi.

vi.). None of the writing officers however, were born Pakistani. This partially explains why different narrative strategies are employed to identify with Pakistan, especially by the generation starting their service in the British Indian Army.[30] As a consequence, the category Pakistani is disputed, attached to the category Muslim and accompanied by a leitmotif of struggle and suffering.

As already developed in chapter four, a commonly found form of identification with the category Pakistani in the narrative of officers who served in the British Indian Army is articulated though the story of alienation or estrangement that gets resolved after the state of Pakistan is established. The officers stress in their narrative that they were "leading the life of a mercenary" (Musa, 1984, p. 72) in the British Indian Army. They convey the feeling, that under the British rule they drifted away from their "own culture, way of life, and manner of living" (Hussain, 2003, p. 91) or that they were educated to be a "Kala Sahibs" (p. 90) – native masters to their own people as Brig. Mirza Hussain (2003)[31] puts it. It is only after the creation of Pakistan that the officers can consider themselves as a citizen of a sovereign homeland and regain a sense of belonging and acting for a higher cause. Again as, Musa (1984) writes, it was

> "a turning point in my professional concept Thence- forth, I considered myself to be a member of our national land force as a free citizen of a sovereign homeland. I took pride in my status as such and was never in doubt that whatever I could do as a soldier would be a humble contribution towards the betterment of our own country" (p. 72).

Musa connecting becoming a Pakistani with a reference to a change of 'professional concept' is only understood in regard to his self-positioning as an exemplary professional Solider throughout his autobiographical narrative.

The theme of alienation linked to the category of Pakistani is attached to the reference to the colonial past and the pre-Pakistani status of the officers and evolved over time. The reference has gained momentum in the last decade, as the example of Mirza Hamid Hussain's narrative *The Battle Within* demonstrates Hussain's narrative was completed and brought to publication by his daughter thirty years after writing. On the back cover it is framed as a "young soldier's attempt to deal with the conflicts arising from the expectations of his colonial overlords and his own feelings towards his family, people and country" (2003, dust jacket). While this motive is found, inside the text it is less prominent than presented on the cover. In the narrative, the British are not exclusively portrayed as overlords and certainly not responsible for his inner

[30] As I have demonstrated in chapter four.
[31] Hussain, Brig. Mirza Hamid (2003), *The Battle Within*, The Royal Book Company, Karachi.

conflict. The inner conflict arises mainly in the narrative from two different family expectations, and the autobiography according to the narrator has to be seen as a "study of the inner conflict that always raged within my soul when it came to deciding between what is termed right (principles), and wrong (get-on-at-all-cost)" (p. vii.).

Identification with Pakistan is further connected to a struggle and sacrifice at Partition. The officers frequently write that they and their families have abandoned comforts to become a Pakistani. This is especially true for the Muhajirs who migrated to Pakistan at the time of Partition. Musharraf (2006)[32] for example, stemming from Delhi and migrating to Pakistan with his family, writes about the problems and anxieties his family faced on the train ride from India to Pakistan. He describes the home and belongings his family sacrificed for the newly created state of Pakistan and the danger they faced when his father carried a box of money destined for the foreign office to the newly created state (Musharraf, 2006, pp. 11-18).

Identification through the reference of struggle for Pakistan is sometimes articulated in reference to a genealogy. The generation writing in the last two decades identify with Pakistan by referencing a struggle of the ancestors and the Muslim League. S. Sajad Haider (2010)[33] for example writes that he "inherited a strong sense of patriotism form [his] father who was a staunch devotee of Muhammad Ali Jinnah and a pioneer of the Muslim League in Baluchistan" (p. xv.) and his "notions of Azadi (Freedom) and loathing for the colonialists were nourished in the embryonic stage" (ibid.). Maj. Gen. Hakeem Arshad Qureshi (2003) also refers to his father's participation in the Muslim League (p. 188). Rahat Latif (1993) after presenting an extensive background on his family tree and their involvement in the struggle for Pakistan, concludes:

> "This then is my blood count. A family so rich in education and culture endowed me with qualities of a Pakistani Muslim. They taught me to serve the motherland. A sense of competition to rise to uphold the tradition of my forefathers was generated in me. My own education helped polish these attributes and subsequently, I entered that great institution - The Pakistan Army" (p. 6).

Several officers trace their genealogy to Central Asia and Afghanistan. Ayub Khan (1967) refers to his Hazara origins from Afghanistan (p. 1), as does Gen. Muhammad Musa (1984, p. 1). General Niazi and Anwar Shamim (2010)[34] refer to their forefathers' migration from Central Asia to the Indus valley (Niazi, 1998, p. 1; Shamim, 2010, p. 6). The presentation of a genealogy

[32] Musharraf, Gen. Pervez (2006), *In the Line of Fire – A Memoir*, Simon and Schuster, London.
[33] Haider, S. Sajad (2010), *Flight of the Falcon*, Vanguard Books, Lahore.
[34] Shamim, Air Chief Marshal M. Anwar (2010), *Cutting Edge PAF – Reminiscences*, Vanguard Books, Karachi.

serves different purposes in the narrative. In Hussain's (2003) case, it is the struggle against the British that goes hand in hand with his identification with Islam and the Muslim state. Genealogy as a form of identification with categories in general is challenged, as already demonstrated in regard to the category Soldier. Maj. Gen. Sher Ali Khan Pataudi, himself of princely origin, ridicules the claim to Pakistan through elaborate genealogy:

> "I am not going to describe the family tree in any further detail, there is neither the space nor any reason to do so here. I have always been quite happy to accept that my forefathers came from Adam and Eve, and find no reason to find ways and means of linking my line to the Sun and Moon. Whether they were originally of red blood or blue blood is immaterial. Their trade, that is whether they were highwaymen, blacksmiths, silversmiths or goldsmiths, is not very relevant. I maintain that at some stage our ancestors must also have cut grass and chopped trees - if only for shelter" (1978, p. 4).

Pataudi's rhetorical strategy used is the depiction of someone who breaks with his past as a member of a princely family because he identified with "ideological basis of the emergent Sate of Pakistan" (1978, p. i.), a theme he develops in his overall narrative. Maj. Aftab Ahmed also voices the strategy represent the identification with Pakistan as a conscious decision. In his narrative Aftab (2004) dismisses claims to Pakistan made through other means than a conscious decision, insisting that he became a Pakistani "not by naturalisation, nor migration from neighbouring lands, neither through parentage" (2004, p. 85). He "opted to oppose the gun and the rank rule through physical and moral assertion of my oath of allegiance to the state and her constitution" (p. 13). In Aftab's case, his identification with Pakistan stands above the category Soldier.

The category Pakistani is also appropriated and negotiated in argumentative sections of officers' autobiographies, mostly in the context of denouncing social, political or economic grievances, such as parochialism and sectarianism. Ayub Khan (1967) for example writes:

> "We Pakistanis are a great mixture, of races and of types. Individualistic in our outlook in civil life, we do not easily make a team and yet when disciplined we make first-class soldiers. This offers every budding leader an opportunity to make a team of his own. We are apt to be emotional and do not always take a realistic view of things. No demagogue can resist the temptation of working on our emotions and misleading us. We criticize everybody except ourselves and as there is a dearth of people with knowledge and experience there is a scramble for offices" (p. 194).

Being Pakistani is presented as remedy for most of the grievances attributed to the identification with other categories. In Ayub Khan's case this proposition serves his overarching narrative, in which he positions himself as a unifying statesman and in opposition

to demands from religious and ethnic parties. Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan Khan (1993)[35] also contrasts the category Pakistani with negative tendencies:

> "I have always considered myself a Pakistani first and last. And I am proud of being one. Never having harboured parochial tendencies, being totally alien to sectarianism and harbouring sycophancy in any form, I can look anyone in the eye on that count and many others for that matter" (p. 103).

Gul Hassan Khan also presents Muhammad Ali Jinnah as a role model, who "had the interest of Pakistan at heart, whereas most of those who followed him, put self-interest first and last" (p. 81). As has been elaborated in the chapter on the officers' representation in relation to the Tragedy, identification as a Pakistani Muslim is related to Hindu India. Maj. Gen. Qureshi (2002),[36] in the context of trying to re-educate the Pakistani POW by the Indians, states:

> "The other important aspect that the Indians had failed to comprehend was the deep impact of the Two Nation theory on the Pakistan Army's psyche. […] We had a well-defined identity as Pakistani POWs. Our collective behaviour was motivated by a sense of belonging to a whole, our home across the border, and professional pride and group cohesion added spine to our determination" (p 214).

As the analysis demonstrates, the identification with and the negotiation of the category Pakistani are articulated through different strategies. In most cases it is closely connected to or brought into relation with the category Muslim.

### 6.3 I am a Muslim

Self-reference to the category Muslim and the negotiation of religion in the ideology of Pakistan are very present in the autobiographical narratives, as I have demonstrated in the chapters on the Tragedy and Partition. Identification with and negotiation of the category Muslim is practiced through different strategies that are similar to the strategies highlighted in regard to the category Pakistani: They are connected to genealogy and discussions of the generational change in the army.

As demonstrated in the last chapters, some officers identify with the category Muslim through the use of figures of speech, like the use of eulogy or Arabic terms or reference to God

[35] Khan, Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan (1993), *Memoirs of Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan Khan*, Oxford University Press, Karachi.
[36] Qureshi, Maj. Gen. Hakeem Arshad (2002), *The 1971 Indo-Pak War – A Soldier's Narrative*, Oxford University Press.

in capital letters.[37] Shahid Hamid (1998) for example uses sections of Imam Ali's *Nahj al-balāġa* to structure all the chapters of his autobiography – besides making frequent references to God and the prophet.

The presentation of an Islamic genealogy is a frequent strategy used by the British generation of officers. Maj. Gen. Shahid Hamid (1988) writing in the late 1980s traces his genealogy to the Prophet:

> "Our family traces its descent from Hazrat Muhammad (peace be upon him), Prophet of Islam. Our ancestors left Arabia and moved to Turkistan, finally settling in Samarkand. Hazrat Syed Amir Kulal in our family received great fame as a saint and preacher. An account of his life appears in most books connected with the learned men of Islam" (p. 1).

In his first chapter *Our Family* (Shahid Hamid, 1988, pp. 1-18) he presents an extensive description of his ancestors who "were mainly men of letters and preachers" (p. 2), "spread Islam" (ibid.) and "earned their living by honest hard work" (ibid.) without being a "burden to the community" (ibid.). From Amīr Kulāl whose "full account appears in the Encyclopaedia of Islam" (p. 2) to his grandfather Jafar Husain, Hamid's chapter reads as a "who is who" of Urdu literature and the Aligarh movement. In the context of Shahid Hamid's autobiographical narrative, the presentation of a genealogy underlines his self-description of a colonial subject who struggled during the "great transition" (p. xvi.) in the British Indian Army. Maj. Gen. Shahid Hamid identifies himself with the "natives" (ibid.) although he was trained to "promote their masters' interests and look at events from their point of view" (ibid.). He identifies with a Muslim tradition that stands in contrast to the British, writing that he "did not for a moment neglect or overlook the fundamental dictates of their religion or ignored the traditional values which made them great" (ibid.).

As I have already elaborated in regard to officers identifying with the category Pakistani, officers trace their line back to the Afghan plateau, the Moghuls or to the Muslim princely states (Musa 1984; Pataudi 1978; Ayub Khan, 1967). Gen. Musharraf (2006) for example writes that as a child he was told that his "father's family came from Saudi Arabia" (p. 13). Several authors trace their origin to the "tribes in Turkestan" who immigrated as Muslim conquerors into the Indian subcontinent. Family origins in territory or lineages to rulers of states lost at Partition are frequently made, most notably Kashmir (Khān, n.d.)[38]

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[37] See for example Malik, Maj. Gen. Tajammul Hussain (1991), *The Story of My Struggle*, Jang Publishers, Lahore. Sirohey, Admiral Ifthikhar Ahmed (1995), *Truth never retires*, Jang Publishers.

[38] Khān, Col. Mirzā Ḥassan, *Shamshīr se zanjīr tak*, Maktab Pablisharz, Islāmābād.

Sajad Haider (2010) who refers to his father as a Pioneer in the Muslim League, writes that his village in Gujarat was "found by our family elder Sayed Moin-ud-Din Shah, a direct descendant of the Holy Prophet (PBUH)" (p. 2). Wajahat Hussain (2010) indicated that his "forefathers claim ancestry from the great Naghshbandi Sufi saint of Bokhara" (p. 15). As with the categories Soldier and Pakistani, this form of identification is also challenged.

Identification with and negotiation of the category Muslim is also connected to the discussion of orthopraxis inside the armed forces, as the reference of Brig. Ṣiddīq Sālik about the Pakistani Muslim identity of the new generation of officers highlights (1989, p. 214). Although not formally recognized as a criterion for promotion, knowledge of Islam and identification as a devoted and practising Muslim seemed to have more importance during these years, as this passage by Brig. Qasim (2003)[39] demonstrates:

> "My early education, specially in the field of religion and character building, has been of tremendous value to me in facing the subsequent challenges of life. I could only appreciate its value fully some forty years later when, to my horror, I discovered that a large number of senior officers (Cols and Brigs) did not even have an elementary knowledge of religion and its practices. There were quite a few who had not read the Quran and some who did not even know how to offer "Namaz"!" (p. 24).

Most of the officers writing in the last decade condemn the show of Islamic orthopraxis in the military and in Pakistan in general. Maj. Gen. Mitha (2003) who elaborates on his quest for his inner self in which religion plays an important part, denounces an intolerant categorization of others as non-believers by Muslims:

> "The so-called Muslims, and I mean so-called, have become more and more intolerant and bigoted, to the extent that anybody belonging to another sect is called a *kafir*. If we were real Muslims and really practised what Islam teaches, there would be real secularism in Pakistan. Everybody's beliefs would be tolerated because the Quran states, 'there is no compulsion in religion'" (p. 112).

The founder of Pakistan Muhammad Ali Jinnah is referred to as the ideal Muslim, "who had studied the Quran in depth" (1993, p. 78) and who "was, therefore, not a bigot or a rabid fanatic. He did not demonstrate to the gallery that he was a Muslim; no one has to. Religion is a sacred contract between man and God," (ibid.) writes Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan Khan. In the last decade Islamic extremism is negotiated as a threat to tolerant Islam, most notably with Musharraf (2006) and his avocation of "enlightened moderation" (p. 295f.). Again, Musharraf's reference is situational and serves his overarching portrait as a reliable partner in world politics.

[39] Qasim, Brig. Syed Shah Abul (2003), *Life-story of an ex-Soldier*, Publicity Panel, Karachi.

He identifies with the category Muslim to represent the Muslim world vis-à-vis the West and attributes the Muslim as subjects of "injustice, alienation, deprivation, powerlessness, and hopelessness" (p. 295). His self-reference of Muslim separates a spiritual from an intellectual understanding of Islam:

> "I have no pretensions to being an Islamic scholar, but I am a Muslim and I understand in my soul the essence and spirit of Islam even if I am not, intellectually, entirely familiar with its minutiae. (But then, who is?) In any case, enlightened moderation has nothing to do with Islam and its teachings. It has more to do with Muslims and their emancipation" (p. 297).

In the last decade, the relational identification and attribution of the category Muslim has been voiced increasingly through opposition to religious and sectarian extremism. Commenting on the siege of the Lal Masjid in 2007, Haider (2010) furnishes the conflict with a historical dimension, and his main theme in the overall narrative, the distorted representation of history:

> "The recent Lal Masjid episode perpetrated by the Mullahs was a terrifying reminder of history repeating itself if its lessons are glossed over callously. The Pakistani nation on the whole has little propensity for history, otherwise people would not be showing sympathy towards the renegade zealots of Lal Masjid who terrorized the capital and elsewhere. In stony silence, we accept twisted versions of our contemporary history; witness the loathsome Hadood Laws imposed by a dictator and their adverse effect on our minorities. We survive on perceptions rather than harsh realities. As the author of the *Murder of History*, the venerable KK Aziz has pointed out generations have been fed with selective history, hence their inability to discern the distortions" (p. 411).

A categorical identification with Muslim in opposition to religious extremism has become a common theme in the last decade. This identification is frequently articulated by confronting Gen. Zia ul-Haq. Admiral Muhammad Shariff (2010) for example reprints a letter to Zia in his autobiographical narrative in which he condemns sectarianism inside the service:

> "Let this be known to you, Sir, that your own credibility is at its lowest ebb, when you have hobnobbed with crooked businessmen and unscrupulous maulvis, allowed defaulters and proclaimed offenders to flee from the country conveniently and allowing sectarianism to flourish in the higher and sensitive job like the DG IS1 and a host of others, in spite of their known loyalties and the Government orders" (p. 308).

Similar Maj. Gen. Wajahat Hussain (2010) stages a confrontation with Zia ul-Haq, in which he openly criticises an "extreme wahabi" interpretation:

> "Don't forget that in the bad bargain of getting Saudi favours, we allowed a flood of Saudi funds to our mullahs, madarsas [sic!] and religious organizations, to propagate their fissiparous extreme wahabi

> views of intolerant extremism, cutting at the very roots of our tolerant, progressive religion along with escalating the Shia/Sunni tension, thereby affecting our relations with Iran" (p. 278).

Finally, the States definition of the category Muslim is debated inside the military. Some officers write that they had to fend off accusations of being Ahmadi (Shamim, 2010, p. 313; Sirohey, 1995, p. 313). Anwar Shamim counters the accusation with the presentation of a Hazara genealogy (ibid.).

### 6.4 Conclusion

As I have shown in the analysis, identification with and negotiation of categories are fundamentally situational, that is, they have to be understood in regard to the overarching narrative in which they are negotiated and to the position the agent occupies inside the field. Second, the attribution of the categories varies greatly; in contrast to the categorical identification the relational practice of identification is relatively stable. Third, several competing definitions of a category can be voiced simultaneously inside the field. Here, I summarise the main developments of the categorical and relational identification with the three main categories and sketch out the differentiations they produced.

Of the three categories analysed in this chapter, the category Soldier and its attributes show the least variation. However, different positions are voiced, notably a position that identifies with Soldier over a (sometimes Islamic) genealogy and a position that identifies with Soldier over a sense of duty. Agents occupying the position of prisoner of war or accuser propagate the first notion, while the latter is voiced exclusively in narratives of the professional military historian. Negotiation evolves around the question why men fight. The category Soldier has been equated by some as defenders of the Muslim *ummah* and fighters for an Islamic cause – in this case Islam is presented as the main motivation force. Military professionals propagate that category Soldier correlates only with profession, and training, professionalism, and a sense of duty are the primary attributes.

The category Soldier is negotiation by referencing a threat to military values. In the 1990s this threat was seen as being caused by the Soldier's distance to the rest of the society. Particularly a British generation of officers was accused of a colonial mind-set, which introduced a distance between Soldier and Pakistani. From the late 1990s, military values are seen in jeopardy because soldiers and officers are more concerned with material wealth and privileges, and less with professionalism. Here the juxtaposition of Soldier to entrepreneur and politician is frequently voiced. The Soldiers who voice the latter concern position themselves

as critical insiders of the military institution that expose the negative tendencies to the Pakistani public as professional Soldiers. This identification is articulated in prisoner of war narratives that refer to the authors' reintegration into the military and frequently expose what they see as the negative developments.

The category Soldier is generally defined in contrast to politicians. The category of Politician however is underdeveloped. It refers both to officers involved in the civilian and military administration of the state as well as to political leaders. The involvement of the officer in the political administration is particularly criticised and denounced as a transgression. Agents representing themselves as political administrators are forced to justify themselves.

As I have demonstrated in chapters four and five, the category Soldier is frequently negotiated in relation to the military performance of other officers during the Tragedy. The question of performance and the question of blame shape the attribution of and identification with the category Soldier. The category Soldier during the Tragedy is attributed with the presence on the battlefield, physical and psychological suffering, and stands in opposition to commanders.

In contrast to the category Soldier, Muslim and Pakistani are less stable and show the most considerable variation in attributes. This could be attributed to the fact that, in their negotiation of the category Soldier, agents claim exclusivity, whereas in the negotiation of the categories Pakistani and Muslim other agents are involved. In other words, identification with, and the attribution of the categories Muslim and Pakistani by agents of the field of military autobiographical narrative production mirrors debates over these categories outside the field.

As demonstrated in chapter four, agents voice their relational identification with the category Muslim and Pakistani at Partition in opposition to Hindu India and senior British officers. Here the categories mirror the differentiation introduced by the two-nation theory between Muslim and Hindu. Over the decades both identification with a local religious community (*millat*) as well as identification with a universal religious community (*ummah*) have been voiced and coexist in the autobiographical narratives.

Both practices of identification with the category Muslim (with the *ummah* and with the *millat*) are also expressed in the subject position agents occupy in relation to the Tragedy. Here the category Muslim stands both in opposition to Hindu India and non-religious Bengali. The latter category is presented as being both secular (influenced by secular Hindus through education and propaganda) as well as a product of ethnic nationalism. The category Bengali presented as standing both in opposition to the identification with national Pakistani (in opposition to ethnic nationalism) as well as religious identification as a Muslim.

Pakistani and Muslim also carry a ‘cultural’ notion that is opposed to the British officers and British educated officers. This cultural notion encompasses the use of language, preferences in food, religious orthopraxis and cultural adaption or imitation of the British ‘culture’. The identification with a ‘cultural’ notion of Pakistani is most prominently voiced in humorous narratives and in prisoner of war narratives.

Finally, the relational identification with the category Muslim has seen a transformation since the late 1990s. Agents identify themselves with the category Muslim which rejects sectarian or extremist interpretations of Islam. Mainly agents occupying subject positions that stand in contrast to officers perceived as supporting Zia ul-Haq voice this form of identification.

# 7 Conclusion

With this study I have tried to contribute to the understanding of the Pakistani military officers' social and symbolic role by analysing the quieter battlefield Pakistani military officers position themselves in: the war of words and meanings in military autobiographical narratives that has been evolving since the 1960s. In contrast to studies that focus on the military as an institution, this study sees officers as cultural producers who engage in different fields. The study has thus focused on a subfield of the field of cultural production: the field of military autobiographical narratives.

The analysis of the field of military autobiographical narrative production has shown that the practice of writing autobiographical narratives is connected to historical truth claim. Officers understand their autobiographical texts as a contribution to the historiography of Pakistan, and as the presence of their texts in the history sections of bookshops in Pakistan show, their claim has been rather successful. The writing of autobiographical narratives as a practice has been evolving since the 1960s and is fuelled by social and military developments. Particularly the Tragedy of 1971 has led the officers to represent themselves and the role of their superiors during the conflict in front of a Pakistani public. Over the years the self-representation through writing an autobiographical narrative has become an exercise in position taking in an ever-expanding net of other representations, particularly from the 1990s onwards. Today, several positions inside the field of military autobiographical narrative production coexist that can be roughly characterised as writers of professional military history, accuser-type of narratives, entertaining accounts and prisoner of war narratives.

The analysis of the texts has shown that the officers negotiate their 'self' in regard to the Partition of the subcontinent in 1947 and to the Tragedy of 1971. Furthermore, the negotiation of the 'self' voiced most prominently through the categories Soldier, Pakistani and Muslim.

The historical representations put forward by the officers are diverse and the different representations of the officers' own position render an integrated cohesive collective narrative of both Partition and the Tragedy impossible. The representation the officers present can be located between producers of 'objective' narratives that centre on the state (narratives of 'high politics') and the producers of multiple narratives as 'history from below'. While the representation in regard to Partition produced heroes and sufferers, the Tragedy produced losers and accusers. The position the officers occupied in regard to Partition is thus negotiated mainly over the protagonists and the events affecting them, the positions occupied in reference to the Tragedy are negotiated in regard to the narrator and his interpretations and arguments.

Since the 1990s the officially commissioned history of the military as well as the purely military professional representation of the Partition have been challenged by the officers. Officers produce more balanced or nuanced accounts that reflect both their personal experience and the representations of other officers. In regard to Partition the writing officers position themselves increasingly as critical insiders of the military institution.

Observations made about the officers' subject positioning in regard to Partition are also valid for the officers' representation as far as the Tragedy is concerned. From the 1990s officers have tended to produce more balanced or nuanced accounts that reflect their personal experiences and the narratives of other officers. The representation of the Tragedy is used as a place to accuse senior officers, rehabilitate one's own role and criticise developments inside the armed forces, for example the polarisation of the armed forces, their venture into the national economy at the expense of professionalism. In regard to the Tragedy, a new subject position in the form of the prisoner of war narratives emerged in the late 1970s. This subject position produced its own genre of text that broke with the traditional form of self-representations. The subject positions the officers occupy in the prisoner of war narratives are those of close observer and accuser. Inherent in this subject position is the contrast to other officers.

The study also finds that representations put forward in autobiographical narratives do not mirror official narratives of the military – they are thus not reducible to a form of historical revisionism. The representation reflects inner military developments and social developments inside Pakistan. The historiography of Pakistan is generally seen as misrepresented and distorted and officers accuse other officers of writing to shed responsibility and as a form of self-promotion. As secondary literature notes, both the historiography of Partition and the Tragedy are "troubled". With their writings, officers position themselves and fill and this narrative vacuum. This is particularly true of the historiography of 1971, which is reduced to a military historiography.

The representation of the Pakistani military 'self' is connected to the identification with and negotiation of professional, religious, national, ethnical and linguistic categories. Officers' representation during Partition and the Tragedy differentiates most prominently between generations of officers. Officers also position themselves in regard to others known: for example to fellow officers, politicians, civilians, Hindus or Bengalis. As I have shown, the identification with and negotiation of the categories Soldier, Muslim and Pakistani in autobiographical narratives are fundamentally situational. The identification with and negotiation of a category has to be understood in relation to the overarching narrative in which it is presented and to the positioning of the agent inside the field. Several competing

understandings of a category can be voiced simultaneously inside the field. While the identification with the category Soldier, is relatively stable, the categories Muslim and Pakistani show considerable variation in attributes. Identification with and attribution of the categories Muslim and Pakistani mirrors debates over these categories outside the field of military autobiographical narrative production.

In writing their autobiographical narratives the Pakistani military officers thus present themselves as Soldiers, Muslims and Pakistanis who contribute to the historiography of Pakistan. As successful agents in the field of cultural production they have the power "to put forward a critical definition of the social world, to mobilize the potential strength of the dominant classes and subvert the order prevailing in the field of power" (Bourdieu, 1993, p. 44). In Pakistan, writing military officers thus play a dual role as members of the dominant class as well as cultural producers that stand outside this class.

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**Appendix I**


Distribution of Publications by Rank and Year
RANK
General (NATO OF-9)
Lt. General (NATO OF-8)
Maj. General (NATO OF-7)
Brigadier (NATO OF-6)
Colonel (NATO OF-5)
Lt. Colonel (NATO OF-4)
Major (NATO OF-3)
Captain (NATO OF-2)
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
YEAR